Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 22SMCV01309, Date: 2024-11-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV01309    Hearing Date: November 14, 2024    Dept: O

  Case Name:  Kang v. Varughese, et al.

SUBJECT:                 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

MOVING PARTY:   Plaintiff Grace Kang

RESP. PARTY:         Defendant Jason Varughese

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff Grace Kang’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED. The scope of discovery in this action is limited to exclude the following topics (the “Excluded Topics”):

a. Plaintiff’s alleged sexual history;

b. Plaintiff’s alleged taxes;

c. Plaintiff’s driver’s license number;

d. Plaintiff’s residential property;

e. Plaintiff’s law firm, law firm clients, and counsel of record, Ekwan E. Rhow and Dorothy Wolpert;

f. The Family Law Matter, Case No. 21STPT02902.

The Court orders Defendant prohibited from seeking discovery on the Excluded Topics in this action. Defendant is ordered to pay sanctions in the amount of $4,020.00 (4 hrs. @ $990/hr. + $60 in filing fees) within 30 days of the Order entry pursuant to CCP §§ 2017.020(b), 2023.010, 2023.030

            Defendant’s RJN is GRANTED as to the existence of the First Amended Complaint but not the truth of its allegations.

            The Court need not rule on Defendants Objections as they are not material to the disposition the motion.

REASONING

(a) The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(b) The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a), (b).)

            “[T]he issuance and formulation of protective orders are to a large extent discretionary.” (Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.)

            The Discovery Act prohibits “the misuse of the discovery process,” including the following:

(a) Persisting, over objection and without substantial justification, in an attempt to obtain information or materials that are outside the scope of permissible discovery.

. . . .

(c) Employing a discovery method in a manner or to an extent that causes unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.

            (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (a), (c).)

            “The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

            “[E]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)

            Plaintiff Grace Kang (“Plaintiff”) argues that a protective order is necessary to prevent Defendant Jason Varughese (“Defendant”) misuse of the discovery process. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s RFP No. 21–22 and RFA Nos 26–27 seeking documents related to Plaintiffs sexual history are disallowed character evidence pursuant to Evidence Code § 1101(a), and constitute a misuse of discovery since they are not reasonable calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Wolpert Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4; Ex.. 1, 2.)

            Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s RFAs Nos 19–22 are requesting irrelevant law firm-related discovery that Defendant argues will reveal knowledge of Plaintiff’s “causal approach to client secrecy,” and thus “Plaintiff’s character.” (Wolpert Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 2.) Plaintiff agues these law firm related discovery requests are disallowed character evidence pursuant to Evidence Code § 1101(a), and constitute a misuse of discovery since they are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Motion, p. 11:2–21.)

            Plaintiff argues that Defendants RFA No. 20 improperly requests information related to Defendant’s “false allegations” about Plaintiff’s alleged tax evasion, which have no relevance to the claims and defenses in this action. (Wolpert Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 2.)

            Plaintiff argues that Defendants RFA No. 15 and Form Interrogatory 2.3 are improper requests related to Plaintiff’s residential properly and Plaintiff’s Drivers License respectively. (Wolpert Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5; Ex. 2, 3.) Plaintiff argues that neither request are relevant to the claims and defenses in the action, and that Plaintiff has a privacy right to protect her drivers license number pursuant to Article I of the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1; see Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 77, 79 [“certain information that is included and essential for the determination of juror qualification and management of the jury system is not properly part of voir dire and public access to it is not warranted . . . . [including] . . . driver's license numbers”].)

            Finally, Plaintiff argues that discovery related to the Family Law Matter, Case No. 21STPT02902 within Defendant’s RFP Nos 11, 12, 14 and RFA No. 18, should be excluded because Defendant should not be able to relitigate the Family Law Matter in civil court, and the matter includes privileged information between Plaintiff’s counsel and Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues she has produced discovery relating to custody and child support in this action, and any discovery related specifically to the Family Law Matter is beyond the scope of discovery in this case. (Motion, pp. 5:16–6:26.)

            The Court agrees with the Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendant does not provide any supporting authority, persuasive arguments, or a more limited protective order for the Court to find for Defendant.

Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective Order is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to pay sanctions in the amount of $4,020.00 (4 hrs. @ $990/hr. + $60 in filing fees) within 30 days of the Order entry pursuant to CCP §§ 2017.020(b), 2023.010, 2023.030.