Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV11822, Date: 2023-02-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV11822    Hearing Date: February 1, 2023    Dept: 61

Plaintiff Mohammad Maaz’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production from Defendant General Motors, LLC, is GRANTED. Further code complaint responses within 30 days

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER – PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand.  (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 8, 11, 16, 17, 19, 21, 31, 53–56, and 63. Of these requests, No. 1 and 31 ask for documents and video and audio tapes concerning the subject vehicle, for which Defendant offered partial compliance and an attestation that it lacked recordings. Requests No. 16, 17, 19, 21, and 63 sought documents concerning investigation of and complaints regarding defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle, to which Defendant offered only objections, save a statement of partial compliance as to Request No. 19. Requests No. 11 and 53–56 sought TSBs related to the defect and communications with the National Highway Traffic Safety Agency (NHTSA) concerning the same. Defendant responded to No. 11 with a statement of partial compliance, and gave only objections to the rest. And Request No. 8 seeks Defendant’s lemon law policies and procedures, to which Defendant offered only objections.

Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet and confer before bringing this motion. (Opposition at pp. 2–3.) Defendant next contends that the requests are overbroad, as they concern vehicles other than Plaintiff’s own. (Opposition at pp. 3–4, 5–6, .) Defendant finally contends that the requests seek trade-secret information. (Opposition at pp. 6–8.)

Defendant’s meet-and-confer objection lacks merit. The evidence shows that Plaintiff served two meet-and-confer letters regarding Defendant’s discovery responses, and although Defendant characterizes such correspondence as strident and obstinate, the letters show Plaintiff offering to enter a protective order. (Neubauer Decl. ¶¶ 29–34, Exhs. 11–16.)

Defendant’s objection based on overbreadth are unpersuasive, as Plaintiff may use evidence of other vehicles to pursue his Song Beverly claims. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective  because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.”  (Id. at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.) And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus merited civil penalties. Thus Plaintiff is not limited to requests concerning the particular vehicle at issue.

Defendant next argues that the requests seek confidential trade secret information. Defendant argues that disclosing documents related to internal analysis of the vehicular issues concerned in this case risks exposing sensitive information related to its vehicles’ engineering, manufacturing, and root cause analysis, which would cause competitive disadvantage to Defendant if such information was released to the public. (Opposition at pp. 9–10.) But Plaintiff has already offered to execute a protective order in Defendant’s favor, and Defendant does not explain why the execution of such an order, as opposed to total nondisclosure, is insufficient to protect its interests.[1]

Defendant also argues that it has already produced responsive documents as to Requests No. 1, 11, 19, 31, and 55. (Opposition at pp. 4–6.) But this argument is unpersuasive, as Defendant has indicated that it is only making partial production in response to these requests, withholding others pursuant to objections discussed above, or else has offered non-compliant statements of inability to comply, which do not indicate whether a diligent search for the documents has been made. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.230.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED.