Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV29825, Date: 2023-03-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV29825 Hearing Date: March 13, 2023 Dept: 61
Plaintiffs
Jose I. Canizalez Ventura and Fatima Mayda Rivera’s Motion to Compel Further
Responses to Reqeusts for Production of Documents from Defendant Ford Motor
Company is GRANTED as to Requests No. 13–16, and DENIED as to Requests No. 34
and 35. Sanctions are awarded in the amount of $1,000.
I.
MOTIONS
TO COMPEL FURTHER
“A party may demand
that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession,
custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further
response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of
compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to
comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the
response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The
motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the
discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a
meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310(b).)
A motion to compel
a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts
showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland
v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a
legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is
met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the
burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully
respond to the inspection demand. (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d
210, 220.)
Plaintiffs Jose I.
Canizalez Ventura and Fatima Mayda Rivera (Plaintiffs) seek a further response
to Requests for Production No. 13–16 and 34–35. Requests No. 13–16 seek
documents evidencing repurchases or complaints by owners of vehicles of the
same year make and model concerning defects alleged for the subject vehicle in
this case. (Separate Statement at pp. 2–9.) Defendant Ford Motor Company
(Defendant) responded to these requests with objections based on overbreadth
and relevance. (Ibid.) Requests No. 34 and 35 sought documents related
to technical service bulletins (TSBs) and recalls issued for vehicles of the
same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle. (Separate Statement at pp.
10–12.) Defendant responded that it would produce documents “applicable to the
Subject Vehicle,” but otherwise objected to the production as overbroad. (Ibid.)
Defendant argues
that Plaintiff did not meet and confer before bringing this motion,
particularly as to Requests No. 34 and 35.(Opposition at pp. 2–3.) The
meet-and-confer letter included with the motion indeed indicates that while
Plaintiffs elaborated on the need for Requests No. 13–16, no mention was made
of Requests No. 34 and 35. (Yashar Decl. Exh. 3.) Accordingly, the motion is
DENIED as to Requests No. 34 and 35.
Defendant further
contends that Plaintiff has not established good cause for the requests, that
the requests seek documents unrelated to Plaintiff’s vehicle, and that in any
event it has offered to supplement responses to Requests No. 13–16 by providing
communications with dealers and customers relating to the defects at issue, and
by providing relevant warranty records for the same. (Opposition at pp. 8–10.)
Defendant’s
arguments are unpersuasive, as the requests concerning vehicles of the same
year, make, and model are supported by good cause. To succeed on a claim
brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the Act”), the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a
vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of
a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and
failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)
A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two
times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed
to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd.
(c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden
obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the
Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers
for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)
Because the Song-Beverly Act itself allows for the
imposition of penalties for “willful” violations, this means discovery in a
lemon law case may encompass a manufacturer’s knowledge of a given defect at
the time the plaintiff’s car is presented for repurchase. . (Civ. Code § 1794,
subd. (c).) Thus discovery into that manufacturer’s knowledge of other vehicles
with similar defects may be permissible.
There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer
complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim
under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial
court abused its discretion by not imposing
terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule similar to
that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular
transmission was defective because he
had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was
“problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was
properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck
and other vehicles.” (Id. at p. 154.) The court held that “[s]uch evidence
certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.” (Ibid.)
And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a
mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the
manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus
merited civil penalties.
Moreover, Defendant’s offer of supplemental responses, as
yet unfulfilled, and made after the motion was filed, does not serve to moot
this motion. (Proudfoot Decl. ¶¶ 8–9.)
Defendant further argues that responding to these requests
would constitute an undue burden. Defendant presents the declaration of John
Southerland, an attorney who has defended Defendant in many cases like the
present, who states that, having been made to conduct similar searches in
similar cases, which took “hundreds of hours,” Southerland estimates that the
production in this case, for these requests, would take “at least 100 hours”
and cost $20,000.00. (Southerland Decl. ¶¶ 17–21.) This showing, however, is
inclusive of all requests at issue, including Reqeusts No. 34 and 35, for which
no further response is necessary for lack of meeting and conferring. It is
doubtful that Defendant’s compliance with the remaining requests would occasion
the burden identified by Southerland, given his description of the searches
necessary to comply with them — going through “consumer complaints” stored in
“Ford’s Customer Relationship Center,” going through “warranty claims made to
dealers,” and “technical contacts from dealers to Ford” (Southerland Decl. ¶
15) — as well as Defendant’s expressed
willingness to supplement these same materials.
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to Requests No. 13–16,
and DENIED as to Requests No. 34 and 35.
II.
SANCTIONS
Statute provides that the court shall impose sanctions upon
a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response
to interrogatories or requests for production of documents, absent substantial
justification otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310,
subd. (h).)
Plaintiffs seek sanctions in
the amount of $2,004.15 for this motion, representing 4.5 hours of attorney
work at $425 per hour, plus $91.65 in filing fees. (Yashar Decl. ¶¶ 14–15.) As Plaintiffs
have only obtained partial relief, sanctions are awarded in the amount of
$1,000.