Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 20SMCV00691, Date: 2023-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20SMCV00691    Hearing Date: May 23, 2023    Dept: O

  Case Name:  Vahmi, et al. v. Jarrell, et al.          

SUBJECT:                 MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF KASRA VAHMI’S ANSWERS TO DEPOSITION QUESTIONS OF DEFENDANT WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY FSB, AS TRUSTEE FOR STANWICH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PREVENTING DISCOVERY ABUSE, FOR APPROVAL OF A DISCOVERY REFEREE, AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,971

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust

RESP. PARTY:         None

TENTATIVE RULING

  Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Vahmi’s Answers to Deposition Questions of Defendant Wilmington, for Protective Order Preventing Discovery Abuse, for Approval of a Discovery Referee and for Monetary Sanctions in the amount of $3,971 is GRANTED as to the request to compel answers, protective order and monetary sanctions and DENIED as to the request for appointment of a discovery referee.

I.  Compel Answers to Deposition Questions—GRANT

Defendant argues Plaintiff Kasra Vahmi refused to answer certain deposition cases based on frivolous objections, such as martial communications privilege, attorney client privilege, Rifkind objections and work product objections.  If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully answer the interrogatories and RFAs. See Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220–221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.

Plaintiff Vahmi did not file an opposition to this motion to compel.  Plaintiff Vahmi fails to justify his objections and refusals to respond to Defendant’s deposition questions. 

Based on a review of the excerpts of the deposition set forth in the separate statement, Plaintiff’s counsel’s objections are meritless.  None of the questions requested information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, the marital privilege or Rifkind v. Sup. Ct. (Good) (1994) 22 Cal.App.4^th 1255, 1259. 

II. Appointment of Discovery Referee—DENY

Parties originally stipulated to appointment of a discovery referee to oversee the.  See Motion, Dec. of C. Kausen, Ex. 1, Case Management Order, ¶¶2-3.  Parties stipulated that the three sets of parties (Plaintiffs, Defendants Will Jarrell and Aldridge Pite, LLP and Defendants Wilmington Savings Fund Society) would divide the cost of the discovery referee three-ways.  Id.  Plaintiff reneged on the agreement, however, at the status conference on 3-17-23.  See Motion, Dec. of L. Wozniak, ¶2.

            Based on a review of the deposition excerpts, Plaintiff’s counsel asserted patently frivolous objections that disrupted the deposition.  However, the disruptions were not so beyond the pale that a discovery referee is “necessary” to oversee the deposition pursuant to CCP §639(a)(5). If Plaintiff’s counsel continues to assert frivolous, disruptive objections, the Court will entertain a motion to appoint discovery referee at a later date. 

III. Protective Order—GRANT

Defendant asks that the Court issue a protective order preventing Plaintiff’s counsel from instructing his client not to answer questions that do not seek any privileged, private or constitutional information.  Plaintiff’s counsel asserted multiple frivolous objections throughout the deposition.  Such conduct qualifies as a misuse of discovery under CCP §2023.010(e), “making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery.”  Good cause exists to issue a protective order prohibiting Plaintiff’s counsel from asserting frivolous, legally baseless objections to the deposition questions. 

IV.  Sanctions