Judge Gregory Keosian, Case 22STCV14663 2022-10-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV14663, Date: 2022-10-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV14663 Hearing Date: October 14, 2022 Dept: 61

Defendant City of Hope National Medical Center’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. Defendant to provide notice.

I. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate a controversy, a court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines the arbitration agreement exists, unless (1) the petitioner has waived its right to arbitrate; (2) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or (3) “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

“[T]he party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. The role of the trial court is to sit as a trier of fact, weighing any affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, together with oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a determination on the issue of arbitrability.” (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.)

Defendant City of Hope National Medical Center (Defendant) moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Sophia Duran’s (Plaintiff) claims based on an arbitration agreement executed by Plaintiff on April 28, 2021. (Vukazich Decl. Exh. A.) The agreement is applicable to “any and all claims with respect to your employment with City of Hope.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff argues that there was no agreement because of lack of mutual assent, as Plaintiff did not understand what she was signing. (Opposition at pp. 2–3; Duran Decl. ¶¶ 2–4.)

This argument is unpersuasive. “[I]t is well established that a party who signs a document is presumed to have read it and to understand its contents.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1163 fn. 6.) Plaintiff cites no facts to support the contention that she could not understand the arbitration agreement, that she lacked an opportunity to learn its nature, or that she was misled as to the contents of the agreement. She is thus bound by the agreement’s terms.

Plaintiff next argues that the agreement is unconscionable. “Unconscionability requires a showing of both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.” (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 795.) Arbitration contracts presented to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are at least minimally procedurally unconscionable. (See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 113.) The agreement here is at least minimally unconscionable, given its adhesive nature.

But Plaintiff does not identify any substantively unconscionable aspect of the agreement. She contends that the agreement contains no signature space for Defendant to sign, and argues that this indicates lack of mutuality. (Opposition at p. 5.) But Defendant’s assent to the agreement can be readily inferred by facts demonstrating its ratification of the terms, such as the fact that it authored the agreement, drafted it on its own letterhead, and propounded it upon Plaintiff as a condition of employment. (See Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 176 [holding employer evidenced consent to arbitration agreement without signature when “not only was the agreement authored by Balco, and printed on Bay Alarm's letterhead, but Balco's later conduct evinces an intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement when it invoked the arbitration process”].)

Plaintiff argues that the agreement does not clearly indicate what Plaintiff is waiving by agreeing to arbitration. This argument also fails, as, in addition to the body terms explaining the arbitration agreement’s applicability, the agreement states in bold type, above the signature space: “You and City of Hope understand and agree that this agreement to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of his/her/its right to a trial in a court of law on any matter subject to arbitration under this agreement.” (Vukazich Decl. Exh. A.) There is no substantive unconscionability here.

Plaintiff finally argues that the arbitration agreement is illegal under Labor Code § 432.6, which prohibits employers from requiring employees or employee applicants “to waive any right, forum, or procedure” for FEHA violations. (Opposition at p. 6; Lab. Code § 432.6, subd. (a).) Plaintiff ignores that Labor Code § 432.6 specifically states, “Nothing in this section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.).” (Lab. Code § 432.6, subd. (f).) The arbitration agreement here specifically states that all arbitration shall be conducted under the Federal Arbitration Act. (Vukazich Decl. Exh. A.) The agreement is not illegal.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.