Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV13119, Date: 2023-03-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV13119 Hearing Date: March 9, 2023 Dept: 61
Plaintiffs
Camelia Valdovinos de Garcia and Alejandro Garcia Valdovinos’ Motions to Compel
Further Responses to Requests for Production and Requests for Admission are GRANTED
as to Reqeusts for Production No. No. 13–16 and 34–35, and DENIED as to
Requests for Admissions. No sanctions are awarded.
Plaintiff to provide notice.
I.
MOTIONS
TO COMPEL FURTHER
“A party may demand
that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession,
custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further
response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of
compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to
comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the
response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The
motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the
discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a
meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310(b).)
A motion to compel
a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts
showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland
v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a
legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is
met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the
burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully
respond to the inspection demand. (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d
210, 220.)
A motion to compel further
responses to requests for admissions may be made on the grounds that an answer
is incomplete or evasive, or an objection is without merit. (Code Civ. Proc. §
2033.290, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)
Plaintiffs Camelia
Valdovinos de Garcia and Alejandro Garcia Valdovinos (Plaintifsf) seek a
further response to Requests for Production No. 13–16 and 34–35. Requests No.
13–16 seek documents evidencing repurchases or complaints by owners of vehicles
of the same year make and model concerning defects alleged for the subject
vehicle in this case. (Separate Statement at pp. 2–9.) Defendant General
Motors, LLC (Defendant) responded to these requests with objections based on
overbreadth and relevance. (Ibid.) Requests No. 34 and 35 sought
technical service bulletins (TSBs) and recalls issued for vehicles of the same
year, make, and model as the subject vehicle. (Separate Statement at pp.
10–12.) Defendant responded that it would produce documents “applicable to the
Subject Vehicle,” but otherwise objected to the production as overbroad. (Ibid.)
Defendant argues
that Plaintiff did not meet and confer in good faith before bringing this
motion. (Opposition at pp. 2–3.) Plaintiff’s motion reveals that Plaintiff sent
a meet-and-confer letter concerning the discovery at issue before filing this
motion, to which Defendant did not respond. (Yashar Decl. Exh. 3.) This effort
was adequate to precede the present motion.
Defendant further
contends that Plaintiff has not established good cause for the requests, that
the requests seek documents unrelated to Plaintiff’s vehicle, and that it
intends to produce partial responsive documents as to Requests No. 34 and 35,
which relate to TSBs and recalls. (Opposition at pp. 3–8.)
Defendant’s
arguments are unpersuasive, as the requests concerning vehicles of the same
year, make, and model are supported by good cause. To succeed on a claim
brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the Act”), the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a
vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of
a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and
failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)
A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two
times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed
to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd.
(c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden
obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the
Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers
for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)
Because the Song-Beverly Act itself allows for the
imposition of penalties for “willful” violations, this means discovery in a
lemon law case may encompass a manufacturer’s knowledge of a given defect at
the time the plaintiff’s car is presented for repurchase. . (Civ. Code § 1794,
subd. (c).) Thus discovery into that manufacturer’s knowledge of other vehicles
with similar defects may be permissible.
There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer
complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim
under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial
court abused its discretion by not
imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule
similar to that only implicit in Doppes.
In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a
particular transmission was defective
because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other
vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other
vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford
installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.” (Id.
at p. 154.) The court held that “[s]uch
evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.” (Ibid.)
And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a
mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the
manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus
merited civil penalties.
Accordingly, because the requests at issue relate to defects
in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the vehicles at issue,
discovery into these requests is permissible. Defendant’s argument as to the
burden of the requests is unpersuasive, as no particularized showing of burden
is made, and Defendant merely states that the burden is unwarranted “given the
limited relevance.” (Opposition at p. 8.)
The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the requests for
production.
Plaintiffs also move for a further response to Requests for
Admission (RFA) No. 5 and 14. These requests ask Defendant to admit, first,
that the vehicle was “a new motor vehicle” under the Song Beverly Act, and
second, that Plaintiff was a “qualifying consumer” under the Act. (Separate
Statement at pp. 2–4.) Defendant responded that it lacked information
sufficient to answer the first, and that the second request was unanswerable,
as the Song Beverly Act contains no definition of a qualifying “consumer.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant may answer whether the
vehicle in question was a “new motor vehicle” without further delay, as said
question may be answered by looking at the sales agreement. (Separate Statement
at pp. 2–4.) But Defendant in opposition notes that the definition of “new
motor vehicle” under Civil Code § 1793.22 means “a new motor vehicle that is
bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” and also
a new motor vehicle used “primarily for business purposes” but by a person with
five for fewer vehicles registered to them in this state. (Civ. Code § 1793.22,
subd. (e)(2).) Thus Defendant argues that it cannot presently admit or deny
whether the vehicle qualifies under this definition, as it must first conduct
discovery with Plaintiff to determine the nature of the vehicle’s use.
Defendant’s argument is the more persuasive. The nature of
the vehicle may not be determined from the sales agreement alone, but is
requires some analysis of its use, which means that the information needed to
admit or deny the request requires that discovery be made upon Plaintiff.
Accordingly, no further response is needed to Request No. 5.
No further response is necessary for Request No. 14, either.
This is because it is not clear to what Plaintiff refers when she seeks an
admission that she is a qualifying “consumer” under the Song Beverly Act.
Although Plaintiff cites Code of Civil Procedure § 1793.2, subd. (b), and CACI
3205, neither of these statutes offer “consumer” as a defined term or an
element of Plaintiff’s Song Beverly claims. Nor does the term appear in Civil
Code § 1791, which defines various terms applicable for consumer warranty
protections. Accordingly, no further response is needed for this request.
The motion is DENIED as to ther equests for admissions.
II.
SANCTIONS
Statute provides that the court shall impose sanctions upon
a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response
to interrogatories or requests for production of documents, absent substantial
justification otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310,
subd. (h).)
Plaintiffs seek sanctions in
the amount of $2,004.15 for each motion, representing 4.5 hours of attorney
work at $425 per hour, plus $91.65 in filing fees. (Yashar Decl. ¶¶ 15–16.) Because
Plaintiffs have only obtained partial relief, no sanctions are awarded.