Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 23SMCV01579, Date: 2025-04-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV01579    Hearing Date: April 15, 2025    Dept: O

  Case Name:  Jacqueline Guidry v. Doris T Bonner, et al.

SUBJECT:                 MOTION TO DISMISS

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Shelbrena Payne

RESP. PARTY:         Plaintiff Jaqueline Guidry

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant Sheri Jo Williams Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Defendant fails to show to show that Plaintiff was not genuinely ignorant of Defendant’s identity under CCP §474 when Plaintiff filed the Complaint.  Therefore, the relation-back doctrine applies.

REASONING

            Defendant argues the Complaint must be dismissed because the complaint is time-barred as to Defendant, and Plaintiff was not genuinely ignorant of Defendant’s identity when the original complaint was filed, thus the relation back doctrine does not apply. (Motion., pp. 3–12.)

“When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 474.) Genuine ignorance of Defendant’s identity is a threshold requirement for use of the DOE procedure under CCP §474. (See Ibid.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 474 is to be liberally construed.” (Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170.)

“The relation-back doctrine requires that the amended complaint must (1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the original one.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408–409.) “[I]f the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the defendant's identity,” at the time the original complaint was filed the “relation-back doctrine applies even if that ignorance is the result of the plaintiff's negligence.” Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 177.)

“Ignorance of the facts giving rise to a cause of action is the ‘ignorance’ required by section 474, and the pivotal question is, ‘did plaintiff know facts?’ not ‘did plaintiff know or believe that he had a cause of action based on those facts?’ Although it is true that a plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant's name must be genuine (in good faith) and not feigned and that a plaintiff need not be aware of each and every detail concerning a person's involvement before the plaintiff loses his ignorance, it is equally true that the plaintiff does not relinquish his rights under section 474 simply because he has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts he does know.” (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 372.) “If the identity of the Doe defendant is known but, at the time of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff did not know facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that liability is probable, the requirements of section 474 are met.” (Id., at p. 374.)

It is Defendant’s burden on this motion to prove that plaintiff knew defendant's identity and the facts giving rise to Defendant's liability when Plaintiffs filed their complaint. (See Fuller, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1173; see Banke and Segal (Rutter Group 2020 Update) Cal. Prac. Guide: CPBT Statute of Limitations, ¶8:106.) Even if Plaintiff knew of Defendant’s existence and its actual identity when they filed their complaint, Plaintiffs were “ignorant” within the meaning of the statute if they were ignorant of facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that Defendant was probably liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. (See McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 372; McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 942-943.) Moreover, in determining whether Plaintiffs were “genuinely ignorant” under CCP §474, the knowledge of Plaintiffs’ counsel is imputed to them. (See Miller v. Thomas (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 440, 445 [plaintiff ignorance of driver’s possible liability for his injuries irrelevant under CCP 474 where plaintiff’s counsel was fully aware of driver’s identity and facts establishing driver’s possible liability for plaintiff’s injury].)

Whether Plaintiffs had the means to obtain knowledge of such facts is irrelevant. (McOwen, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at 942-943; Woo v. Supr. Ct. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 [“if the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the defendant's identity, the section 474 relation-back doctrine applies even if that ignorance is the result of plaintiff's negligence”].) “Section 474 does not impose upon the plaintiff a duty to go in search of facts she does not actually have at the time she files her original pleading.” (Fuller, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.)

“[S]ection 474 includes an implicit requirement that a plaintiff may not “unreasonably delay” his or her filing of a Doe amendment after learning a defendant's identity.” A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1066–1067, as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 6, 2009) A Defendant “may challenge the amendment by way of an evidence-based motion, which argues that the plaintiff “unreasonable delayed” his or her filing of the challenged amendment, ” requiring a “showing by the defendant that he or she would suffer prejudice from plaintiff's delay in filing the Doe amendment.” (Ibid.)

Defendant’s evidence fails to establish that Plaintiff was not genuinely ignorant under CCP §474 when this action was filed on 4-11-23. Defendant did not file a declaration with its motion. Regardless, the Court will consider Defendant’s declaration in support of the same motion filed on 7-1-24. (See 7-1-24 Williams Decl.)

Nothing in the Defendant’s Declaration filed with the 7-1-24 Motion to Dismiss and Motion to quash establishes that Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s counsel had knowledge of facts indicating that Defendant was probably liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. At best, the declaration establishes that Plaintiff may have been negligent in their due diligence to discover Defendant’s name, however, that will not defeat Plaintiff’s alleged actual ignorance of the defendant’s identity. (See Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 [“if the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the defendant's identity, the section 474 relation-back doctrine applies even if that ignorance is the result of the plaintiff's negligence”].

Defendant fails to satisfy its burden of proving that Plaintiff knew of Defendant’s identity, and the facts giving rise to Defendant’s liability for Plaintiff’s injuries.

Additionally, Plaintiff states they discovered the identity of the Defendant on 4-26-24 and promptly amended the Complaint on 4-29-24, thus Plaintiff acted with diligence and did not unreasonably delay their filing. (Oppo., p. 5.)  The Court notes that the Plaintiff did not provide a declaration of these alleged facts, however, since Defendant does not provide specific diligence related arguments, only conclusory arguments that Plaintiff unreasonably delayed their filing, the Court finds that the Plaintiff acted with diligence in filing the amendment upon discovery of the Defendant’s name.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds that Plaintiff was not genuinely ignorant of its identity under CCP §474 when they Plaintiff this complaint on 4-11-23 is DENIED. The Complaint is not time-barred as the relation-back doctrine applies.