Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 23SMCV02080, Date: 2024-02-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV02080 Hearing Date: February 6, 2024 Dept: O
Case
Name: Baber v. City of Los Angeles,
et al.
|
Case No.: |
23SMCV02080 |
Complaint Filed: |
5-12-23 |
|
Hearing Date: |
2-6-24 |
Discovery C/O: |
N/A |
|
Calendar No.: |
18 |
Discovery Motion C/O: |
N/A |
|
POS: |
OK |
Trial Date: |
None |
SUBJECT: DEMURRER W/O MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant State of California
RESP.
PARTY: Plaintiff Patricia
Baber
TENTATIVE
RULING
Defendant
State of California’s Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the 1st and 2nd
causes of action of Plaintiff Patricia Baber’s FAC. Plaintiff Patricia Baber
has substantially complied with Government Code § 910, and has
successfully plead all necessary elements of Premises Liability pursuant to Government
Code § 835 and General Negligence pursuant to Government Code § 815.2.
Defendant
State of California’s RJN is GRANTED.
I.
Demurrer for failure to comply with Government
Claims Act GOV Code § 910 - OVERRULED
Public
entities, such as the State of California “subject to a procedural condition
precedent; that is to say, the timely filing of a written claim with the proper
officer or body is an element of a valid cause of action against a public
entity.” (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 374; see
CA GOVT §§ 900.4, 905.) “The failure to timely present a proper claim for money
or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against
that entity. (Gong, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 374.) “If the
plaintiff fails to include the necessary allegations, the complaint is subject
to attack by demurrer.” (Id.) If a plaintiff alleges compliance with the
claims presentation requirement, but the public records do not reflect
compliance, the governmental entity can request the court to take judicial
notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) that the
entity's records do not show compliance.” (Id. at p. 376.) Failure to
comply with the Government Claims Act prior to bringing suit bars the claim
against the public entity (Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 247.)
“The
purpose of these statutes is “to provide the public entity sufficient
information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them,
if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. Consequently, a claim need
not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading, but need only
“fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done. As the purpose of
the claim is to give the government entity notice sufficient for it to investigate
and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate meritorious actions, the claims
statute “should not be applied to snare the unwary where its purpose has been
satisfied” (Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins.
Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446, citations omitted.)
“The claim,
however, need not specify each particular act or omission later proven to have
caused the injury. A complaint's fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond
that given in the claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not based on
an “entirely different set of facts. Only where there has been a “complete
shift in allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil liability on
acts or omissions committed at different times or by different persons than
those described in the claim,” have courts generally found the complaint
barred. Where the complaint merely elaborates or adds further detail to a
claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by
the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly reflects the facts
pled in the complaint.” (Id., at p. 447, citations omitted.)
“A claim
shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her behalf
and shall show all of the following: (a) The name and post office address of
the claimant. (b) The post office address to which the person presenting the
claim desires notices to be sent. (c) The date, place and other circumstances
of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. (d) A
general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss
incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.
(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury,
damage, or loss, if known. (f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim,
including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss,
insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim,
together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount
claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be
included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a
limited civil case.” (CA GOVT., § 910.)
Here, Plaintiff
Patricia Baber (“Baber”) has substantially complied with the requirements of CA
GOVT § 901. Baber states the name and post office address of the claimant,
the attorney or representative information, the date and place where the
alleged incident occurred, a general description of the incident, and checked
the box for non-limited civil case type. (See RJN, Ex. 1.) Baber did not include the names or name of
public employees causing the injury within her claim because Baber alleges to
not the know the names. (See Oppo., pp. 6:26-27—7:1–2.) Baber stated the same
facts within the FAC and did not base the FAC on an entirely new set of facts.
(See generally FAC.)
Thus, the
Court finds Baber has substantially complied with CA GOVT § 910. Defendant
State of California’s (the “State”) Demurrer to the FAC for failure to comply
with the Government Claims Act pursuant to CA GOVT § 910 is OVERRULED.
II.
Demurrer to 1st Cause of action – Premises
Liability – Dangerous Condition of Public Property - OVERRULED
“[A] public
entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if
the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous
condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk
of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee
of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous
condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury
to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code,
§ 835.)
“Except as
otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury,
whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a
public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815.)
The State cites
to Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112 to argue that a
failure to install barriers or other safety measures does not constitute a
defect in property, however Zelig dealt with a specific instance where the
court found that a barrier installation would ultimately not have kept people
armed with weapons away from the property as a matter of law. (Zelig, supra ,27
Cal.4th 1112, 1139 [“Finally, a barrier against the introduction of weapons
cannot be comprised of a simple physical barrier, at least given current
technology, but requires personnel to conduct screening, deny entrance to
persons carrying weapons, and confiscate those weapons. This amounts
essentially to providing police service.”].) In the present case, the issue is
not whether a barrier would have protected Baber from an armed individual, and
thus Zelig does not apply here.
The State
further cites to Avedon v. State of California (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1336 to argue in the absence of evidence
relating to a “defect in the property,” a party fails to state a state a cause
of action for dangerous condition of public property pursuant to section 835.” (Demurrer,
p. 10.) The Court in Avendon also stated, “[w]hile in some instances a
public entity may be required to alter its property to provide a physical
barrier against danger presented by third parties, the Zelig court
concluded that the addition of a physical barrier, by itself, would not have
had any effect on the risk of harm faced by the decedent or other persons using
the courthouse.” (Avendon, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.) As
stated above, the issue in the present case does not involve a person with a
weapon where a barrier would not have protected the plaintiff, and the Avedon
court does state that in some instances it may be appropriate for a public
entity to provide a barrier against the dangers presented by Third Parties. (Ibid.)
The State does not provide any authority stating the public entity is not
required to provide a physical barrier to protect the public against an
unrestrained dog, or anything similar to the unrestrained dog scenario.
Baber pleads
all the requisite elements of a Premises Liability – Dangerous Conditions of
Public Property claim pursuant to Gov Code § 835. (FAC, p. 6.) Thus, the
State’s Demurrer to the 1st cause of action for Premises Liability –
Dangerous Conditions of Public Property is OVERRULED.
III.
Demurrer to 2nd Cause of Action –
General Negligence - OVERRULED
“(a) A
public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of
an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act
or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of
action against that employee or his personal representative. (Gov. Code, §
815.2.)
“The
elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are
‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal
duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the
resulting injury.’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913,
917.)
Here, Baber
pleads all the essential elements of a negligence claim. (See FAC, p. 7.) Baber
alleges “Defendants failed to properly train their employees and/or supervise
their staff and failed to barricade the area and/or to warn of the dangerous
condition, rendering the area on said premises dangerous and resulting in
serious bodily injury to the Plaintiff in the following manner.” (FAC, p. 7.)
Baber has essentially plead that the act and omission of a public entity
employee caused Baber injury, and thus has plead a claim pursuant to Gov Code,
§ 815.2.
Thus, the
State’s Demurrer to the 2nd cause of action for General Negligence
is OVERRULED.