Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 21STCV45891, Date: 2023-03-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV45891    Hearing Date: March 9, 2023    Dept: 61

Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University and Martha Contreras’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant to give notice.

I.                   MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings as to an entire complaint or as to a particular cause of action in a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438 subd. (c)(2)(A).) If a defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings and argues that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant, then the court should grant a defendant’s motion only if the court finds as a matter of law that the complaint fails to alleges facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action. (See id., § 438 subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii); see also Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677.)

“The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.) When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court not only should assume that all facts alleged in the SAC are true but also should give those alleged facts a liberal construction. (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515–516, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720.) In particular, the court should liberally construe the alleged facts “‘with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.’ [Citation.]” (See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601.)

Defendants The Board of Trustees of the California State University and Martha Contreras (Defendants) move for judgment on the pleadings against each of Plaintiff Joshua Mauldin’s eight causes of action for disability and race discrimination and associated claims, based on the matters deemed admitted against Plaintiff in this court’s order of November 7, 2022.

“A matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission, unless the court has permitted amendment or withdrawal of the admission.” (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272.) Judicial notice may be taken of the admissions and this court’s order that they are deemed admitted against Plaintiff. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (c) [official judicial acts]; see also Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604–605 [holding that court may take “judicial notice of records such as admissions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and the like, when considering a demurrer, only where they contain statements of the plaintiff or his agent which are inconsistent with the allegations of the pleading before the court”].) Thus the court here takes judicial notice of the matters deemed admitted against Plaintiff in the November 7, 2022 order.

To establish a discrimination claim under FEHA, an employee must prove the following elements: “(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 378.)

“The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are (1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA, (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability.” (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 969, internal quotation marks omitted.)

“Under FEHA, an employer must engage in a good faith interactive process with the disabled employee to explore the alternatives to accommodate the disability.” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 379.) “To prevail on a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, the employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the time the interactive process occurred. (Ibid.)

“‘[California's] Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) . . . explicitly prohibits an employer from harassing an employee on the basis of race, sex or [ethnicity.]’ . . .  To prove a claim under Title VII, the harassment must be ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive “to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.”’ [Citation.]” (Dee v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 30, 35.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has been deemed to admit that no adverse action was taken against him during his employment with Defendant. (RJN Exh. 3, No. 19.) Plaintiff has been also deemed to admit that no employee of Defendant’s made any derogatory remarks about Plaintiff’s race, sex, disability. (RJN Exh. 3, No. 10, 12, 13, 15.) Plaintiff is also deemed to admit that he requested no accommodation until December 3, 2021, at which point he was entirely unable to perform any job, even with an accommodation. (RJN Exh. 3, No. 2, 3, 8.) Thus Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claims for discrimination and retaliation, as no adverse actions were taken against him. Nor can he prevail on his claims for harassment, as no disparaging remarks — as are alleged in his Complaint (Complaint ¶¶ 18, 22) — were made against him. Nor can Plaintiff prevail on his claims for failure to accommodate, or for failure to engage in the interactive process, as no accommodations were available. (Motion at pp. 14–19.) And because Plaintiff cannot prove an underlying FEHA violation, his eighth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and harassment fails. Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the present motion.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.