Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 23SMCV02219, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV02219    Hearing Date: March 5, 2024    Dept: O

Case Name:  Prescott v. Thavarajavel, et al.

SUBJECT:                 MOTION TO STRIKE

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Vinotheesan Thavarajavel

RESP. PARTY:         Plaintiffs Tyler Prescott and Rachele Prescott

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant Vinotheesan Thavarajavel’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages as to Plaintiffs Tyler Prescott and Rachele Prescotts’ complaint is DENIED. Plaintiffs sufficiently plead Defendant acted with malice by alleging Defendant drove while under the influence of alcohol causing injury to Plaintiffs.

            Defendant Vinotheesan Thavarajavel (“Thavarajavel”) moves to strike the words “willful and wanton” and the prayer for punitive damages in its entirety from Plaintiffs Tyler Prescott and Rachele Prescotts’ (“Plaintiffs”) complaint. (See Compl., ¶ 10, and prayer ¶ 5 at p. 5.)  Defendant argues punitives must be struck from the complaint because under Taylor v. Superior Court, Plaintiff has not properly plead “the Defendant’s tendency, habit, history, practice, proclivity or inclination to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and that based on those facts, Defendant was aware of the dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated.” (MTS, p. 6; Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 893.).   

            The Court finds that Thavarajavel has misstates the Supreme Court requirements in Taylor for pleading punitive damages against an alleged drunk driving Defendant. Taylor states that Plaintiffs can plead allegations that Defendant was driving while knowingly under the influence of alcohol to support malice, and thus a prayer for punitive damages. (See Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 890–891[“[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under Civ. Code, § 3294, which authorizes recovery of punitive damages in noncontract cases “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,” if such act is performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences . . . . [T]he essential gravamen of the complaint was that defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby, and that, while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps might heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, such aggravating factors were not essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.”] Emphasis added.)

            Plaintiffs Complaint ¶¶ 9 and 10 state the following:

9. After vacating their vehicle, plaintiffs discovered that THAVARAJAVEL was severely intoxicated and acting belligerently. Law enforcement responded to the scene and arrested THAVARAJAVEL for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The collision was severe, causing damage to plaintiffs who suffered significant injuries as a result of the incident, along with significant property damage.

10. As a result, the actions of THAVARAJAVEL, in the unsafe and willful and wanton conduct of operating his vehicle while severely intoxicated, legally caused or contributed to causing the collision and the severe and substantial injuries and damages to plaintiffs.

(Compl., ¶¶ 9–10.)

            Plaintiffs do not have to plead any other facts regarding Thavarajavel which might heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have properly plead a claim for punitive damages under Taylor, and Thavarajavel’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.