Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 24SMCV000621, Date: 2024-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV000621 Hearing Date: December 8, 2024 Dept: O
Case Name:
Lewensztain, et al. v. El Camino Townhouses Owners Association
|
Case No.: |
24SMCV00621 |
Complaint Filed: |
2-9-24 |
|
Hearing Date: |
10-8-24 |
Discovery C/O: |
N/A |
|
Calendar No.: |
12 |
Discovery Motion C/O: |
N/A |
|
POS: |
OK |
Trial Date: |
None |
SUBJECT: DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant Karamali Mohammad
Pashmforoosh
RESP.
PARTY: Plaintiffs Miriam
Lewensztain and Shlomo Kattan
TENTATIVE
RULING
Defendant Karamali
Mohammad Pashmforoosh’s Demurrer to the 1st, 3rd, 4th,
and 5th causes of action in Plaintiffs Miriam Lewensztain and Shlomo
Kattan s’ Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant Karamali
Mohammad Pashmforoosh’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Plaintiffs
RJN is GRANTED. The Court “may take judicial notice of the fact of a document's
recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to
the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document's legally
operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the
document's authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the
legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its
face.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743,
755, as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 16, 2013)
REASONING
As a general matter, in a demurrer
proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via
proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the
evidence or facts alleged.” (E428.50Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes
the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.)
The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it
stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained,
leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of
successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)
The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended
successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118,
226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can
state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave
to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240,
245).
Plaintiff is only required to
allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (See Committee on Children's
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212 [“the
complaint should set forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts”); 1 Cal.
Affirmative Def. § 10:2 (2d ed.) [allegations of agency, course and scope of
employment, etc. qualify as ultimate facts].) Plaintiff’s allegations must be
accepted as true on demurrer. (See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924 [“For purposes of reviewing a demurrer, we accept
the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint”].)
I.
1st cause of action for Breach of
Governing Documents (CC&R’s)—OVERRULED
The essential elements of breach of
contract are “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting
damages to the plaintiff." (D'Arrigo Bros. of California v. United
Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800.)
“Unless they are unreasonable, the
CC & R's in the declaration governing a common interest development may be
enforced as equitable servitudes and as covenants running with the land.” (Cutujian
v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384.) “The CC
& R's benefit and bind the owners of all separate interests in the project.
Unless the declaration provides otherwise, CC & R's may be enforced by any
owner of a separate interest, by the association or by both.” (Ibid.,
citing Civ. Code, § 1354, subd. (a).) “A party who is damaged by a violation of
the CC & R's may seek money damages.” (Id., at p. 1385.)
“The
governing documents of a homeowners association are enforceable in a civil
action by a homeowner or by the association.” (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar
Coastal Collection Community Association (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1082, review
denied (Dec. 13, 2023).) The Davis Stirling Act, codified in Civ. Code §§
5145, et seq, states “[a] member of an association may bring a civil action for
declaratory or equitable relief for a violation of this article . . ., ”
and (Civ. Code, § 5145, subd. (a); see
also Civ. Code § 5235, subd. (a) [“A member may bring an action to enforce
that member's right to inspect and copy the association records.”].)
A
Member of a homeowners association “means an owner of a separate interest.”
(Civ. Code, § 4160.) Tenants, or
non-homeowners, within an HOA community are not considered owners of a separate
interest and thus have no standing to bring a suit under the Davis Stirling
Act. (See Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 1024, 1036 [“the right of enforcement is inextricable from
ownership of real property—a parcel, a lot—in a planned development . . . and,
thus, cannot be assigned absent a transfer of ownership of the parcel to which
it applies.]
Defendant Karamali Mohammad
Pashmforoosh (“Defendant”) demurs to the first cause of action in Plaintiffs Miriam
Lewensztain and Shlomo Kattan (“Plaintiffs”) Complaint for Breach of Governing
documents, or CC&R’s, arguing Plaintiffs do not plead standing. Defendant
argues that per the CC&R’s Plaintiffs can only plead standing if Plaintiffs
are an association, and cannot plead standing by just alleging Plaintiffs are
members of the HOA. Defendant cites to the specific Sections of the CC&R’s
in Article II, §§ 2(j) and 2(m), attached the Complaint as Exhibit A. (See
Compl., Ex. A, Article II, §§ 2(j) and 2(m).)
