Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV13276, Date: 2024-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13276    Hearing Date: April 5, 2024    Dept: 61

Plaintiff John Gross’ Motions to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production and Form and Special Interrogatories from Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC are GRANTED as to Special Interrogatories No. 38, 45, and 60, and Requests for Production No. 12, 37–72, and 82. Defendant is to redact information personal identifying consumer information. The motions are DENIED as to form interrogatories and the remaining requests for production.

Plaintiff John Gross’ Motion to Compel Deposition of Brandon Sangster is GRANTED, and Sangster’s deposition and document production is directed to take place on or before August 8, 2024.

I.       MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION

A party may make a motion compelling a witness’s deposition “after service of a deposition notice” if that witness “fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (a).) The motion must include a meet-and-confer declaration and show good cause for the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1), (2).)

Plaintiff John Gross (Plaintiff) seeks to compel the deposition of Brandon Sangster, the Customer Satisfaction Senior Technical Specialist for Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiff’s notice of deposition, served on November 13, 2023, sought information concerning Defendant’s warranty policies and procedures, the investigation into Plaintiff’s vehicle, and the production of related documents. (Motion Exh. 1.) Defendant responded with objections on November 20, 2023, based on overbreadth, privacy, burden, and privilege, and noted that the deposition was scheduled on a date for which Defendant and the witness were unavailable. (Motion Exh. 2.) Plaintiff on December 15, 2023, sent a letter seeking alternative dates and contesting Defendant’s objections. (Motion Exh. 3.) When Defendant did not respond, Plaintiff followed up by email on December 27, 2023. (Motion Exh. 4.) Defendant responded that day by stating that Sangster’s calendar “is quite filled” and that he “is also presently out of the office,” and that Defendant was working on providing deposition dates as “as soon as we secure one.” (Motion Exh. 5.) Plaintiff filed the present motion on January 18, 2024.

Defendant in opposition argues that as of January 30, 2024, it notified Plaintiff that August 8, 2024, is Sangster’s earliest available date for deposition. (Opposition at p. 1.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff did not adequate confer regarding its objections to the deposition. (Opposition at p. 2.)

Good cause supports the categories of examination and documents sought in the deposition notice, as all such categories relate to the subject vehicle at issue in this litigation and Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s warranty repairs. Contrary to Defendant’s argument in opposition, Plaintiff attempted to confer with Defendant regarding its objections to the notice, but Defendant failed to respond in any substantive way, much as it does not defend its objections in opposition to this motion. Thus Defendant may be properly directed to provide responses to the document requests at issue.

Plaintiff in reply argues that Defendant’s proffered August 8 date is too far in the future, and seeks an order compelling Sangster’s deposition within the next ten days. (Reply at pp. 2–3.) The parties present little evidence concerning either Sangster’s availability or the prejudice to be suffered by an August deposition date. Trial in this matter is currently set for September 2025.

The motion to compel deposition is therefore GRANTED, with Sangster’s deposition to take place on or before August 8, 2024.

II.                MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER

“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by propounding to any other party to the action written interrogatories to be answered under oath.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.010(a).) If a propounding party is not satisfied with the response served by a responding party, the former may move the court to compel further interrogatory responses.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403.)  The propounding party must demonstrate that the responses were incomplete, inadequate or evasive, or that the responding party asserted objections that are either without merit or too general.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300(a)(1)–(3); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 403.)

“A propounding party may demand a responding party to produce documents that are in their possession, custody or control. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010.) A party may likewise conduct discovery by propounding interrogatories to another party to be answered under oath. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.010, subd. (a).) The responding party must respond to the production demand either by complying, by representing that the party lacks the ability to comply, or by objecting to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210.) The responding party must respond to the interrogatories by answering or objecting. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.210, subd. (a).) If the responding party fails to serve timely responses, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses to the production demand and interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.)

Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories No. 12.1, 15.1, and 17.1, Special Interrogatories No. 38, 45, and 60, and Requests for Production No. 10, 12, 24, 32, 37–73, 76, 77, and 82.

1.      Form Interrogatories

No further responses are proper as to the Form Interrogatories, as Plaintiff has identified no deficiencies in the responses. Indeed, it is unclear why the motion was brought. Plaintiff contends, as to Interrogatory No. 12.1, that Defendant has not identified the technicians who serviced the vehicle. (Separate Statement at p. 3.) But Defendant identifies the technicians by name and technician number. (Ibid.) As to Form Interrogatory No. 15.1, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has “neither provided one single fact nor identified any witnesses or documents that supports its general denial or the bevy of affirmative defenses that Defendant has asserted.” (Separate Statement at p. 8.) But again, the response to the interrogatory sets forth facts, witnesses, and documents upon which the general denial and affirmative defenses are based. (Motion Exh. 2.) Plaintiff finally contends that a “simple look” at Defendant’s response to Interrogatory No. 17.1 reveals its inadequacy, but Plaintiff does not elaborate, and a simple look at the interrogatory response reveals descriptions of responsive facts, witnesses, and documents, at times incorporating references to earlier interrogatory responses.. (Separate Statement at pp. 13–14.) Plaintiff in reply appears to argue that the problem with the response is Defendant’s practice of grouping certain requests for admission together and providing answers to more than one admission at a time, arguing that Defendant “must separate out each request” but “did not separate out each request.” (Reply at p. 4.) But Plaintiff identifies no authority requiring Defendant to separate out each request if the responses to different requests would be the same. Plaintiff is entitled to no relief on his form interrogatories.

