Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV18182, Date: 2023-07-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV18182    Hearing Date: July 21, 2023    Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Jazmin Gonzalez’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production from Defendant FCA US, LLC, is GRANTED as to Requests No. 12, 19, 21, 24, 31, 32, 36, 39, 51, 53, 81–83, and 85, and DENIED as to all other requests.

I.                   MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER – PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand.  (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

Plaintiff Jazmin Gonzalez (Plaintiff) moves to compel further responses to Requests for Production, No. 1, 12, 17, 19, 21, 24, 31, 32, 36, 39, 51, 53, 55, 65–67, 77–79, and 81–85. These requests may be divided into the following categories:

·         Requests No. 1 and 17: Documents concerning the subject vehicle purchased by Plaintiff in this case;

·         Requests No. 12, 19, 21, 24, 31, 32, 36, 39, 51, 53, and 55: Documents concerning defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle;

·         Requests No. 81–85: TSBs, campaigns, recalls, and communications with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration;

·         Requests No. 65–67 and 77–79: Defendant’s lemon law policies and procedures.

Defendant FCA US, LLC (Defendant) initially responded to the requests with a mixture of statements of compliance, objections, and statements of inability to comply. Defendant has since served supplemental responses to most of the requests, which it contends now contain either statements of compliance or statements of inability to comply. (Opposition at pp. 3–4.) Defendant argues that it has searched all relevant databases for responsive documents and has identified those databases accordingly. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) Defendant also argues that the discovery is overbroad in relation to the subject matter of this case — concerning as it does Plaintiff’s sole vehicle — and that Plaintiff has not shown good cause for the breadth of discovery sought. (Opposition at pp. 5–12.)

No further response is necessary as to Request No. 1, 17, 65–67, 77, 78. These request sought all documents related to the subject vehicle and Defendant’s buyback and consumer warranty policies, and Defendant responded with statements of compliance, stating that it will produce “all responsive documents,” and that no documents are being withheld. (Opp. Separate Statement at pp. 3, 5, 27–33.) Although these responses list particular documents that will be produced, Plaintiff does not explain how the listing of documents in these responses operates as a limitation on the documents produced. The motion is therefore DENIED as to these requests.

Plaintiff has shown good cause as to most other requests at issue in this case, as they may be used to support Plaintiff’s claims for civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the Act”), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.) In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective  because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.”  (Id. at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.) Thus the requests are not overbroad as to subject matter.

However, there are some requests for which good cause has not been shown. Request No. 55 simply sought “all documents . . . from one year prior to Plaintiff’s purchase of the subject vehicle to the present,” with no limitation save a clause indicating that the request was meant to include organizational charts. (Motion Exh. 5, No. 55.) This request has no limitation as to any subject matter and is massively overbroad. Plaintiff’s Request No. 79 is less broad, seeking Defendant’s “recall policies and procedures,” but Plaintiff has not shown good cause as to why recall policies and procedures need be produced in this action.

Plaintiff further objects to the supplemental responses provided to Requests No. 19, 21, 24, 31, 32, 36, 39, 51, 53, 81–83, and 85, because although Defendant responded with statements of compliance in full (Requests No. 19, 21, 31, and 83) or statements of inability to comply (Requests No. 24, 32, 36, 39, 51, 53, 81, 82, and 85), Defendant states with respect to each request that its searches for responsive documents were made by reference to certain databases, when Plaintiff has knowledge of other databases in Defendant’s possession that potentially have responsive documents which Defendant does not claim to have searched. (Supp. Smith Decl. ¶¶ 8c–8f.)

Plaintiff’s argument as to these requests is persuasive. Plaintiff has identified several databases in Defendant’s control (obtained from discovery in another action involving Defendant) potentially containing responsive documents, which are not among the databases that Defendant identifies in its search. (Smith Decl. Exh. 12.) Defendant’s arguments in opposition are unpersuasive. Although Defendant claims that the “Global Warranty System” identified by Plaintiff is actually a “Global Warranty Application” that Defendant did search, Defendant presents no evidence on this point to contradict the evidence presented by Plaintiff. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) The databases that Defendant identifies as nonresponsive — Proving Ground Testing Information System (PGTIS), the Parts Return Analysis System (PRAS) — are reasonably likely to contain responsive information related to the defects alleged in the subject vehicle. (Opposition at p. 5.) A further response is necessary, indicating the results of searching the databases identified by Plaintiffs.

Further response is also warranted as to Request No. 12, which sought from Defendant any pre-sale documents made available to purchasers of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle which referred to disclosures of problems or malfunctions in such vehicles. Defendant responded only with objections based on overbreadth. (Opp. Separate Statement at pp. 3–4.) But the requested category of documents is reasonably particular and is not beyond Defendant’s ability to respond.

However, no further response is necessary as to Request No. 84. In reply, the only defect with respect to this request is Plaintiffs contention that Defendant has not produced documents in keeping with its statement of compliance. (Supp. Smith Decl. ¶ 8i.) This, however, is a matter to be addressed via a motion to compel compliance under Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.320, not the present motion.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to Requests No. 12, 19, 21, 24, 31, 32, 36, 39, 51, 53, 81–83, and 85, and DENIED as to all other requests.