Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: BC697640, Date: 2024-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC697640 Hearing Date: January 17, 2024 Dept: 61
Defendant
Ronald B. Hasson’s Motion to Vacate Judgment is therefore DENIED.
I.
Motion to vacate judgment
A
judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special
verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and
vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for
either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of
the party and entitling the party to a different judgment:
1.
Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not
supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the
statement of decision shall be amended and corrected.
2. A
judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 663.)
“[S]ection 663 is a remedy to be
used when a trial court draws incorrect conclusions of law or renders an
erroneous judgment on the basis of uncontroverted evidence.” (Simac Design,
Inc. v. Alciati (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 146, 153.) Section 663 “does not
authorize . . . additional findings.” (Knapp v. City of Newport Beach
(1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 669, 682.)
Defendant and
Cross-Complainant Ronald Hasson (Defendant) seeks an order vacating the
judgment entered on December 1, 2023, and entering a new judgment with the
following amendments: finding in favor of Defendant’s cause of action for
trespass alleged in the cross-complaint; removing all damages awarded to
Plaintiff Robert P. Carreon (Plaintiff) for damage to the driveway wall;
removing all damages for plants; removing treble damages for the plants; and
awarding no damages for gate repair. (Motion at pp. 3–10.)
Defendant’s argument
as to his trespass cause of action in the cross-complaint is as follows.
Defendant notes that his claim for trespass arose from Plaintiff’s sewer line
crossing his property. (Motion at p. 3.) And this court found that no easements
claimed by either party existed, meaning that this court found no easement for
Plaintiff’s sewer line across Defendant’s property. (Motion at pp. 3–4.) Thus
Defendant argues that the judgment should be revised to find the cause of
action in his favor, and to enter damages in the amount of $150,000.00 for the
replacement and rerouting of Plaintiff’s sewer line. (Motion at p. 4.)
This argument is
unpersuasive. Section 663 does not permit the making of additional findings
after judgment is entered. (Knapp, supra, 186 Cal.App.2d at p.
682.) There is thus no basis for the court to amend the judgment to incorporate
a damages finding not already made. Moreover, Defendant identifies no evidence
that he has suffered damages from the sewer line within the three-year
limitations period for trespass. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338.) Finally, there is no
reason to believe that Defendant, rather than Plaintiff, would bear the
$150,000 cost of rerouting Plaintiff’s sewer line.
Defendant’s
argument as to the $44,420.58 awarded against him, representing 25% of the cost
for repairing the damaged driveway wall, is also unpersuasive. Defendant argues
that these damages are calculated for a new retaining wall with different
features than the original, rather than the wall as it existed prior to
Defendant’s grading of his yard. (Defendant at pp. 4–6.) But this court found, based on
expert testimony, that Defendant’s piling of soil near the wall was a
contributing factor to the wall’s damage, which was showing signs of probable
failure. The additional features that Defendant decries are features which are
reasonably necessary to maintain the wall intact against the soil placed there
in large part by Defendant. Cost of repair is a legitimate measure of damage. (See Rovetti v. City and
County of San Francisco (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 973, 978.) Defendant is
justly liable for damages incurred rebuilding the wall when his actions made
rebuilding the wall necessary.
Defendant’s argument against treble damages is also
unpersuasive. Treble damages are permitted “[f]or wrongful injuries to timber,
trees, or underwood upon the land of another . . . except that where the trespass was casual or
involuntary,” or the injurer had probable cause to believe the land was their
own. (Civ. Code § 3346, subd. (a).) Although Defendant argues that this court
found against an award of punitive damages, the absence of malice or oppression
under Civil Code § 3294 does not mean that the conduct is inadvertent or
casual. (Opposition at pp. 6–7.) Defendant’s argument as to the lack of
evidence supporting the value of the plants at issue is also unpersuasive, as
the damages in question were supported by the testimony of Plaintiff’s arborist
expert. Defendant’s argument as to the insufficiency of this evidence is not a
basis for relief under Code of Civil Procedure § 663. Defendant’s final
argument as to the $733.63 charged for damages to Plaintiff’s gate also sounds
exclusively in the weight to be afforded to the evidence presented by
Plaintiff’s repair estimate, and furnishes no basis for relief.
The motion is therefore DENIED.