2.      Special Interrogatories

Further responses are required to Special Interrogatories No. 38, 45, and 60, however. Defendant primarily objects that the interrogatories at issue exceeded the 35 permitted by Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.030. However, Plaintiff supported the interrogatories with a declaration of necessity as required under Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.040, and Defendant did not object to the interrogatories on the grounds that they exceeded the amount allowed.

Moreover, the interrogatories themselves are supported by good cause, Interrogatory No. 38 asked whether the written warranty provided to Plaintiff was a written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., which was effectively a contention interrogatory permitted by Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.010, subd. (b). Defendant’s objection that such interrogatories seek attorney work product has been rejected. (See Burke v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 285.)

Defendant’s argument as to Interrogatory No. 45 is also defective. Although Defendant responded only with boilerplate objections, Defendant now contends that it cannot identify the individual who made any decision on Plaintiff’s repurchase request because no such request was ever made. (Opposition at pp. 8–9.) Such information ought to have been included in Defendant’s interrogatory response, rather than the opposition to the present motion.

Defendant finally objects to Interrogatory No. 60, which asks Defendant to describe the process by which a technical service bulletin is recalled or superseded, on the grounds that the subject matter goes beyond the bounds of this lemon-law dispute, and further, that Defendant “is not involved in the process by which a technical bulletin is recalled or superseded.” (Opposition at pp. 9–10.)

These arguments are unpersuasive. As with Interrogatory No. 45, information concerning Defendant’s role in the TSB process ought to have been put in the interrogatory, rather than raised in opposition to a motion to compel further. Additionally, good cause supports the interrogatory, as a lemon law plaintiff is not limited to discovery concerning the subject vehicle at issue. may use evidence of other vehicles to pursue their Song Beverly claims. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.) A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

Case authority supports this position. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced an evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective  because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.”  (Id. at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.) And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus merited civil penalties.

The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the special interrogatories.

3.      Requests for Production

Plaintiff seeks further responses to Requests for Production No. 10, 12, 24, 32, 37–73, 76, 77, and 82. The bulk of these requests — Nos. 37–72 — seek documents related to customer complaints and internal investigations related to particular issues identified by reference to applicable repair orders on the subject vehicle, including issues with the hood latch, charge port label, acoustic vehicle alert system warning, image processing module B, the auxiliary and main batteries, gateway module, battery energy control module, traction battery, and battery management system. Other requests, including Requests No. 12, 24, 73, 76, and 82, sought information particular to the subject vehicle in this case. Requests No. 10 sought advertising media related to the subject vehicle, while Request No. 32 sought documents related to Defendant’s customer loyalty program.

Defendant objects on the basis of undue burden. (Opposition at pp. 7–8.) Defendant’s argument is based solely on the breadth of discovery that Plaintiff has served, amounting to 237 total discovery requests, including interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission. (Opposition at p. 8.)

“The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.020, subd. (a).) However, “the party opposing discovery has an obligation to supply the basis for this determination,” and to provide evidence “showing the quantum of work required.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.) Here, Defendant has not provided evidence to show that the quantum of work required to respond to this discovery is unreasonable.

As noted with regard to the Special Interrogatories, Plaintiff’s discovery is not limited solely to the vehicle they purchased. Although Defendant argues information regarding customer complaints may implicate the privacy rights of other consumers, Defendant may account for this potential intrusion by redacting personal information from its production.

However, good cause has not been shown for all requests. Request No. 10 seeks advertising materials, but Plaintiff’s case is for breach of warranty. Request No. 24 seeks documents relating to the certification of the vehicle, but Plaintiff offers no explanation as to the relevance of such documents. Likewise, Plaintiff provides no explanation as to the requests regarding the customer loyalty program (Request No. 32), or the “as-built data,” “pinpoint tests,” or “VIN digit breakdown” regarding the subject vehicle (Requests No. 73, 76, and 77), which are terms that Defendant objects to as unintelligible, and which Plaintiff does not clarify in his moving papers.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to Requests No. 12, 37–72, and 82. Defendant is to redact information personal identifying consumer information.