Judge Gregory Keosian, Case Number: 22STCV27020, Date: 2023-12-04 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Lucia Mendez Jaimes (Plaintiff) objects to portions of the declaration of Matthew Proudfoot submitted in support of Defendant Ford Motor Company’s opposition to the motion for attorney fees. These objections are OVERRULED, as Proudfoot may testify to his own experience in similar matters, and may further introduce examples of the use of templates in pleadings and motions filed by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff here asks for a total of $36,873.82 in attorney fees and costs, representing a fee lodestar of $34,771.50 and costs in the amount of $2,102.63. (Motion at p. 2.) This motion follows a settlement in which Plaintiff obtained a payment of $68,000.00. (Id. at p. 1.)

Parties to litigation must generally bear their own attorney’s fees, unless they otherwise agree. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.) However, the Song-Beverly Act provides for the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs as follows:

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment. (See id.)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. “Fundamental to its determination . . . [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).) A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney. (Id. at p. 49.) “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV).) The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys’ fees are recoverable. (See id. at p. 624.)

Defendant argues that the hourly rates sought — $695 per hour for Michael Saeedian and $525 per hour for Christopher Urner — are unsupported except by a citation to the “Laffey Matrix,” which Defendant objects to as hearsay. (Opposition at p. 5.) Yet the Laffey Matrix has been used to assess fees just as Plaintiff submits here in other cases. (See Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1057; Schiff v. District of Columbia (D.D.C., Sept. 7, 2021) 2021 WL 4059469, at *3.)

Defendant identifies various charges that it claims represents excessive time spent on matters that ought to have been expedited through the use of templates. (Opposition at pp. 6–8.) These charges are:

Defendant’s arguments as to these charges are persuasive in part. Defendant presents persuasive evidence that Plaintiff’s complaint and discovery are largely duplicative of prior templates. (Proudfoot Decl. Exhs. A, B, D, E.) However, Plaintiff’s counsel spent only one hour to draft the Complaint, which is reasonable in light of the available templates. It remains appropriate to reduce the hours spent preparing template discovery by 2.6 hours, a reduction of $1,807.00. It is further appropriate to reduce the number of hours spent on pre-filing work by two hours, as much of the work performed is duplicative review of documents, yielding a further reduction of $1,390.00.

There are, however, substantial differences between the meet-and-confer correspondence and motions that Defendant presents to the court, indicating that the hours claimed were not mere alterations of templates. Moreover, review of the time expended by the law clerk shows time engaged in non-clerical tasks, including the drafting of correspondence and memoranda. Accordingly, no reduction is proper as to these tasks.