Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV12824, Date: 2024-02-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV12824    Hearing Date: February 22, 2024    Dept: 61

Defendant Brink’s Incorporated’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

Defendant to provide notice.

I.                   MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate a controversy, a court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines the arbitration agreement exists, unless (1) the petitioner has waived its right to arbitrate; (2) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or (3) “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

“[T]he party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing the existence of a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. The role of the trial court is to sit as a trier of fact, weighing any affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, together with oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a determination on the issue of arbitrability.” (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.)

Defendant Brink’s Incorporated (Defendant) presents an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff Ciro Santoyo (Plaintiff) upon gaining employment with Defendant in September 2019. (Johnson Decl. Exh. 1.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims ought to be arbitrated pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906, in which the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted California’s rule prohibiting “division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate,” and allowed PAGA defendants “to compel arbitration of [a PAGA plaintiff’s] individual claim.” (Id. at p. 1925.) Defendant argues that this court should stay the representative PAGA claims pending resolution of Plaintiff’s individual arbitration. (Motion at pp. 5–7.)

Plaintiff in opposition argues that no stay of litigation in this matter should be entered because delay would prejudice prosecution of the PAGA claims. (Opposition at pp. 3–5.)

Plaintiff’s individual claims are properly ordered to arbitration, and a stay is properly entered on his representative claims pending resolution of his individual claims. Such an approach was embraced in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1123–1124:

First, Uber contends that unless Adolph's non-individual claims are dismissed, his PAGA action will run afoul of Viking River because he will be permitted to relitigate whether he is an aggrieved employee in court to establish standing even if he has agreed to resolve that issue in arbitration as part of his individual PAGA claim.

In response, Adolph explains that his PAGA action could proceed in the following manner if he were ordered to arbitrate his individual PAGA claim: First, the trial court may exercise its discretion to stay the non-individual claims pending the outcome of the arbitration pursuant to section 1281.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Following the arbitrator's decision, any party may petition the court to confirm or vacate the arbitration award under section 1285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the arbitrator determines that Adolph is an aggrieved employee in the process of adjudicating his individual PAGA claim, that determination, if confirmed and reduced to a final judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4), would be binding on the court, and Adolph would continue to have standing to litigate his nonindividual claims. If the arbitrator determines that Adolph is not an aggrieved employee and the court confirms that determination and reduces it to a final judgment, the court would give effect to that finding, and Adolph could no longer prosecute his non-individual claims due to lack of standing. (See Rocha v. U-Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 76–82, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 587.)

Uber makes no convincing argument why this manner of proceeding would be impractical or would require relitigating Adolph's status as an aggrieved employee in the context of his non-individual claims, and we see no basis for Uber's concern. In any event, Viking River makes clear that in cases where the FAA applies, no such relitigation may occur.

(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1123–1124.) The prejudice that Plaintiff identifies in opposition to the present motion — the potential loss of discoverable information and delayed recovery — would be applicable to any matter stayed pending arbitration, and no showing is made of concrete harm to be suffered by the stay.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.