Judge: Gregory Keosian, Case: BC721810, Date: 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC721810    Hearing Date: October 18, 2022    Dept: 61

Defendants Magnum Property Investments LLC, Strategic Magnum Holdings, Peter Baer, and BDR Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Fifth Amended Complaint is DENIED.

 

I.                   MOTION TO STRIKE

Equis moves to strike Zepeda’s prayer for punitive damages against it on the grounds that all of the discriminatory and harassing conduct is alleged on the part of LA Care, not Equis itself. (Motion at pp. 9–12.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)

Defendants Defendants Magnum Property Investments LLC, Strategic Magnum Holdings, Peter Baer, and BDR Inc. (Defendants) move to strike the prayer for punitive damages in the Fifth Amended Complaint (5AC) alleged against the entity defendants. (Motion at pp. 7–9.) Defendants argue that the 5AC does not state facts supporting the existence of malice, oppression, or fraud.

Punitive damages are allowed in non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294.) The terms are defined as:

“Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

“Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

“Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) Proof of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Dawes v. Sup.Ct. (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.) Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence or other nonintentional torts if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant acted with the state of mind described as “conscious disregard” of the potential dangers to others. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) When malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 794, 713 (“College Hospital”).)

The 5AC alleges the existence of malice and oppression within the meaning of Civil Code § 3294. It is alleged that Defendants changed the locks to the doors of Plaintiffs’ property, padlocked the entrances, disabled access, and removed Plaintiff’s personal property from the premises, in order to create the impression that the property was abandoned and to absolve themselves of evicting Plaintiffs via lawful procedures. (5AC ¶¶ 23–24.) It is alleged that managing agents, officers, and directors of Defendants were responsible for the decision to engage in this conduct. (5AC ¶¶ 55–57.)

The motion is DENIED.