Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV02613, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV02613 Hearing Date: May 9, 2023 Dept: 61
Defendants
Steaven Jones Development Company and Glencoe Avenue Associates LLC’s Motions
to Quash Service of Summons and Reclassify Action are DENIED.
I.
MOTION TO
QUASH SERVICE
A defendant may serve and file a motion to
quash service of summons on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction over him or
her. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10 subd. (a)(1).) A plaintiff opposing a motion to
quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction “has the initial burden to
demonstrate facts establishing a basis for personal jurisdiction.” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167.) If satisfied, the burden then shifts to defendant
to show that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Id.)
Mere notice of litigation does not confer personal jurisdiction absent
substantial compliance with the statutory requirements for service of summons.
(MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557.) While courts are not required to accept
self-serving evidence — such as declarations that one was not served —
submitted to support a motion to quash, facial defects of the proof of service
will rebut its presumption of proper service. (American Exp. Centurion Bank, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) The burden is on a plaintiff to prove facts showing
that service was effective. (Summers v.
McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.)
Defendants Steaven Jones
Development Company and Glencoe Avenue Associates LLC (Defendants) move to
quash service of summons on the grounds that no proof of service has been
filed, and no service has been made.
Since filing the motion,
Plaintiff has filed a proof of service on April 11, 2023, indicating that
service was accomplished upon Defendants on March 27, 2023, by substitute
service upon the address of Defendants’ agent for service of process, as
provided in Code of Civil Procedure § 415.20, subd. (a). Defendants in reply
offer no argument for why this service is deficient.
Accordingly, the motions to
quash are DENIED.
II.
MOTION TO
RECLASSIFY
Code Civ. Proc. section 403.040 provides in relevant part:
(a)
The
plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner may file a motion for
reclassification within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial
pleading. The defendant or cross-defendant may file a motion for
reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the
initial pleading. The court, on its own motion, may reclassify a case at any
time. A motion for reclassification does not extend the moving party's time to amend or answer
or otherwise respond. The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for
reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been
classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.
(b)
If a party
files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party to amend that
party's initial pleading or to respond to a complaint, cross-complaint,
or other initial pleading, the court shall grant the motion and enter an order
for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1)
The case is
incorrectly classified.
(2) The moving party
shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier
The
appropriate standard for determining whether a matter must be reclassified for
failing to meet the jurisdictional threshold for the amount of recovery is not
whether damages “realistically” will exceed the threshold, but rather whether
it is possible that the damages will. (See Maldonado v. Superior Court of Orange
County (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 402 [“the trial court looks to the
possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its
probability.”]; see also Walker v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270 [“the
[trial] court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the
amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it
appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount [of the]
demand.”]; Ytuarte v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 278–79.)
Defendants
move to reclassify the present case as one of limited jurisdiction, based on
their contention that this case is solely over a security deposit amounting to
$1,550.00, of which Defendants retained only $142.45 for unpaid utility bills,
and does not amount to $25,000 in damages necessary to maintain unlimited
jurisdiction. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 86 [defining limited civil cases to
include those involving $25,000 or less].)
Plaintiff in opposition contends that the damages sought in
the Complaint exceed $25,000. Plaintiff argues that Defendants overcharged her
for $8,000 in rent in breach of the lease, and that she may obtain as damages
the full $39,000 she paid in rent over her 13-month tenancy. (Opposition at p.
5.) Plaintiff also argues that under Civil Code § 1951.5, she is entitled to
statutory damages for each violation in the amount of “up to twice the amount
of the security, in addition to actual damages.” Opposition at pp. 5–6.) Plaintiff
also notes that the Complaint includes a prayer for injunctive relief.
(Opposition at pp. 6–7.)
No reclassification is necessary
here. A limited civil case is not merely one in which “[t]he amount in controversy
does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars,” but must also be an action that
seeks relief “that may be granted in a limited civil case.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
85 [Identifying characteristics of limited civil actions].) A limited civil action may seek
only limited types of injunctive relief, such as “a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 86, subd. (b)(8).) Plaintiff here seeks permanent
injunctive relief. (Complaint ¶¶ 5, 46, 67, 82, 89.) Accordingly, because this
is not an action which seeks relief that may be granted in a limited civil
case, no reclassification is appropriate.
The motions to reclassify are therefore DENIED.