Judge Gregory Keosian, Case Number: 23STCV20963, Date: 2024-01-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV20963, Date: 2024-01-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV20963 Hearing Date: January 29, 2024 Dept: 61

Defendants Lin Dong, Guoqing Li, and Chloe Li’s Motion to Transfer Venue to Riverside County is GRANTED. Sanctions are ordered against Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $961.65

Defendants to provide notice.

I. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

“The court may, on timely motion, order transfer of an action when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court. The moving party must overcome the presumption that the plaintiff has selected the proper venue. Thus, it is the moving defendant's burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff's venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.” (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836.)

Defendants Lin Dong, Guoqing Li, and Chloe Li (Defendants) move to transfer venue to Riverside County under Code of Civil Procedure § 395, subd. (a), as this is the county “where the defendants or some of them reside,” as well as the county where the alleged “injury occur[red].” (Motion at p. 4.) Indeed, the Complaint alleges that “[v]enue is proper in Riverside County because all of the allegations herein named occurred in this County, and the Plaintiffs and Defendants both reside in this county.” (Complaint ¶ 9.)

Plaintiffs in opposition effectively confirm the allegation in the Complaint that venue is proper in Riverside County. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Jacob Partiyeli, indeed states that he only filed the action in Los Angeles County after repeated attempts to file in Riverside County resulted in clerk’s rejection of the pleadings. (Motion at p. 1.) Plaintiffs now argue, however, that they have changed their minds as to venue because, according to Partiyeli, “most, if not all, of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses reside in Los Angeles County, and such crucial witnesses are senior citizens.” (Partiyeli Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs further argue that the motion is untimely. (Opposition at pp. 2–3.)

Plaintiffs have no basis to oppose the present motion. The motion is timely, as the date for filing a motion to change venue is the same as the date to file a responsive pleading (Code Civ. Proc. 396b, subd. (a)), which here was extended by Defendants’ filing of a declaration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) This was pointed out in Defendants’ initial motion. (Motion at p. 3.) Nor is there any basis to retain jurisdiction of this action for “the convenience of the witnesses or the ends of justice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 396b, subd. (d).) Plaintiffs advance no evidence on this point except the vague assurance that unnamed, unnumbered, and unexplained “witnesses,” reside in Los Angeles County. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) This is insufficient basis to maintain the case in what Plaintiffs’ counsel knew at the outset to be the wrong venue.

Plaintiffs’ counsel is subject to sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure § 396b, for opposing this motion and failing to accept Defendants’ stipulation to transfer:

(b) In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action. In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. As between the party and his or her attorney, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney not chargeable to the party. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursuant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party's papers, or on the court's own noticed motion, and after opportunity to be heard.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 396b, subd. (b).) Defendants sent repeated correspondence to Plaintiffs prior to the bringing of this motion, seeking either this action’s dismissal and re-filing in Riverside, or a stipulation to change venue. (Rasmussen Decl. Exhs. A, B.) Plaintiffs’ counsel did not respond to these inquiries, and instead served discovery upon Defendants. (Rasmussen Decl. Exh. B.) There was no good faith basis to oppose this motion.

The motion is GRANTED. Sanctions are awarded against Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $961.65, per the declaration of Defendants’ counsel. (Rasmussen Decl. ¶¶ 10–11.)

Dated: January 29, 2024