Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 22SMCV00186, Date: 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00186    Hearing Date: January 24, 2023    Dept: O

  Case Name:  Hurricane Holdings, LLC v. Gonzalez, et al.

Case No.:                    22SMCV00186

Complaint Filed:                   2-8-22

Hearing Date:            1-24-23

Discovery C/O:                     7-28-23

Calendar No.:            11       

Discover Motion C/O:          8-14-23

POS:                           OK

Trial Date:                             8-28-23

SUBJECT:                 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Victoria Gonzalez

RESP. PARTY:         Plaintiff Hurricane Holdings, LLC

 

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant Victoria Gonzalez’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs pursuant to CCP §425.16(c) is GRANTED in the reduced amount of ________________  in fees and $911.69 in costs.  The Court’s reduction of fees reflects Defendant’s partial victory on Defendant’s SLAPP Motion. 

                                         

Defendant Gonzalez partially prevailed on the SLAPP motion filed on 5-9-22 and heard on 9-15-22.  Defendant’s SLAPP Motion was granted as to the fraud cause of action and denied as to the trespass and conversion causes of action.  Defendant achieved a significant victory by eliminating the fraud cause of action.  Defendant reduced the burden of discovery in this action and narrowed the scope of issues to trespass and conversion.  See Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181, 232, 233 (defendants success on SLAPP as to one of two causes of action was “not trivial or a pyrrhic victory”; partial SLAPP narrowed litigation, impacting discovery, motion practice and trial preparation, and eliminated potential liability for tort other than malicious prosecution); Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 (SLAPP fees can only be denied partially prevailing defendant where defendant’s victory was so “insignificant” that it achieved “no practical benefit,” as determined by court’s broad discretion); Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 82 (partially prevailing defendant only entitled to fees and costs incurred in connection with successful portion of SLAPP).

 

            However, Defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to recovery of all fees incurred in connection with the SLAPP, even if the work performed in connection with the fraud claim overlapped the work performed on the trespass and conversion claims.  “[W]e conclude a defendant should not be entitled to obtain as a matter of right to his or her entire attorney fees incurred on successful and unsuccessful claims merely because the attorney work on those claims was overlapping. Instead, the court should first determine the lodestar amount for the hours expended on the successful claims, and, if the work on the successful and unsuccessful causes of action was overlapping, the court should then consider the defendant's relative success on the motion in achieving his or her objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate.”  Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at 344–345 (court erred in refusing to reduce requested fee award for fees attributable to causes of action remaining in litigation). 

 

             In analyzing the amount to which Defendant is entitled and whether a reduction is warranted for the trespass and conversion claims, the Court must consider “the extent to which the defendant’s litigation posture was advanced by the motion, whether the same factual allegations remain to be litigated, whether discovery and motion practice have been narrowed, and the extent to which future litigation expenses and strategy were impacted by the motion.”  Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at 345.  “The fees awarded to a defendant who was only partially successful on an anti-SLAPP motion should be commensurate with the extent to which the motion changed the nature and character of the lawsuit in a practical way.”  Id.

 

            The Court is not required to apply a “purely mechanical approach by allocating particular hours to particular claims,” but it should consider “the significance of the overall relief obtained by defendants in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation and whether the expenditure…was reasonable in relation to het success achieved.”  Id.

 

            Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s entitlement to fees under CCP §425.16(c).  Plaintiff only objects to the requested amount as unreasonable and excessive given Defendant’s partial victory and the nature of the SLAPP motion.

 

            Defendant’s request for fees is based on the following: 

 

Fees and costs related to Special Motion to Strike:

22.7 hours at $650 per hour $ 14,755.00

Costs $ 826.52

Subtotal $ 15,581.52

 

Fees and costs related to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees:

0.5 hours at $650 per hour $ 325.00

3.2 hours at $450 per hour $ 1,440.00

Costs $ 73.41

Subtotal $ 1,838.41

 

Anticipated fees and costs related to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees:

5.0 hours at $650 per hour $ 3,250.00

Costs $ 11.76

Subtotal $ 3,261.76

 

Total fees and costs incurred:

Total fees: $ 19,770.00

Total costs: $ 911.69

Grand Total: $ 20,681.69

 

See Campbell decl. at ¶ 12-14; Boone decl. at ¶ 8-10.

 

            Defendant requests the entirety of her fees in connection with the SLAPP motion. Defendant does not address the impact of her failure to succeed in striking the trespass and conversion claims and why a reduction for those unsuccessful claims is not required. 

 

            The facts alleged in the 1st cause of action for fraud are significantly different from those alleged in the 2nd cause of action for trespass and 3rd cause of action for conversion.  The 1st cause of action for fraud was based on the false statements Defendant made to the City of Los Angeles.  See Complaint, ¶25.  The 2nd cause of action for trespass is based on Defendant’s physical occupation of Unit 4 without permission.  See Complaint, ¶33.  The 3rd cause of action for conversion is likewise based on Defendant’s occupation of Unit 4 and conversion of the property and the fair market rent that should have been paid.  Id. at ¶¶38-39. 

 

Defendant failed to establish the 1st step of SLAPP as to the 2nd and 3rd causes of action for trespass and conversion.  Based on the nature of those claims, those two claims were clearly not subject to SLAPP under the test in Bonni.  Defendant failed to cite to Bonni or apply it.

 

While dismissal of the fraud claim was a significant victory that narrowed the scope of litigation, there are two claims remaining and those two claims were quite apparently not subject to SLAPP under Bonni.  In addition, a significant portion of the SLAPP was dedicated to the 2nd step of SLAPP as to trespass and conversion. See SLAPP Motion, pp. 10-11; SLAPP Reply, pp. 12-13. 

 

In light of these facts, Defendant’s request for the entirety of the fees in connection with the SLAPP motion is unreasonable.  Defendant’s requested fees must be reduced to reflect her partial success and partial failure.  The reduction reflects what would have been a reasonable amount of time spent to strike only the 1st cause of action for fraud based solely on ¶25 of the Complaint.  The fee award must be reduced to reflect the narrow grounds for Defendant’s victory. 

 

Defendant’s Motion for SLAPP Fees is GRANTED in the amount of _________________.  Defendant’s request for costs is GRANTED in the amount requested of $911.69.