Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV02610, Date: 2022-07-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV02610    Hearing Date: July 29, 2022    Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Regent LP and Megal International, LLC’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents from Defendant S5 Equity LLC is GRANTED as to Request No. 4, with the date range limited to 2019 onward, rather than 2017, and DENIED as to Requests No. 3 and 5.

Plaintiffs Regent LP and Megal International, LLC’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents from Defendant Stephanie Messiter Steinhafel is GRANTED as to Requests No. 1, 3, 7–9, 12 and 14, limited in time to those created from 2020 onward, and DENIED as to Requests No. 2, 4–6, 10, and 11.

I.                MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER – PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand.  (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Plaintiffs moves to compel further responses to requests for production served upon Defendants S5 Equity, LLC, and Stephanie Messiter Steinhefel. The requests addressed to Messiter ask for communications related to business activity or transactions from 2021 onward, and for communications related to Plaintiffs from 2017 onward, to which Defendant responded with objections. Plaintiffs claim that Messiter’s business activity and communications related thereto are relevant to evaluate whether Messiter was an independent contractor or employee — misclassification is a cause of action in the Cross-Complaint — or whether she engaged in work that conflicted with her obligations to Plaintiffs. (Separate Statement at p. 19.)

These requests are overbroad in relation to Plaintiffs’ stated purpose. Although Messiter’s communications related to Plaintiffs are relevant concerning her and her spouse’s alleged conversion of Plaintiffs’ resources, the request seeks communications dating back to 2017, when the alleged conversion only begins in 2019, as pleaded in the FAC. (FAC ¶ 48.) Request No. 4 is therefore properly limited to that date.

Requests No. 3 and 5, meanwhile, which seek all documents and communications related to Messiter’s business activities from 2021 onward, are overbroad beyond repair. While the existence of outside employment may be relevant to the misclassification inquiry (See Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 957 [third factor in test is whether worker “is customarily engaged in an independently established trade”]), such an inquiry is properly conducted through requests framed with “reasonable particularity,” and need not require in the first instance that the worker concerned produce each and every document and communication related to any other work performed in the relevant period. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 218.)

The motion as to Messiter  is therefore GRANTED as to Request No. 4, with the date range limited to 2019 onward, rather than 2017, and DENIED as to Requests No. 3 and 5.

The requests addressed to S5 seek emails sent from a Regent email address, communications and documents related to any business activity from 2017 onward, communications with Plaintiffs’ employees from 2017 onward, all documents related to S5 in any respect, communications with one Brad Belen, and communications with anyone related to entities called Drybar, Mackinac Partners, Wel 1 Biz Brands.

Good cause supports the requests seeking communications with Plaintiffs’ personnel, emails from an account belonging to Plaintiffs, and those related specifically to Drybar, namely Requests No. 1, 3, 7–9,  12, and 14. Request No. 1 seeks only communications sent from a Plaintiff-affiliated email to S5, a category of documents easily discernable and relevant to allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets. Request No. 3 similarly seeks communications from S5 related to Plaintiffs, which are relevant for the same reasons. Requests No. 7–9, 12 and 14 seek communications with Brad Belen and others related to Drybar, and communications with Belen related to Plaintiffs, where S5 acknowledges in opposition that a Drybar transaction is alleged to be one of the opportunities that Defendants stole from Plaintiffs. (Opposition at p. 4.) However, these requests once again seek communications dating from 2017 onward, when the entity against whom the requests are directed is alleged to have only been formed in 2020. (FAC ¶ 36.) Accordingly, the good cause for these requests is limited to documents created in 2020 or after.

S5 argues that all requests are irrelevant because the trade secrets alleged to have been stolen belong to Regent, when Steinhefel was only employed by Mega. (Opposition at pp. 3–8.) This argument is unpersuasive, as the FAC in fact pleads that Steinhefel was employed by both entities. (FAC ¶ 1.) S5 further argues that Plaintiffs have already secured a deal related to Drybar, meaning Plaintiff did not appropriate this opportunity, but presents no evidence to support this point. (Opposition at p. 4.) S5 argues that Plaintiffs did not serve a trade secret designation under Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.210 before serving this discovery, but acknowledges that a designation was served prior to the filing of this motion. (Opposition at p. 5.) S5 finally argues that a protective order should be entered to preserve its competitive interests, once again presents no evidence to support its request. (Opposition at pp. 9–10.)

However, Defendant persuasively argues that certain requests, namely Requests No. 2, 4–6, 10, and 11, are so overbroad as to warrant denial of relief here. (Opposition at pp. 1–2.) Requests No. 2 and 5 asked for all documents related to S5’s business, and Request No. 4 asked for all documents related to S5, each of which effectively ask S5 to turn over all documents it has in its possession, of whatever nature. No attempt has been made to ensure that these requests are framed with reasonable particularity, no good cause supports them, and no further response is necessary. The remaining requests seek documents related to particular people or entities — Brad Belen, Mackinac Partners, Wel1Biz Brands — for which Plaintiffs present no explanation or evidence as to why discovery related to them is necessary or supported by good cause.

Accordingly, the motion as to S5 is GRANTED as to Requests No. 1, 3, 7–9, 12 and 14, limited in time to those created from 2020 onward, and DENIED as to Requests No. 2, 4–6, 10, and 11.

II.   SANCTIONS

Statute provides that the court shall impose sanctions upon a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or requests for admission, absent substantial justification otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h); 2033.290, subd. (d).)

Plaintiffs request $5,910.00 in attorney fees as to the Messiter motion, and $6,235.00 as to the S5 motion, representing 9 hours and 9.5 hours, respectively, of attorney work at $650 per hour, plus two $60 filing fees. (Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 11–13.) However, as Plaintiffs have only obtained partial relief on this motion, no sanctions are appropriate.