Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 23SMCV00466, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV00466    Hearing Date: June 5, 2025    Dept: O

Case Name:  Mariana Erieh v. Peet’s Coffee, Inc., et al.

SUBJECT:                 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Peet’s Coffee, Inc.

RESP. PARTIES:     Plaintiff Mariana Erieh

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant Peet’s Coffee, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to both causes of action in Plaintiff Mariana Erieh’s Complaint is GRANTED. Defendant shows that they did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition prior to the alleged incident. Plaintiff does not meet their burden to show a triable issue of material fact as to Defendant’s actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. Defendant to submit proposed order.

Defendant Peet’s Coffee’s Objections:

1.     Objection to the Ruiz Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3, 6, 7, 9—SUSTAINED for lack of personal knowledge, lack of foundation, and not properly authenticated.

2.     Objection to Ruiz Decl., Ex. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, `

3.     7—SUSTAINED, not properly authenticated and lacks foundation

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections recited in the Separate Statement in Opposition to the motion do not comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1354.  (See Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 (Evidentiary objections not set forth in a separate document as required by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1354 are disregarded).

REASONING

A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

Plaintiff Mariana Erieh (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Peet’s Coffee, Inc. (“Defendant”) and Does 1 to 20, inclusive, asserting causes of action for (1) premises liability and (2) negligence.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing that it is entitled to entry of judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot establish that (1) Defendant had notice of alleged slip-and-fall hazard on the premises, or (2) the area where Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell was in a dangerous condition.

I.                Defendants Meet Their Burden to Show that Plaintiff cannot establish the Dangerous Condition Element of the cause of action

            Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(o)(2).) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.” (Id.) If unable to prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact, summary judgment or summary adjudication in favor of the defendant is proper. (Id.)

“Commercial property owners are not insurers of the safety of their patrons, although they owe the patrons duties ‘to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.’” To exercise a degree of care that is commensurate with the risks involved, the owner must make reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises open to customers. [citations] An owner is liable for harm caused by a dangerous condition, of which the owner had actual or constructive knowledge. [citation] An injured plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it, but failed to take reasonable steps to do so. [citation] One way to carry that burden is to raise an inference that the hazardous condition existed long enough for the owner to have discovered it, if an owner exercising reasonable care would have learned of it.

(Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403, 431, citing Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 and Moore v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 472, 476–477.)

“[W]here the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition to prove the owner's negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it. The plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where evidence suggests that the dangerous condition was present for a sufficient period of time to charge the owner with constructive knowledge of its existence. Knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence ‘which is nothing more than one or more inferences which may be said to arise reasonably from a series of proven facts.’ [Citation.] Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations.

(Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1035, as modified (Nov. 21, 2024).)

“A plaintiff seeking recovery for negligence against a landowner must establish sufficient facts or circumstances that support an inference of a breach of duty, to defeat a defense summary judgment motion. [citation] It is not enough to provide speculation or conjecture that a dangerous condition of property might have been present at the time of the accident.” (Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403, 421.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot produce any evidence to show that Defendant had actual notice of the trip hazard at issue in this case, and that the evidence demonstrates that the alleged trip hazard at issue did not actually exist. (Motion, p. 4:15–17.) Defendant points to evidence that Plaintiff cannot identify the dangerous condition because she indicted in her deposition that she did not notice anything, or trip on anything while walking into the store, however, Plaintiff also states she tripped over the umbrella thus Plaintiff cannot identify the dangerous condition, meaning there was no dangerous condition. (SSUF, ¶¶ 15, 16; Defendants Compendium of Evidence (“COE”), Ex. 4 at 132:9–15, 134:2–12)

However, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the Plaintiff’s deposition testimony stands for the fact that no dangerous condition existed when Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell. Plaintiff clearly states she “tripped over the umbrella,” within the deposition. (COE, Ex. 4, at p. 131:2–4.) Upon further questioning surrounding the seconds prior to the alleged tripping, Plaintiff appears to be confused regarding the line of questioning regarding which was she was facing prior to the alleged slip and then states:

“When I tripped over, I know -- see, you're asking me questions that it's very, to me, it's vague, I'm sorry. I took the step to go back to the inside the Peet's Coffee and right away I fell. So I do not have enough memory because right away I fell and right away I was in pain and people were around me and then . . .”

