Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 22SMCV02219, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22SMCV02219    Hearing Date: March 12, 2024    Dept: O

Case Name:  Brown v. General Motors, LLC

Case No.:

22SMCV02219

Complaint Filed:

11-2-22          

Hearing Date:

3-12-24

Discovery C/O:

6-24-24

Calendar No.:

1

Discovery Motion C/O:

7-8-24

POS:

OK

 Trial Date:

7-22-24

SUBJECT:                 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES AND DOCUMENTS TO RFP (SET ONE)

MOVING PARTY:   Plaintiff Eula Mae Brown

RESP. PARTY:         Defendant General Motors, LLC

 

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff Eula Mae Brown’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production (SET ONE), Nos. 16–17, 22–25 as to Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to serve further responses without objection in ______ days.  Plaintiffs have abided by the statutory requirements of CCP § 2031.310 with its request for further responses to RFP. RFPs Nos. 16–17, and 22–25 are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

 

Request Nos. 16–17, and 22–25—These Requests seek documents regarding cars of the same year, make and model as Plaintiff Eula May Brown’s (“Brown”) vehicle. They do not seek documents that pertain specifically to Brown’s vehicle. The Requests seek the following information regarding cars of the same make, model and year as Brown’s vehicle:

 

Request No. 16—all documents concerning internal analysis or investigation by Defendant General Motors, LLC(“GM”) or on behalf of GM regarding the Engine Defect at issue. The Engine Defect is defined as “check engine light illuminated; activation of dtc u060f; activation of dtc u1346; performance of doc. 59596147; activation of dtc 00299 engine underboost; removal of turbocharger; replacement of turbocharger; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2021 Chevrolet Trailblazer; Vehicle Identification Number KL79MMS21MB172417.” (Walker Decl., ¶ 17, Ex. 6, p. 3.)

 

Request No. 17— all documents concerning internal analysis or investigation by GM or on behalf of GM regarding the Electrical Defect at issue. The Electrical Defect is defined as “broken wires in wiring harness at mass air flow sensor zip tie; replacement of wiring harness connector; securing of wiring harness; routing of wiring harness; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2021 Chevrolet Trailblazer; Vehicle Identification Number KL79MMS21MB172417.” (Walker Decl., ¶ 17, Ex. 6, p. 3.)

 

Request No. 22—customer complaints, claims, reported failures and warranty claims related to the Engine Defect.

 

Request No. 23— customer complaints, claims, reported failures and warranty claims related to the Engine Defect.

 

Request No. 24—documents concerning failure rates because of the Engine Defect

 

Request No. 25— documents concerning failure rates because of the Electrical Defect

 

 

Brown has the initial burden of demonstrating good cause on a motion to compel further responses to Requests by making a facts specific showing of relevance. (See Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310, subd., (b)(1); Kirkland v. Supr. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 [“Once good cause was shown, the burden shifted to Kirkland to justify his objection.”].) It is only after Brown demonstrates good cause to the satisfaction of the Court that the burden shifts to GM to justify its objections. This burden is no different in an action under the Song-Beverly Act, and Brown fails to cite any authority to the contrary.

 

Brown makes a convincing case of good cause to compel production of documents relating to other customer complaints involving vehicles of the same make, model and year. Such information would be relevant to GM’s knowledge of the particular defect in Brown’s specific vehicle and its good faith or bad faith attempts at compliance with the Act. Brown establishes the relevance of these complaints GM’s alleged willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act. The nature of other complaints regarding the same vehicle type is also relevant to what constitutes a “reasonable” number of repair attempts.

 

Brown therefore makes a fact-specific showing of relevance as to Request Nos. 16–17 and 22–25 and refutes the objection based on undue burden. The burden therefore shifts to GM to justify its objections. GM fails to satisfy this burden. GM argues this general information pertaining to vehicles of the same make, model and year are irrelevant and unduly burdensome, and could include trade secret information. As discussed above, Plaintiff makes a sufficient showing of relevance.

 

GM fails to demonstrate that production in response to these Requests would be unduly burdensome. Counsel Kay’s declaration does not set forth specific facts regarding what production in response to these Requests would entail, or how production in response to these Requests would be unduly burdensome. (See Kay Decl., filed on 2-28-24, ¶ 13 (detailing orders in other cases where court notes the burden such discovery imposes on the courts). “The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Supr. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417 [discussing such objections asserted to interrogatories].)

           

            Further, GM fails to demonstrate that production in response to these Requests would include trade secret information in which the 4-26-23, or the stipulated 2-8-24, Protective Order would not protect (See 4-26-23 Protective Order; see also Kay Decl., ¶ 10.)