Judge Gregory Keosian, Case Number: 22STCV35235, Date: 2023-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 22STCV35235, Date: 2023-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35235 Hearing Date: August 3, 2023 Dept: 61

Plaintiffs Rosa Samano’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production from Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED as to Requests for Production No. No. 13–16 and 34–35.

Sanctions are awarded against Defendant in the amount of $941.65.

Plaintiff to provide notice.

I. MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER

“A party may demand that any other party produce . . . a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(b).) The demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand,” and “[t]he motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b).)

A motion to compel a further response to an inspection demand must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 444.) Once the moving party demonstrates good cause for the discovery, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the inspection demand. (Coy v Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

A motion to compel further responses to requests for admissions may be made on the grounds that an answer is incomplete or evasive, or an objection is without merit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.290, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)

Plaintiff Rosa Samano (Plaintiff) seeks a further response to Requests for Production No. 13–16 and 34–35. Requests No. 13–16 seek documents evidencing repurchases or complaints by owners of vehicles of the same year make and model concerning defects alleged for the subject vehicle in this case. (Separate Statement at pp. 2–9.) Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) responded to these requests with objections based on overbreadth and relevance. (Ibid.) Requests No. 34 and 35 sought technical service bulletins (TSBs) and recalls issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle. (Separate Statement at pp. 10–12.) Defendant responded that it would only produce a list of TSBs from which Plaintiff could choose those applicable to the subject vehicle. (Separate Statement at pp. 11–14.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not meet and confer in good faith before bringing this motion. (Opposition at pp. 3–4.) Plaintiff’s motion reveals that Plaintiff sent a meet-and-confer letter concerning the discovery at issue before filing this motion, addressing Defendant’s objections and offering search terms Defendant could use to identify pertinent documents in its electronic databases. (Yashar Decl. Exh. 3.) This was sufficient prelude to the present motion.

Defendant further contends that Plaintiff has not established good cause for the requests, that the requests seek documents unrelated to Plaintiff’s vehicle, and that it intends to produce partial responsive documents as to Requests No. 34 and 35, which relate to TSBs and recalls. (Opposition at pp. 4–7.) Defendant also argues that the requests seek trade-secret material. (Opposition at pp. 7–9.)

Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive, as the requests concerning vehicles of the same year, make, and model are supported by good cause. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the Act”), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

Because the Song-Beverly Act itself allows for the imposition of penalties for “willful” violations, this means discovery in a lemon law case may encompass a manufacturer’s knowledge of a given defect at the time the plaintiff’s car is presented for repurchase. . (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Thus discovery into that manufacturer’s knowledge of other vehicles with similar defects may be permissible.

There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced a evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.” (Id. at p. 154.) The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.” (Ibid.) And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus merited civil penalties.

Defendant next argues that disclosing documents related to internal analysis of the vehicular issues concerned in this case risks exposing sensitive information related to its vehicles’ engineering, manufacturing, and root cause analysis, which would cause competitive disadvantage to Defendant if such information was released to the public. (Opposition at pp. 7–9.) But Defendant has already promulgated, and Plaintiff has executed, a confidential protective order in this action. (Yashar Decl. Exh. 5.) Defendant does not explain how the current protective order is inadequate to protect its confidential interests.

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the requests for production.

II. SANCTIONS

Statute provides that the court shall impose sanctions upon a party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to interrogatories or requests for production of documents, absent substantial justification otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (d); 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Plaintiffs seek sanctions in the amount of $2,004.15, representing 4.5 hours of attorney work at $425 per hour, plus $91.65 in filing fees. (Yashar Decl. ¶¶ 15–16.) Sanctions are awarded in the amount of $941.65.