Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: 23STCV21391, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21391 Hearing Date: January 24, 2024 Dept: 61
Defendant
Vladimir Rozumny’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons is DENIED.
I.
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subd. (a)(1) states: “A
defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any
further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a
notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes . . . (1) To quash
service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him
or her.”
“‘[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of
process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction.” (Ellard v. Conway (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.) Mere notice of litigation does not confer personal
jurisdiction absent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements for
service of summons. (MJS Enterprises,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557.)
While
courts are not required to accept self-serving evidence — such as declarations
that one was not served — submitted to support a motion to quash, facial
defects of the proof of service will rebut its presumption of proper service. (American Exp. Centurion Bank, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) The
burden is on a plaintiff to prove facts showing that service was effective. (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 403, 413.)
Substitute service
is allowed when personal service cannot be effect by reasonable diligence by
leaving the summons and complaint at the “dwelling house, usual place of abode,
usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States
Postal Service post office box, in
the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in
charge,” and by subsequently mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by
first-class mail to the person to be served at the place the summons and
complaint were left. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).)
Defendant Vladimir
Rozumny (Defendant) moves to quash the service of summons alleged against him
in a proof of substitute service filed with this court on September 18, 2023.
Although that proof of service states that substitute service was made on September
16, 2023, at 1:05 p.m., upon a “co occupant” called “Svetlana Doe,” Defendant
submits a declaration stating that, although he lives on the premises served:
·
“I have
surveillance footage of the surrounding area [of the premises served ] . . .
and no process server is shown to have entered the premises on September 16,
2023, between the hours of 12:51 PM and 2:00 PM.”
·
“I do
not have a co occupant by the name of Svetlana Doe.
·
“I do
not know anyone by the name of Svetlana Doe.”
(Rozumny Decl. ¶¶
2–5.)
Defendant has not
shown any basis for quashing service here. Service as stated in the proof
thereof is supported by the sworn statement of the registered process server,
creating a presumption in favor of the facts stated therein. (See Evid.
Code § 647.) Defendant’s declaration, meanwhile, is framed in an overtly
evasive manner. Defendant does not deny receiving the complaint and summons on
the date in question, and admits to residing on the premises. Defendant states
that he does not know a “Svetlana Doe,” neglecting that “Doe” is generally a
placeholder for an unknown surname, not intended as a specific appellation.
Defendant is silent as to whether he knows or lives with anyone else, let alone
someone by the name of “Svetlana.” Likewise, Defendant’s characterization of
the surveillance footage — which he does not submit with the motion — is
pointedly specific as to the fact that no process server entered the premises
after 12:51 p.m. on the day in question, raising the natural inference that the
process server could have entered the premises at any time before 12:51 p.m.
Defendant thus does not rebut the testimony of the process server.
The motion is
therefore DENIED.