Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV20594, Date: 2023-03-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV20594 Hearing Date: March 6, 2023 Dept: 61
Defendants Regents of the
University of Calfiornia, Jose Torres, Andy Gonzalez, and Ernesto Virgen’s
Demurrer and Motion to Strike are SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the
eleventh cause of action alleged against Defendants Torres, Gonzalez, and
Virgen, and OVERRULED as to the fourth, tenth, and twelfth causes of action.
The motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend as to unsupported
allegations of failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive
process included under other causes of action, as well as allegations of
“separate bases” of liability that articulate different legal theories from the
causes of action containing such allegations.
I.
DEMURRER
A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear
on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§
430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is
relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege
facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See
id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) Cal.3d 311: “We
treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give
the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts
in their context.” (Id. at p.
318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the
evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects
appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)
“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as
against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears
the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the
defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be
clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)
“A demurrer
for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some
respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612,
616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored,
and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant
cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v.
Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)
A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if
the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any
theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.
1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the
nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it
probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)
Defendants Regents of the University of Calfiornia, Jose
Torres, Andy Gonzalez, and Ernesto Virgen demurrer to the fourth cause of
action for disability discrimination on the grounds that Plaintiff Michael
Richardson has failed to allege the existence of a disability or that
Defendants were aware of same. (Demurrer at pp. 4–5.) Defendants further argue
that the tenth cause of action for retaliation under Labor Code § 1102.5 fails
to state a claim because no protected activity is alleged. (Demurrer at pp.
5–6.) Defendants argue that the eleventh cause of action for waiting time
penalties on Plaintiff’s last paycheck is ill-pleaded against the individual
defendants. (Demurrer at p. 6.) Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not state either
outrageous conduct or the requisite level of intentionality. (Demurrer at p.
7.)
To establish a
discrimination claim under FEHA, an employee must prove the following elements:
“(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the
position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3)
he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or
denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests
discriminatory motive.” (Dinslage v. City
and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 378.)
The FAC alleges
that Plaintiff suffered from a disability, namely, obesity and associated
medical issues. (FAC ¶ 12d.) The FAC further alleges that Defendants were aware
of Plaintiff’s disability, as Plaintiff physically appeared for work, and his
appearance was the subject of rude looks and comments by coworkers and
supervisors. (FAC ¶¶ 13c, 13e.) Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff fails to
allege either a disability or their awareness of it is thus unpersuasive.
Moreover, although Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege that he was
qualified for the position he held, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff “was an exemplary
employee.” (FAC ¶ 11.) Accordingly, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action
is OVERRULED.
Defendants’ arguments against the retaliation claim under
Labor Code § 1102.5 is also unpersuasive. To establish a claim for retaliation under Labor Code § 1102.5, subd.
(b), the plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in protected activity, (2)
that the defendant subjected the plaintiff to an adverse employment action, and
(3) that there exists a “causal link” between the adverse action and the
protected activity. (See Manavian v. Department of Justice (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 1127, 1141.) The protected
activity at issue is the disclosure of information that the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of state or federal law. (Lab. Code § 1102.5,
subd. (b).) Here, Plaintiff identifies two instances of complaints of illegal
activity: Plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination and harassment, as well as
Plaintiff’s complaint that the demanding of private health information violated
his rights under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
(FAC ¶¶ 12e, 13o, 13t.) Likewise, the short proximity in time between
Plaintiff’s complaints and his termination can support the existence of a
causal link to his protected activity. (See Arteaga v. Brink’s,
Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 [temporal proximity between
disclosure of disability and adverse action supported prima facie case of
discrimination].) The demurrer is therefore properly OVERRULED as to the tenth
cause of action.
Defendants also argue that the twelfth cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is insufficiently pleaded.
(Demurrer at p. 7.)The elements of an IIED claim are: (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) made with intent to cause, or with
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) severe
emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation. (Huntingdon
Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259; Bogard v. Employers Casualty Company (1985) 164
Cal.App.3d 602, 616.) The level of distress required to state a claim for IIED
is distress of “such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable
[person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Hughes v.
Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) “Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law that must
initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is
for the jury to determine whether the conduct
was, in fact, outrageous.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
518, 534.)
Defendants’
argument as to the absence of outrageous conduct is unpersuasive. Plaintiff
alleges repeated instances in which supervisors degraded him on account of his
age, race, and obesity, such as by comparing him to a Raiders lineman,
expressing disbelief at his upbringing in Watts, discounting his complaints as
to a younger employee, subjecting his lunch breaks to particular monitoring,
and requiring particular disclosures of his private medical history. This is in
addition to other alleged actions, including subjecting Plaintiff to unfair
performance reviews, moving him to a distant and nocturnal work-site without
cause, and finally, terminating his employment. Reasonable persons may differ
as to whether this conduct is outrageous. The demurrer is therefore OVERRULED
as to the twefth cause of action.
Defendants’ final argument as to the failure of the claim for personal
liability against the individual defendants under Labor Code § 551.8 is also
unpersuasive. Section 558.1 states that personal liability may be had against “a natural person who is an owner, director,
officer, or managing agent of the employer.” (Lab. Code § 558.1, subd. (b).) Here,
although Plaintiff alleges the waiting time penalties claim against individual defendants Torres,
Gonzalez, and Virgen, the FAC contains no allegations that any of them are “an
owner, director, officer, or managing agent” of the University of California.
Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the eleventh cause of action
alleged against Torres, Gonzalez, and Virgen.
In summary, the demurrer
is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the eleventh cause of action alleged
against Defendants Torres, Gonzalez, and Virgen, and OVERRULED as to the
fourth, tenth, and twelfth causes of action.
II.
MOTION TO
STRIKE
Any
party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice
of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., §
435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote
in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike
an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of
Court Rule 3.1322.)
The grounds for a motion to
strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter
of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §
437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading
not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or
an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which
justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave
to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court
(1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)
Defendants argue the the FAC’s
prayer for punitive damages against the University of California fails, because
punitive damages are unavailable against public entities. (Motion at p. 4.) Defendants
are correct that " a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under
Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake
of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Gov. Code § 818.) However,
the FAC alleges punitive damages claims only against the individual defendants
in this case. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 36, 54, 71, 94.) There is no need to strike any
allegations of punitive damages against the University, as no such allegations
are made.
Defendants also demurrer to
allegations of other substantive wrongs included within the captions of other
causes of action as “separate bases” of liability under those causes of action,
such as conclusory allegations of failure to accommodate or engage in
interactive process included in his claims for disability discrimination and
harassment claims. (FAC ¶¶ 44, 45b–45c, 56, 57b–57c.) Plaintiff also includes
various “failure to prevent FEHA violation” allegations under the umbrella of
other causes of action. (FAC ¶¶ 26c, 32b, 39c, 45d, 50b, 57e, 62c, 67b, 73c.)
The motion is GRANTED as to
unsupported allegations of failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the
interactive process included under other causes of action, as well as
allegations of “separate bases” of liability that articulate different legal
theories from the causes of action containing such allegations, with leave to
amend.