Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 22SMCV00186, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00186    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: O

Case Name:  Hurricane Holdings, LLC v. Victoria Gonzalez, et al.

SUBJECT:                 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Vickey Gonzalez

RESP. PARTY:         Plaintiff Hurricane Holdings, LLC

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant Vickey Gonzalez’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Hurricane Holdings, LLC’s claim for trespass is GRANTED.  

            Gonzalez’s objection nos. 1,2 and 3 to the declaration of Richman Bry are SUSTAINED, and objection nos 4,5,6,7 and 8 to the declaration of Daniel Palo are SUSTAINED. 

Hurricane Holdings did not file any objections to evidence in compliance with CRC Rule 3.1354 subd. (b). (“All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion.”) Because the incomplete objections stated in Hurricane Holdings response to Gonzalez’s separate statement do not comply with Rule 3.1354, they are overruled. (See e.g. Santos v. Crenshaw Manufacturing, Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 39, 53 as modified (Sept. 25, 2020.)).

REASONING

Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, they must show either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Code of Civil Procedure §437c(o)(2).) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.” (Ibid.) If unable to prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact, summary judgment or summary adjudication in favor of the defendant is proper. (Ibid.)

            Trespass is the “unlawful interference with possession of property.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.4th 245, 261.) “The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (See id. at p. 262, citing CACI No. 2000.)

I.         Defendants Burden

            Defendant Vickey Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) moves for summary judgment of the trespass claim within Plaintiff Hurricane Holdings, LLC (“Hurricane Holdings”) FAC arguing Hurricane Holdings cannot establish the “lack of permission” element of trespass. Gonzales provides evidence that Hurricane Holdings cannot establish Gonzales lacked permission to enter the unit 4, the unit at issue, because Gonzalez moved into unit 4 with her family in 1996 with the permission of the former landlord under an oral lease agreement, Gonzales and other family members continue to live in unit 4, and this “permission is not extinguished by the sale of the building to Hurricane Holdings,” and (MSJ, p. 5; SSMF Nos. 1–6, Victoria Gonzalez Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3, 4,6, 8, Jesus Gonzales Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 5.)

            “After a property is sold or transferred, the transferee takes subject to the existing lease; this new owner steps into the landlord's shoes and becomes the successor landlord, assuming the terms and conditions of the lease the tenant had with the prior owner.” (DLI Properties LLC v. Hill (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1.)  Furthermore, “[t]enancies in property need not be created by written leases,” because a person “may become a tenant by occupancy with consent.” (Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 505, 516.) “A tenant who enters a rent-stabilized apartment as a minor with her parents and remains there after her parents vacate is an “original lawful occupant of the apartment” entitled to the same eviction protections as her parents. (Id. at p. 515.).

            Gonzales meets her burden of establishing that Plaintiff cannot establish Gonzales lacked permission to enter the unit.  The burden shifts to the Plaintiff.  

II.        Plaintiff’s Burden

            When the burden shifts to the Plaintiff, “[i]t is not enough to produce just some evidence. The evidence must be of sufficient quality to allow the trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.” (McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1105.) “The opposing party may rely upon inferences, but “those inferences must be reasonably deducible from the evidence, and not such as are derived from speculation, conjecture, imagination, or guesswork. (Joshi v. Fitness International, LLC (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 814, 823.)  Hurricane Holdings disputes Gonzalez’s statements of material fact numbers 5, 8, and 9, but does not provide any evidence to dispute these statements. (See SSUMF Nos. 5, 8, 9.)  Regardless, Hurricane Holdings objections lack merit. In particular, the hearsay objection to the 2014 rent notices lacks merit because those documents are not offered not to show the truth of the stated amount of rent, but rather, to show the owner and manager of the building considered Gonzales a tenant of Unit 4.

Hurricane Holdings provides two estoppel certificates for both units 2 and 4 allegedly signed by Gonzales to show that Gonzalez left Unit 4 and only remained in Unit 2. (See Oppo., p. 6; see also SSUMF Nos 108–110; Palo Decl., Exh. A, B.) However, the provided certificates only contain a signature from building manager, Daniel Palo, and not the purported signature of Gonzalez. (See SSUMF Nos 108–110; Palo Decl., Exh. A, B.) An unsigned estoppel certificate does not carry any legal effect. (See Plaza Freeway Ltd. Partnership v. First Mountain Bank (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 616, 626 [“Black's Law Dictionary defines estoppel certificate” as “[a] signed statement by a party, such as a tenant or a mortgagee, certifying for the benefit of another party that a certain statement of facts is correct as of the date of the statement, such as that a lease exists, that there are no defaults and that rent is paid to a certain date.”] Unsigned estoppel certificates and no explanation, or other evidence, of disputed material fact is not adequate evidence to find in favor of Hurricane Holdings.

            The Court finds that Hurricane Holdings has not met its burden to provide evidence of a triable issue of material fact regarding the lack of consent to Gonzalez’s entry into unit Unit 4.