Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV22185, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV22185 Hearing Date: April 15, 2024 Dept: 61
Plaintiff John N. Drooyan’s Motion
to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production from Defendant Marathon
HVAC Service is GRANTED. No sanctions are awarded..
I.
MOTIONS
TO COMPEL FURTHER
A party may demand
the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of “documents, tangible things,
land or other property, and electronically stored information in the
possession, custody, or control of any other party to the action.” (Code Civ.
Proc. § 2031.010, subd. (a).) The
responding party must respond to the production demand either by complying, by
representing that the party lacks the ability to comply, or by objecting to the
demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210.) The demanding party may move for
an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems
that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a
representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or
(3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good
cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall
be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)
A motion to compel
a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts
showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland
v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a
legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is
met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the
burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully
respond to the inspection demand. (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d
210, 220.)
Plaintiff John N. Drooyan (Plaintiff) seeks
to compel further responses to Requests for Production No. 21–28, which seeks
all photos and videos taken or recorded by Defendant Marathon HVAC, Inc.’s
(Defendant) counsel or agents during a site inspection of Plaintiff’s property
on October 14, 2022. Defendant responded with objections based on privilege and
work-product.
Pictures taken by an attorney or
their expert may fall within the protections of the work-product. The statute
defining the work-product doctrine gives absolute protection to writings that
reflect “an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or
theories,” and gives qualified protection to other attorney “work product.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 2018.030.) In certain circumstances, “disclosing a list of witnesses from whom an attorney has taken recorded
statements may, in some instances, reveal the attorney's impressions of the
case.” (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 501.) Disclosure
of photos taken by an attorney or that attorney’s expert may similarly reveal
attorney impressions or theories, if the circumstances of the case are such as
to make the photos suggestive of a given attorney opinion. Although the
requests differentiate between photos and videos taken by Defendant’s attorney
and recordings made by “any person other than Defendant’s counsel,” the fact
that Plaintiff is seeking recordings within Defendant’s possession means any
such recordings not taken by the attorney were taken by their experts or other
agents. The work-product doctrine preserves from disclosure not simply the
work-product of the attorney themselves, but also the attorney’s agents or
investigators. (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 495.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant
waived the objections by tardy response, since he received the responses on
January 18, 2024, rather than the due-date of January 14, 2024. An untimely
response may waive objections. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300, subd.
(a).) However, because the January 14, 2024 deadline fell on a Sunday, with the
following Monday a court holiday, and the time in which to respond to
Plaintiff’s email-served discovery is extended by two court days per Code of
Civil Procedure § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B), the actual deadline was January 17,
2024. (Ortega-Smith Decl. ¶ 8.) This is the date indicated on the proof of
service for Defendant’s responses. (Ortega-Smith Decl. Exh. A.)
However, other factors here militate against a
finding that the work-product protection applies. First, as Defendant
acknowledges, the site inspection where the recordings were taken took place at
Plaintiff’s dwelling, while “Plaintiff was present and observed every aspect of
the inspection that occurred at his property.” (Ortega-Smith Decl. ¶ 15.) It is
doubtful that the work product doctrine could preserve an attorney’s
photographs in such a situation, as the doctrine is a rule against
discoverability and disclosure, which may be waived by an intentional
disclosure inconsistent with the privilege, particularly to one who “has no interest in maintaining the
confidentiality ... of a significant part of the work product.” (Laguna Beach County Water Dist. v. Superior Court
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1459.) When the information to be protected by the
privilege was itself obtained in full view of the adverse party, that privilege
would have been waived, if it ever applied at all.
Second, Plaintiff is not seeking a particular
strategic selection of the photos or videos taken, such as the photos the
expert or Defendant intend to rely upon in defending their case. He is instead
seeking “any and all photographs taken” at the site inspection and, per
Defendant, in his presence.
The parties do not present much in the way of authority supporting their
positions except to cite the relevant statutes and framing case law. However,
there is one federal case involving the application of photographs taken during
an inspection conducted in the presence of an adverse party, in which the court
determined that there could be no expectation of confidentiality for such
images, and therefore the work product doctrine did not apply. (See Estate of Mazon v. County of
Riverside (C.D. Cal., Mar. 26, 2014, No. EDCV122240DMGSPX) 2014 WL
12966419, at *5–6 [“In effect,
by conducting the jail inspection, DSI is waiving its work product protection
as to any images it takes. DSI is not, of course, required to conduct this
inspection. But if it wishes to conduct the inspection, the images it takes
during the inspection will not be entitled to work product protection.”].) This
decision is in accord with the court’s reasoning above.
The motion is therefore GRANTED.
II. SANCTIONS
Statute provides that the court shall impose sanctions upon
a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response
to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or requests for
admission, absent substantial justification otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. §§
2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h); 2033.290, subd. (d).)
Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the
amount of $1,600.00, representing four hours of attorney work at $500 per hour.
(Drooyan Decl. ¶ 13.) However, because Plaintiff is an attorney representing
himself, no such fees are available. (See Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1180.) Thus no
sanctions are awarded.