Judge Gregory Keosian, Case Number: 23STCV18147, Date: 2024-03-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV18147, Date: 2024-03-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18147 Hearing Date: March 25, 2024 Dept: 61

Plaintiff Fermina Chavez’s Motions to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production from Defendant General Motors are GRANTED as to the Requests for Production, with the condition that Defendant shall redact requests containing personal identifying information of customers. The motion is GRANTED as to Interrogatories No. 23, 25, 39, 41, and 43, and DENIED as to Interrogatories No. 14, 20, and 26.

Plaintiff to provide Notice.

I. MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER

“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by propounding to any other party to the action written interrogatories to be answered under oath.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.010(a).) If a propounding party is not satisfied with the response served by a responding party, the former may move the court to compel further interrogatory responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403.) The propounding party must demonstrate that the responses were incomplete, inadequate or evasive, or that the responding party asserted objections that are either without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300(a)(1)–(3); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 403.)

“A propounding party may demand a responding party to produce documents that are in their possession, custody or control. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010.) A party may likewise conduct discovery by propounding interrogatories to another party to be answered under oath. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.010, subd. (a).) The responding party must respond to the production demand either by complying, by representing that the party lacks the ability to comply, or by objecting to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210.) The responding party must respond to the interrogatories by answering or objecting. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.210, subd. (a).) If the responding party fails to serve timely responses, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses to the production demand and interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.)

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to Requests for Production No. 10, 11, 20, 23–26, 28, 29, 37–39, and 44–68, as well as Special Interrogatories No. 14, 20, 23, 25, 26, 39, 41, and 43, from Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant).

Requests for Production No. 10, 11, 20, and 23–26 concerned Defendant’s warranty policies, procedures, and practices. Requests No. 28 and 29 sought Defendant’s policies and procedures for issuing recalls and technical service bulletins. (Separate Statement at pp. 15–19.) Request No. 44 sought documents related to communications with repair facilities concerning the subject vehicle, while the remaining requests (No. 37–39 and 45–68) concern documents related to various defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle, and customer complaints related to the same. For each request, Defendant responded to the requests with objections, stating that no documents would be produced.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not meet and confer in good faith. (Opposition at pp. 3–4.) However, this argument is unpersuasive. The parties exchanged letters regarding the requests and interrogatories at issue in this motion, and exchanged and signed a protective order pursuant to Defendant’s request. (Motion Exhs. J–N.) The present motion followed the parties’ offering irreconcilable positions on the merits of their respective requests and responses.

Good cause supports the requests for production. Contrary to Defendant’s arguments in opposition, Plaintiffs may use evidence of other vehicles to pursue their Song Beverly claims. To succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers for the civil penalty. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

There is case authority for this proposition. The court in Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 993–994, held that Bentley’s failure to turn over customer complaints regarding defects on other Bentleys to support the plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act was an abuse of discovery so flagrant that the trial court abused its discretion by not imposing terminating sanctions. Other cases have embraced an evidentiary rule similar to that only implicit in Doppes. In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular transmission was defective because he had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was “problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles.” (Id. at p. 154.) The court held that “[s]uch evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.” (Ibid.) And in another case, Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 347, the court held that a manufacturer’s internal emails concerning a mechanical defect in a lemon law case were relevant to show that the manufacturer “intentionally chose not to honor the express warranty,” and thus merited civil penalties. Thus Plaintiff is not limited to requests concerning the particular vehicle at issue.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s document requests impermissibly seek trade-secret material concerning its internal investigations of car components and warranty policies and procedures. (Opposition at pp. 8–9.) Defendant also argues that the requests may include personally identifying information for Defendant’s consumers. (Ibid.) Defendant shall indeed redact consumer identifying information. However, Defendant’s trade secrets offer no persuasive basis to deny Plaintiff’s request for relevant discovery, where any confidential materials may be adequately preserved by the entry of an appropriate protective order, as has already been entered in this case.

Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories No. 14, 20, 23, 25, 26, 39, 41, and 43, largely sought the identification of persons with information related to the subject matter of this action. Interrogatories No. 14, 20, and 23 sought the identification of all persons who performed warranty repairs on the vehicle, who tested or inspected the subject vehicle during a defined period, and persons with knowledge of Plaintiff’s notice of defects to Defendant. (Separate Statement at pp. 2–7.) Defendant responded by pointing to documents such as Global Activity Reports, Global Warranty History Report, and repair orders for the subject vehicle. (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues that because the information lies in the custody of Defendant’s agents, Defendant may be compelled to produce it. (Separate Statement at pp. 2–7.)

Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive as to Interrogatories No. 14 and 20. The case cited for the proposition that the dealerships conducting the relevant repairs are agents of the manufacturer is Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 886, but this case did not decide that a car dealership was the agent of a car manufacturer for repair purposes, but that repairs made by an authorized dealer counted as repairs by a “representative in this state” for the purpose of calculating a reasonable number of repair attempts under Civil Code § 1793.2, subd. (d). (Ibrahim, supra, 214 Cal.app.3d at pp. 885–886.) It did not decide that dealerships are the agents of manufacturers for the purposes of whether the given information is in their possession or control. The motion is therefore DENIED as to Interrogatories No. 14 and 20.

However, Plaintiff’s argument is persuasive as to Interrogatory No. 23. This interrogatory sought the identification of persons with knowledge of Plaintiff’s notice to Defendant of defects in the vehicle, i.e. someone receiving information on Defendant’s behalf. Defendant’s reference to documents that contain the identifies of those who “serviced, maintained, or repaired the subject vehicle” under Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.230 is insufficient, because the interrogatory does not ask for such information. The motion is GRANTED as to Interrogatory No. 23.

Interrogatories No. 25 and 39 sought the identity of individuals in Defendant’s customer relations department having jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint, to which Defendant offered objections. (Separate Statement at pp. 7–10.) Defendant argues that it has responded by offering relevant policies and procedures. (Opposition at p. 7.) It has not offered the identifies of the individuals sought, however. Thus the motion is GRANTED as to Interrogatories No. 25 and 39.

Interrogatories No. 41 and 43, sought the identity of individuals responsible for the investigation of the subject vehicle and the decision whether or not to repurchase or replace it. (Separate Statement at pp. 11–12.) Defendant responded with objections and references to a broad array of documents, including a warranty global history report and repair orders, which plainly offer no responsive information as to the interrogatories at issue. (Ibid.) The motion is GRANTED as to Interrogatories No. 41 and 43.

The motion is DENIED, however, as to Interrogatory No. 26, which sought the identification of Defendant’s employee in California “most knowledgeable regarding your warranty policies,” given that such an inquiry properly awaits a notice of deposition served under Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.230. (Separate Statement at p. 9.)

In summary, the motion as to requests for production is GRANTED, with the condition that Defendant shall redact requests containing personal identifying information of customers. The motion is GRANTED as to Interrogatories No. 23, 25, 39, 41, and 43, and DENIED as to Interrogatories No. 14, 20, and 26.