(COE, Ex. 4, at p. 134:20–25.)

Pointing to the deposition testimony alone does not show enough evidence that no dangerous condition existed at the time Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell. Thus, Defendant does not meet their burden to show that no dangerous condition existed at the time of alleged incident.

Defendant however does show that Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Defendant had notice of the trip hazard at issue in this case, and it is Plaintiff’s burden to establish sufficient facts or circumstances that support an inference of the breach in this type of negligence cause of action. (See (Howard, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 421.) Further, Defendant provides declaratory evidence from Bernie Dechellis (“Dechellis”), District Leader Retails in the Atlantic Region, whose “duties include those related to managing the risk management department.” (COA, Ex. 3; Dechellis Decl., ¶ 2.) Dechellis declares “Peet’s has not received any complaints regarding the placement or condition of the umbrella or its stand prior to this incident.” (Id., ¶ 6.) Thus, Defendant has provided evidence to show they were not on notice of any dangerous condition at the time of the alleged incident due to the declaration of no previous complaints regarding the positioning of the umbrellas.

Defendant therefore meets their burden to show that they were not on notice of the alleged dangerous condition, and now the burden moves to Plaintiff to prove a triable issue of material fact as the dangerous condition notice element.

II.             Plaintiff’s Burden

Plaintiff fails to provide any admissible evidence to refute that Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition, here the umbrella. Plaintiff’s provided evidence within the 5-25-25 opposition, Exhibits, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7,  are all inadmissible as Plaintiff has failed to authenticate the provided documents, nor has Plaintiff laid any foundation for the hearsay statements within the provided documents, documents that are allegedly attributed to Defendant and their business practices. Plaintiff has only provided a declaration stating the attached documents are a “a true and correct copy” of the attached documents and without more authentication and foundation these documents purporting to show documents belonging to Defendants are not admissible. (See Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 855 (   An attorney’s declaration in summary judgment proceedings merely stating the documents are true and correct is not sufficient to authenticate documents authored by other persons.)

Plaintiff provides evidence from the Dechellis Deposition, Defendant’s PMK, that “store managers relied on informal photographs taken on personal or Peet’s-issued cell phones to guide set up,” and “did not follow any measurements to set up the furniture,” and argues that this evidence shows that Defendant was on notice because there was no “standardized diagram or corporate-issued layout for patio furniture or umbrella base placement.” (Opposition, p. 9; Plaintiff’s Additional Disputed Facts (“PADF”) ¶¶ 4–6; Ruiz Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, Exhibits 4 & 5. Dechellis Deposition 22:2-23:25, 24:22-23:18; 60:14-17; 60:25-62:18.)

Plaintiff also argues that the positioning of the umbrellas were not in compliance with City of Santa Monica codes but again provides inadmissible evidence to support this argument. Plaintiff does not request judicial notice of the Santa Monica City codes, nor does Plaintiff provide a certified or properly authenticated copy of the purported city codes. Furthermore, even if this provided evidence were admissible, Plaintiff does not provide any authority to show that compliance with codes regarding precise location of umbrellas on a sidewalk would put Defendant on notice of a dangerous condition. Plaintiff also does not provide any evidence to show that the umbrellas were not in compliance with the purported city codes other than conclusory statements in a declaration by the attorney, and not by an expert witness who specialized in these matters. (PADF ¶ 4.)

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to provide any admissible evidence to show that Defendant were on actual or constructive notice that the placement of the subject umbrellas were in fact a dangerous condition. Plaintiff has provided mere speculation and conjecture that a dangerous condition existed which is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion on a premises liability and negligence claim of this nature. (See Howard, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 421.) Thus, Plaintiff fails to meet their burden to show a triable issue of material fact as to the Defendants notice of the dangerous condition.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.