Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV13829, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13829    Hearing Date: January 16, 2024    Dept: 61

Defendant Mary Ellen Attridge’s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $49,303.81.

 

Defendant to provide notice.

 

I.                ATTORNEY FEES

Defendant Mary Ellen Attridge (Defendant) seeks $56,304.96 in attorney fees and costs after prevailing on her anti-SLAPP motion against Plaintiff Okorie Okorocha (Plaintiff). Motion at p. 2.)

Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, subd. (c)(1) states that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.” “The party prevailing on a special motion to strike may seek an attorney fee award through three different avenues: simultaneously with litigating the special motion to strike; by a subsequent noticed motion, . . .  or as part of a cost memorandum.” (Carpenter v. Jack In The Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.)

The statute authorizing attorney fees to a successful bringer of an anti-SLAPP motion also authorizes fees incurred defending against an unsuccessful appeal. (See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)  In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment.  (See id.) 

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method.  The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  “Fundamental to its determination . . . [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . in the presentation of the case.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).)  A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney.  (Id. at p. 49.)  Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues.  A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”  (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV).)  The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys’ fees are recoverable.  (See id. at p. 624.)

Defendant’s requested $56,304.96 in attorney fees and costs represents 121.60 hours of attorney and law clerk work, at rates ranging from $175 to $625 per hour, with an average rate working out to $455.38 per hour. (Gray Decl. Exh. E.) The division of hours presented in the ledger of hours shows:

 

·       Eight hours of work from June 26 to June 30, 2023, related to the filing of the case prior to preparation of the anti-SLAPP motion;

·       43.7 hours of work from July 6 to July 31, 2023, preparing and filing the anti-SLAPP motion;

·       24.8 hours spent from July 22 to September 6, 2023, reviewing Plaintiff’s discovery and opposing his application to conduct discovery during the pendency of the anti-SLAPP motion;

·       28 hours spent from September 11 to October 5, 2023, reviewing Plaintiff’s opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, drafting the reply, and attending the hearing;

·       17.1 hours spent preparing the present motion for attorney fees.

 

(Gray Decl. Exh. E.)

 

Plaintiff in opposition argues that the fees sought are unreasonably high. Plaintiff specifically questions why more than 100 hours were spent to “draft one motion.” (Opposition at pp. 5–7.) Plaintiff argues for a 50% reduction in the fees sought, and seeks a referal to the state bar against Defendant’s counsel for misconduct. (Opposition at pp. 3, 7.)

 

Defendant in reply raises the amount of fees sought to $66,327.50, arising from Plaintiff’s appeal and new correspondence threatening further litigation against Defendant and her counsel. (Supp. Gray Decl. Exh. E.)

 

Plaintiff’s opposition to the present motion does not accurately characterize the fees sought. Defendant’s fees were not incurred in drafting and defending a single motion, but also included efforts to defend against Plaintiff’s premature efforts to obtain discovery in this action, including via motion practice of his own. (See 9/6/2023 Order.) It is not surprising that substantial fees would be incurred in bringing an anti-SLAPP motion in this context.

 

However, certain reductions are appropriate. Specifically, Defendant claims 71.7 hours of attorney work in bringing the anti-SLAPP motion, not considering the time spent opposing Plaintiff’s own motion. This amount of time is excessive, given the relative simplicity of this case. Plaintiff alleged a single claim for defamation on a fact-pattern encompassing one email chain, which even in the relatively complex procedural device of an anti-SLAPP motion ought not to have called for 70 hours of attorney work. This is especially true when Plaintiff’s own discovery motion essentially addressed the substance and legal sufficiency of his claims, and therefore ought to have substantially reduced the time necessary to prepare a reply to Plaintiff’s anti-SLAPP opposition. In this light, a reasonable amount of time to claim in bringing the anti-SLAPP motion would have been 45 hours, a 26.7 hour reduction, amounting (at the average rate charged) to a lodestar reduction of $12,158.65.

 

Defendant may justly claim an additional 9.9 hours and $5,157.50 of attorney work expended in replying to Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion, as evidenced by the supplemental declaration submitted therewith(Gray Decl. Exh. 5.) However, Defendant’s expenses related to the appeal are not properly awarded until they prevail on that front.

 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the amount of $49,303.81.