Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV23115, Date: 2023-08-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV23115 Hearing Date: August 22, 2023 Dept: 61
Defendant
General Motors, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Adjudication is GRANTED
as to the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty, and DENIED as
to all other claims.
I.
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
A party may move for summary judgment “if it
is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the
action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences
or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving
party will be entitled to summary judgment.
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made
by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall
proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
The moving party bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing
party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850;
accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Once the defendant
has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable
issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a
defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)
The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead,
shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material
fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.)
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the
motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Defendant General Motors LLC (Defendant) moves for summary
judgment and adjudication as to all of Plaintiffs Martin Mora Mendez and Irma
C. Mendez’s causes of action, on essentially two bases. Defendant argues that
the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty fails because the
Song Beverly Act’s provisions applicable to implied warranties apply only to
distributors or sellers of used goods, not to manufacturers of new goods, as
Defendant is here. (Motion at pp. 7–9.) Defendant also argues that the
remaining express causes of action brought under the Song Beverly Act fail
because the Act’s protections apply to “new motor vehicle[s],” while Plaintiffs
purchased the subject vehicle used. (Motion at pp. 6–8.) Defendant thus argues
that Plaintiffs lack any predicate state-law violation to serve as the basis
for their remaining claim under the Magnusson Moss Act. (Motion at p. 5–7.)
For Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims, Defendant relies on
the case, Rodriguez v. FCA US (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209,
where the court assessed the definition of “new motor vehicle” announced in
Civil Code § 1793.22, which states:
“New
motor vehicle” means a new motor vehicle that is bought or used primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes. “New motor vehicle” also means a new
motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight under 10,000 pounds that is bought or
used primarily for business purposes by a person, including a partnership,
limited liability company, corporation, association, or any other legal entity,
to which not more than five motor vehicles are registered in this state. “New
motor vehicle” includes the chassis, chassis cab, and that portion of a motor
home devoted to its propulsion, but does not include any portion designed,
used, or maintained primarily for human habitation, a dealer-owned vehicle
and a “demonstrator” or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car
warranty but does not include a motorcycle or a motor vehicle which is not
registered under the Vehicle Code because it is to be operated or used
exclusively off the highways. A demonstrator is a vehicle assigned by a dealer
for the purpose of demonstrating qualities and characteristics common to
vehicles of the same or similar model and type.
(Civ. Code, § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2), italics added.) The
clause of this definition that was at issue in Rodriguez, and which is
at issue here, concerns the “new motor vehicle” that is “a dealer-owned vehicle
and a ‘demonstrator or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car
warranty. The Rodriguez plaintiff argued that “other motor vehicle sold
with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” included used vehicles with a balance
remaining on the manufacturer’s warranties. (Rodriguez, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) The appellate court disagreed, reasoning
that the very definition at issue was for “new motor vehicles,” not used
vehicles. (Id. at p. 220.) Additionally, the operative clause was added
specifically with the addition of language addressing dealer-owned or
“demonstrator” vehicles, i.e. vehicles used by dealer’s for showcase purposes,
thus indicating that the definition was not intended to sweep in all used
vehicles. (Id. at pp. 220–221.)
Rodriguez was not the first case to interpret this
statutory language, however. The court in Jensen v. BMW of North America,
Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.app.4th 112 126, analyzed the same provision
and determined that the statute “includes cars sold with a balance remaining on
the new motor vehicle warranty.” The court reasoned that this interpretation
was “consistent with the [Song Beverly] Act’s purpose as a remedial measure,”
and with regulations promulgated by the Department of Consumer Affairs. (Id.
at p. 126.)
The Rodriguez court
attempted to distinguish the Jensen decision, reasoning that the earlier
case involved a used vehicle sold with a full 36,000 mile warranty. (Rodriguez,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.) But the existence of the
36,000 mile warranty was not material to the Jensen court’s analysis,
and was presented only as a representation of the salesperson’s offer on the
vehicle, not as the operative warranty. (Jensen, supra, 35
Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The Rodriguez decision is more
persuasively read as a disagreement with the Jensen holding than a
distinguishing exercise, and the California Supreme Court has taken up Rodriguez
on review, leaving this court the discretion to determine which holding
applies in this case. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US (Cal. 2022) 295
Cal.Rptr.3d 351, citing Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 456.)
Jensen is the more
persuasive case. The Act’s definition of a new motor vehicle includes a vehicle
“other motor vehicle[s] sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.” (Civ.
Code § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).) The language can be read to include either a
full warranty or a warranty with a remaining balance. Jensen’s holding,
applying the protections of the Song Beverly Act to used car consumers, is
consistent with the Act’s remedial purpose. Moreover, Jensen operated as
the rule for more than 20 years before the holding in Rodriguez, and the
same statutory definition has been amended in the intervening time, without any
changes made to the clause at issue. (See 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 352
(A.B. 1848).) “[I]t is a well-established principle of statutory construction
that when the Legislature amends a statute without altering portions of the
provision that have previously been judicially construed, the Legislature is
presumed to have been aware of and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial
construction.” (Fontana Unified School Dist. v. Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d
208, 219.)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs may proceed on their express
warranty claims against Defendant because they purchased their vehicle with a
balance remaining on applicable warranties. The motion is therefore DENIED as
to the first and third causes of action.
Relief is appropriate, however, as to the second cause of
action for breach of implied warranty. This is because, as held in the case Nunez
v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, “only distributors or
sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied
warranty obligations in the sale of used goods.” (Nunez v. FCA US LLC
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 399.) Defendant here was not the seller or
distributor of the used vehicle at issue here. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement
of Material Facts No. 2.)
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant issued new special warranty
coverage for the vehicle after the sale, and that new discovery may shed
further light upon the applicability of this new warranty coverage to
Plaintiff’s Song Beverly claims, meaning a discovery continuance should issue
for the present motion. (Opposition at pp. 9–12.) But this discovery would
relate to Plaintiffs’ claims under an express warranty, which remain viable
under the Jensen decision, and Plaintiffs do not articulate a relation
between the evidence sought and their second cause of action for breach of the
implied warranty. (Opposition at pp. 10–11.) Although Plaintiffs argue that the
arguments raised in the present motion were not raised in Defendant’s answer
(Opposiiton at p. 13), Defendant’s arguments related to the applicability of
the Song Beverly Act to new or used goods are directed the elements of
Plaintiffs’ claims. “It is the plaintiff's burden of pleading and proving that
the [Song Beverly] Act applies to his or her claims.” (Dagher v. Ford Motor
Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 917.)
Plaintiffs also seek $5,325.00 in sanctions against
Defendant for the present “frivolous” motion. (Opposition at pp. 12–13.) But
the motion is not frivolous, as it relies upon available legal authority, and
in any event has shown the nonviability of Plaintiff’s claim based on an
implied warranty.
The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the second cause of
action, and is otherwise DENIED.