Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 20SMCV00591, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20SMCV00591    Hearing Date: March 14, 2024    Dept: O

  Case Name:  Coppelson v. N.E Designs, Inc, et al.

SUBJECT:                 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY:   Defendants N.E. Designs, Inc. and Eran Gispan

RESP. PARTY:         Plaintiff Aaron Coppelson

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendants N.E. Designs, Inc. and Erin Gispan’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all causes of action in Plaintiff Aaron Coppelson’s Complaint.   Plaintiff is to submit the proposed judgment.

            Defendants N.E. Designs, Inc and Erin Gispans’ Objections Nos 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, are SUSTAINED, and Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12,  are OVERRULED

            Plaintiff Aaron Coppelson’s Objections are OVERRULED.

Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Code of Civil Procedure §437c(o)(2).) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.” (Id.) If unable to prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact, summary judgment or summary adjudication in favor of the defendant is proper. (Id.)

“The burden on a defendant moving for summary judgment based upon the assertion of an affirmative defense is different than the burden to show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established. Instead of merely submitting evidence to negate a single element of the plaintiff's cause of action, or offering evidence such as vague or insufficient discovery responses that the plaintiff does not have evidence to create an issue of fact as to one or more elements of his or her case the defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense. If the defendant does not meet this burden, the motion must be denied.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467–468.)

I.                Defendants Establish a Complete Defense as all Claims Are Barred by Statute of Limitations.

            Defendants N.E. Designs, Inc. and Erin Gispan (“Gispan Defendants”) move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Aaron Coppelson’s (“Coppelson”) complaint arguing all causes of action are barred by their relative statute of limitations.  The Gispan Defendants argue that Coppelson’s claims all arose on, or prior to 12-29-14, when Coppelson sold the property at issue, 9410 Sierra Mar Place (the “Property”). (See SSUF, No. 10; Defendants Compendium of Exhibits (“Defendants Compendium”), Ex. 4, the “Grant Deed” and Ex. 17, Coppelson Deposition at pp. 61:22-62:9; 91:4-6.) The Gispan Defendants argue that upon sale of the Property the Gispan Defendants were no longer obligated to perform any contractual services for Coppelson. (SSUF, No. 22.) The contract, entered into on 2-5-14, between Coppelson and the Gispan Defendants, which included no time provision for completion, was for the purpose of preparing designs and plans sufficient to obtain LADBS approval for the Property (SSUF, No 7, Compendium, Ex 10, “Building Design Contract”; Gispan Decl., ¶ 7.)

            The Gispan Defendants show all causes of action arise out of the breach of contract claim which has the longest statute of limitations out of all the claims at four years. (SSUF, Nos. 1, 22, 25–39; see Code Civ. Proc., § 337 [Breach of contract claims must be brought “[w]ithin four years.”]; see also Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App. 4th, 336, 364 [“The UCL has a four-year statute of limitations.”].) Because more than four years had passed between the latest possibly alleged claim discovery date of the 12-19-14 Property Sale and 4-17-20, when the Complaint was filed, all claims are time barred. (Ibid.)

            The Gispan Defendants have established a complete defense to all causes of action and the burden now shifts to Coppelson show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense.” (Union Bank, supra, 31 Cal.App.4^th at p. 590.)

II.             Plaintiff Fails To Meet His Burden To Show That The Discovery Rule Applies To The 5-14-19 CAB Letter Thus Tolling The Statute Of Limitations

            Coppelson argues all claims were tolled by the delayed discovery rule until 5-14-19, when Coppelson “received a letter from the California Architects Board [“CAB’] informing Plaintiff of the result of his Consumer Complaint.” (SSUF, No 26, Plaintiff’s Compendium of Exhibits (“Plaintiff’s Compendium”), Ex. C, D.) The CAB letter allegedly informed Coppelson that the Gispan Defendants received a citation on 1-30-19 for the Coppelson’s consumer complaint filed on 5-29-18. (Ibid.) Coppelson does not dispute the fact that he knew Defendant Eran Gispan was not a licensed architect “as early as 2013.” (SSUF No. 19.)

             “[U]nder the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has reason to suspect an injury and some wrongful cause, unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that a reasonable investigation at that time would not have revealed a factual basis for that particular cause of action. . . . Under the discovery rule, suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause of action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements would generally trigger the statute of limitations period.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 803, 807.)

            “The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have information of circumstances to put them on inquiry or if they have the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to their investigation.” (Id., at pp. 807–08.) “[P]laintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by such an investigation.” (Ibid.)

            Coppelson does not provide any evidence for the delay in investigating the claims in between the 2014 Property sale and the 2018 CAB consumer complaint filing, and then to the eventual filing the complaint in this action in 2020. The discovery rule obligates Plaintiffs to conduct a reasonable investigation upon discovery of injury or damages, which here Coppelson declares to have occurred upon the 12-19- 24 Property Sale. (See Coppelson Decl., ¶ 12 [“At the time of the sales, 9410 Sierra Mar, LLC, was provided a set of plans that were not approved by the City of Los Angeles as was represented and required by the terms of the Agreement. Due to the delays in the design services being rendered a significant overhead related to the project, 9410 Sierra Mar, LLC was unable to continue developing 9410 Sierra Mar Place and 9416 Sierra Mar Place.”]

            Eisenberg Village, Etc. v. Suffolk Construction Co., Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1201 is instructive. There, the Plaintiff brought a claim against a contractor, whom the Plaintiff later found was unlicensed, after the one-year statute of limitation for the claim. The Plaintiff argued that he was unaware of the contractor’s license situation “any time during the construction of the project,” thus the discovery rule should apply. (Eisenberg Village, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1207–1208.) The Court held the statute of limitation barred Plaintiff’s claim because the claim starts accruing when the cause of action is complete with all its elements, and “the cause of action is complete when an unlicensed contractor completes or ceases performance of the act or contract at issue.” (Id., at pp. 1214–1215.)

            Similarly, the Gispan Defendants were unlicensed, Coppelson knew this fact as early as 2013, and Coppelson was placed on inquiry notice on 12-19-14 Property sale, the moment the Gispan Defendants ceased performance on the contract. Thus, the filing of the Complaint on 4-17-20 is more than the maximum four-year statute of limitation from 12-19-14 barring all causes of action within the Complaint.

            The Court finds that Coppelson has not met his burden to show a triable issue of material fact as to the Gispan Defendants complete Statute of Limitations defense to all causes of action. Thus, the Gispan Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.