Judge Gregory Keosian, Case Number: 23STCV06036, Date: 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV06036, Date: 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV06036 Hearing Date: August 18, 2023 Dept: 61

Defendant City of Los Angeles’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint is GRANTED with leave to amend as to the requests for injunctive relief numbered (1), (2), and (3) in paragraphs 56, 69, and 81, and is DENIED as to request number (4) in the same paragraphs.

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)

Defendant City of Los Angeles (Defendant) seeks an order striking portions of Plaintiff Edgar Pineda’s (Plaintiff) Complaint, specifically those portions which seek injunctive relief. The injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in paragraphs 56, 69, and 81 are of four kinds: First, an order changing the City’s characterization of Plaintiff’s time on leave, beginning in April or May 2022, from unpaid leave to paid leave; second, an order awarding back pay for the duration of this leave; third, an order restoring to Plaintiff the leave that he exhausted during this period; and fourth, an injunction prohibiting Defendant from promoting any employee whose conduct has ever resulted in a jury verdict against the City in a FEHA cause of action.

Defendant argues that the first three requests, which relate specifically to his administrative leave, are not properly the subject of injunctive relief, as they seek an order to address “completed wrongs,” which an injunction is not designed to correct. (Motion at pp. 3–4, citing Madrid v. Perot Systems Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 465.) As to the fourth request for relief, Defendant contends that an order prohibiting promotions as Plaintiff seeks “would result in violations of applicable Union and City of Los Angeles agreements to promote employees within the Bureau of Sanitation within clearly delineated time frames,” as well as a deprivation of due process to many employees. (Motion at p. 4.)

Plaintiff in opposition contends that injunctive relief is available under FEHA and Labor Code 1102.5. (Opposition at pp. 6–8.)

Defendant is correct that Plaintiff’s prayer for back pay and a restitution of leave are not the proper subjects of injunctive relief. Although back pay is available for successful FEHA claimants, it is available as a form of damages. (See Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895, 908 [“[W]e decline to adopt a rule that would strictly limit back pay and front pay damages in cases where there is a failure to promote.”].) To allow this form of relief under the umbrella of an injunction would violate the rule that injunctive relief is to be granted where evidence establishes “the reasonable probability the acts [to be enjoined] will be repeated in the future.” (Madrid, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) Plaintiff’s authority does not stand for the contrary proposition.

However, Defendant has failed to show entitlement to an order striking the fourth prong of Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief respecting an order prohibiting certain promotions. Defendant argues that such an injunction would violate various employees’ contractual entitlements and therefore deprive them of due process, but does not present the contracts or otherwise elaborate on how the order sought would be unlawful. (Motion at p. 4.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED with leave to amend as to the requests for injunctive relief numbered (1), (2), and (3) in paragraphs 56, 69, and 81, and is DENIED as to the request numbered (4) in the same paragraphs.