Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV08642, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV08642    Hearing Date: September 19, 2023    Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Francisco Heredia and Lorenzo B. Heredia’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production from Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED as to Requests No.  3, 5, 8, 11, 12, and 16–36. The motion is DENIED as to Requests No. 1, 2, 9, and 37.

Plaintiffs to provide notice.

I.      MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand.  (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Plaintiff Francisco and Lorenzo Heredia (Plaintiffs) seek further responses to Requests for Production No. 1–3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 16–37.[1] Requests No. 1 and 2 sought documents identified in Defendant’s responses to interrogatories. Request No. 3 sought all documents related to Defendant’s affirmative defenses. Requests No. 5, 8, 9, 11, and 12 sought documents related to the inspection of the subject vehicle, Plaintiff’s repurchase request, and contacts between Defendant and Plaintiff or related to the subject vehicle. Reqeusts No. 16–32 sought Defendant’s policies, training, practices, and statistics related to consumer warranty and repurchase laws. Requests No. 33–36 sought technical service bulletins, recalls, and consumer complaints regarding defects in vehicles of the same year, make, or model as the subject vehicle. And Request No. 37 sought advertising and promotional materials for the year, make, and model of vehicle at issue.

Defendant responded with statements of compliance with respect to Requests No. 1 and 2, concerning interrogatories, and responded to Request No. 9 (regarding repurchase requests) with the averment that Defendant’s records indicated that no such request was made. (Separate Statement at p. 27.) With regard to Requests No. 3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 34 and 37 — relating respectively to Defendant’s affirmative defenses, inspections and communications related to the subject vehicle, TSBs and promotional materials — Defendant stated that it would “comply in part” by producing specific listed documents. As to the remaining requests — No. 16–33, 35, and 36, each of which relates to Defendant’s warranty policies and practices, or recalls and defects in vehicles like the subject vehicle — Defendant offered objections and stated that no documents would be produced.

Several requests do not warrant a further response. Defendant responded to Request No. 1 and 2 with statements of compliance, to Request No. 9 with a statement of inability to comply, and Plaintiff does not explain why a further response is warranted as to these requests. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210.) Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented good cause for the promotional and advertising materials requested in Request No. 37. The motion is therefore DENIED as to Requests No. 1, 2, 9, and 37.

A further response is required, however, to Requests No. 3, 5, 8, 11 and 12. These requests concerned either Defendant’s affirmative defenses or else related directly to the subject vehicle and Defendant’s contacts with Plaintiffs. Defendant argues with respect to these requests only that it has already produced documents (Opposition at pp. 4–5), but neglects that it has only offered to “comply in part” with each request, and has accordingly limited its document production. As Defendant does not justify the limitations placed upon its responses, further response is needed.

The remaining requests relate to Defendant’s warranty policies and defects that potentially exist in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, to which Defendant offered either no responsive documents or, in the case of requests for TSBs and recalls, either denied that any were applicable to the subject vehicle or attempted to limit production to a selection from a list. Good cause supports a further response to these requests..

To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the Act”), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

Because the Song-Beverly Act itself allows for the imposition of penalties for “willful” violations, this means discovery in a lemon law case may encompass a manufacturer’s knowledge of a given defect at the time the plaintiff’s car is presented for repurchase. . (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Thus discovery into that manufacturer’s knowledge of other vehicles with similar defects may be permissible.

There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective  because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.”  (Id. at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.) And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus merited civil penalties.

In light of the above authority, Defendant may not rely upon its narrow characterization of the case to limit its production in response to the requests at issue.

Defendant finally argues that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer, and further argues that Plaintiff impermissibly seeks trade secret and confidential materials. (Opposition at pp. 3, 7–8.) Both objections are answered by Plaintiff’s letter of May 25, 2023, which addressed Defendant’s objections and offered to enter into a protective order to preserve Defendant’s confidential materials. (Motion Exh. 3.) Defendant does not explain why such an order would      not be adequate to preserve the confidentiality of its materials.

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to Requests No.  3, 5, 8, 11, 12, and 16–36. The motion is DENIED as to Requests No. 1, 2, 9, and 37.