Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 23SMCV03853, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV03853    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: O

Case Name:  Hernandez-Venegas, et al. v. Coastal Health Care, Inc, et al.  

SUBJECT:                 MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:   Defendants Coastal Health Care, Inc. and Brentwood Health Care, Inc., Dba Brentwood Healthcare Center,

RESP. PARTY:         Plaintiffs Rita Hernandez-Venegas, Individually And As Successor-In-Interest To Anna Valarie Casillas Flores (Deceased), Jaime Hernandez, Jr., Anita Hernandez-Barba, and John Anthony Hernandez

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendants Coastal Health Care, Inc. and Brentwood Health Care, Inc., Dba Brentwood Healthcare Center Motion to Strike Portions of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DENIED as to striking the prayer for punitive and treble damages under the first cause of action for elder abuse (Compl., Prayer, p. 34:23–25.). Plaintiffs have successfully plead enough facts for punitive damages under CC § 3294, and treble damages under CC § 3345.

            The parties have stipulated, and the Court has signed an order, to strike attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and treble damages from the fourth cause of action for violation of patient’s bill of rights (health & safety code § 1430(b).) (See 11-2-23 Stipulation and Order Striking Portions of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.) Defendants Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Prayer, pg. 35:11–13 is MOOT.

            In ruling on a motion to strike, the court reads the entire challenged pleading as whole, with all parts in context. (Courtesy Ambulance Service v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1519. “The allegation of specific intent is adequate as a matter of pleading to show malice.” (Ibid.) “[A] motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading which are not subject to demurrer. A motion to strike does not lie to attack a complaint for insufficiency of allegations to justify relief; that is a ground for general demurrer.” (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.)

I.                Punitive Damages

            CC §3294(a) provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Cal Civ. Code § 3294, subdiv., (a).)

            “Malice is ‘conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is ‘despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.’ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Despicable conduct is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)

            Whether Defendants’ conduct is “despicable conduct” is a question of fact for the jury that a court should not decide in ruling on a motion to strike. (Robinson v. Managed Accounts Receivable Corp., (2009) 654 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065; see Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228–1229 [“A jury should decide whether [Defendant’s] alleged sexual relations with [Plaintiff] were despicable enough to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.”]

            “In order to obtain the [Elder Abuse] Act's heightened remedies, a plaintiff must allege conduct essentially equivalent to conduct that would support recovery of punitive damages.” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 789.) “[M]aking it more difficult for Elder Abuse Act plaintiffs to plead punitive damages would, as a general matter, likely diminish the willingness of attorneys to undertake such cases on a contingency basis. (See Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15600, subd. (h) [reciting Legislature's observation when enacting Elder Abuse Act that “few civil cases are brought in connection with this abuse due to ... the lack of incentives to prosecute such suits”].).” (Id., at p. 787.)

            Plaintiffs successfully state enough facts to plead punitive damages under the first cause of action for elder abuse.  Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff only plead recklessness and thus punitive damages are not allowed is incorrect. Plaintiff pleads facts to allege both malice and oppression within the “Recklessness, Ratification, Authorization and Direct Participation” section of the Complaint (See Compl., ¶¶ 74–104.) In sum, Plaintiffs plead specific facts alleging the Defendants authorized, ratified, and directly participated in the wrongful conduct of not administering the specified amount of insulin to Decedent causing Decedent’s eventual death. (Id.) The Court finds a reasonable jury could find the Plaintiffs pleaded facts to be despicable conduct, and thus a motion to strike punitives is not appropriate at this stage.

            Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the first cause of action for elder abuse is DENIED.

II.              Treble Damages

            Civ Code § 3345 applies to “actions brought by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of" senior citizens and disabled persons “to redress unfair or deceptive acts” (Civ. Code, § 3345.)

Whenever the trier of fact makes an affirmative finding in regard to one or more of the factors set forth in paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, it may impose a fine, civil penalty or other penalty, or other remedy in an amount up to three times greater than authorized by the statute, or, where the statute does not authorize a specific amount, up to three times greater than the amount the trier of fact would impose in the absence of that affirmative finding.

(1)             Whether the defendant knew or should have known that his or her conduct was directed to one or more senior citizens or disabled persons.

. . . .

(3)       Whether one or more senior citizens, disabled persons, or veterans are substantially more vulnerable than other members of the public to the defendant's conduct because of age, poor health or infirmity, impaired understanding, restricted mobility, or disability, and actually suffered substantial physical, emotional, or economic damage resulting from the defendant's conduct.

            (Civ. Code, § 3345.)

            Plaintiffs satisfy the pleading requirements of Civ. Code § 3345 by alleging Defendants knew their conduct was directed towards senior citizens or disabled persons, that  that Defendants operate a nursing facility, that Defendants knew their nursing facility was understaffed for the purpose of cutting costs therefore creating a high risk of patient injury, that Defendants knew Decedent needed insulin and other care to prevent major health issues, and that upon Decedent’s admittance to the facility the Defendants knew they could not provide the care Decedent needed. (Compl., ¶¶ 72, 73, 74, 78, 81, 82, 83, 103.)  The Court finds that Plaintiffs alleged facts which place the complaint within the purview of Civ Code 3345 by pleading unfair or deceptive acts against the Decedent, a senior citizen and disabled person. 

            Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Strike Treble Damages is DENIED.