Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV29880, Date: 2023-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV29880    Hearing Date: January 17, 2023    Dept: 61

Defendants Gem Healthcare LLC and Saint Cabrini Healthcare Services, LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

I.                MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate a controversy, a court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines the arbitration agreement exists, unless (1) the petitioner has waived its right to arbitrate; (2) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or (3) “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

“[T]he party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. The role of the trial court is to sit as a trier of fact, weighing any affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, together with oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a determination on the issue of arbitrability.” (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.)

Defendants Gem Healthcare LLC and Saint Cabrini Healthcare Services, LLC (Defendants) present an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff Monica Lopez (Plaintiff) nominally on behalf of Decedent Socorro Lopez (Decedent) upon Decedent’s admission to Defendants’ healthcare facility on January 24, 2022. (Dela Cruz Decl. Exh. A.) That agreement requires arbitration of “any dispute as to medical malpractice,” i.e. disputes charging that the services rendered under the contract were “improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered,” as well as any dispute “that relates to the provision of care, treatment and services the Facility provides to the Resident.” (Ibid.) Thus as Plaintiff’s claims arise from the services rendered to Decedent by Defendants in their facility, the present dispute appears to fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement.

Plaintiff in opposition makes two arguments. She first argues that she in fact never signed the arbitration agreement, and presents a declaration denying that she did so. (Lopez Decl. ¶ 3.) Second, she argues that the signature on the agreement purports to be hers, not Decedent’s, and as there exists no evidence that Plaintiff possessed authority to bind Decedent’s claims to arbitration, no arbitration may be compelled here. (Opposition at pp. 5–7.)

Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s declaration states that the signature appearing on the arbitration agreement is not hers, and contrasts it to her signature appearing on the “Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment” (POLST) form, also submitted with the motion. (Lopez Decl. ¶ 3; Dela Cruz Decl. Exh. B.) But while it is true that the signature on the arbitration agreement differs from that on the POLST form, the signature is consistent with that appearing on a number of other admission papers that Defendants present in reply. (Supp. Dela Cruz Decl. Exh. A.) As Plaintiff acknowledges the broad array of paperwork she was asked to and did sign upon Decedent’s admission to the facility (Lopez Decl. ¶ 4), it is likely that the arbitration agreement was among those signed and delivered to the facility.

As to whether Plaintiff’s signature may bind Decedent’s claims, Plaintiff is only partly correct, as it is Defendants’ “burden to establish [the signatory’s] authority to sign the agreement” (Young v. Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130, fn. 6), and Defendants have identified no conduct on the part of the principal (Decedent) to indicate that Plaintiff acted as her ostensible or actual agent.  (See Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1087.) However, Plaintiff has nonetheless agreed, both as an individual and successor to Decedent, that her claims may be compelled to arbitration, even in the absence of an agency relationship. The arbitration agreement here purports not merely to bind Decedent, but also to bind Decedent’s “representatives, agents, executors, family members, successors in interest and heirs who execute this agreement,” including Plaintiff as a signatory to the agreement. (Dela Cruz Decl. Exh. A.) Thus Plaintiff is bound by the agreement, both as to her individual claims and as to the claims she brings as Decedent’s successor.

The motion to compel arbitration is therefore GRANTED.