The Court is not persuaded. The
CCR’s state, “The Provisions of this declaration shall be enforceable by any of
the owners of an interest in the real property above described against any
other owner or owners thereof, . . .” (Compl., p. 15; Ex. A at p. 2.)
Additionally, Civ. Code § 5975 allows any owner within an HOA community to
bring suit against another owner, or against the association, or both, to
enforce the governing documents. (See Civ. Code. § 5975, subd. (a).) Thus,
by statute, and possibly by the CC&R’s, Plaintiffs have standing as an HOA
member to bring suit against another HOA member for breach of governing
documents.
Plaintiffs plead the existence of
the CC&R’s, or HOA governing documents, and provide a copy of the alleged
CC&R’s attached to the Complaint. (Compl., ¶¶ 11,12; Ex. A.) Plaintiffs
plead that both Plaintiffs and Defendant are members of the HOA, and thus
standing to bring the case. (Id., ¶¶ 4, 11.) Plaintiffs plead that Defendant
is an agent of the HOA since the HOA hired Defendant to carry out the
re-roofing and storm drain projects at issue. (Id., ¶¶ 13–21, 38
39.) Plaintiffs plead they repeatedly requested the HOA repair the roof, the
HOA ignored their requests, “water continued to flood the property during
periods of rain,” and Plaintiffs “began water and mold remediation in the
Property.” (Id., ¶¶ 24–26.) Plaintiffs plead that Defendants breached
the governing documents by damaging “the common area through negligent
re-roofing.” (Id., ¶¶ 43–44. Plaintiffs plead resulting damages. (Id., ¶ 45.)
Thus, Plaintiffs have plead a claim for Breach of Governing Documents
as to Defendant. Defendant’s demurrer to the 1st cause of action is
OVERRULED.
II.
3rd cause of action for negligence—OVERRULED
“The elements of a cause of action
for negligence are well established. They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use
due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate
or legal cause of the resulting injury.’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)
Plaintiffs allege Defendant owed a
legal duty “owed a duty to [Plaintiffs] to build improvements according to
plans and specifications in a good and workmanlike manner,” and Defendant “breached
that duty when the roofing work allowed flooding into the Property . . . . result[ing]
in significant water damage to the Property, as well as to personal property.”
(Compl., ¶¶ 13–23, 55.) Plaintiffs plead Defendant’s “breaches were, jointly or
severally, the proximate or legal cause of the injury to” Plaintiffs. (Id.,
¶¶ 55–56.) Plaintiffs have plead all the necessary elements of negligence as to
Defendant.
Defendant’s Demurrer to the 3rd
cause of action is OVERRULED.
III.
4th cause of action for nuisance—OVERRULED
The elements of a private nuisance claim
are as follows: “First, the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use
and enjoyment of its property. Second, the invasion of the plaintiff's interest
in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., it
caused the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage. Third, the
interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, it must
also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or
amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
the land.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1176. reh'g denied
(Oct. 25, 2022), review denied (Jan. 18, 2023).)
A nuisance includes: “Anything which is
injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of
controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use,
in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal,
or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Civ.
Code, § 3479.)
Discharges of water on to a plaintiff’s property
can be held as a nuisance and a trespass. (See Mangini v. Aerojet-General
Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1136 [“the city's discharge of water on
to plaintiff's property was held to be both a trespass and a nuisance.”].)
Plaintiffs successfully
pleads a claim for private nuisance as to Defendant. Plaintiffs plead that
leaks from the common area roof and storm drain substantially and unreasonably interfered
with the use and enjoyment of their property. (Compl., ¶¶ 59–60.) Plaintiffs
allege Defendant’s “shoddy repairs caused Plaintiff to suffer actual damage
from the alleged nuisance. (Id., ¶ 13–24, 61, 62.)
Defendant’s
demurrer to the 4th cause of action is OVERRULED.
IV.
5th. Cause of action for trespass—OVERRULED
Trespass is the “unlawful
interference with possession of property.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory
Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.4th 245, 261.) The elements of trespass
are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the
defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3)
lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and
(5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (See id.
at p. 262, citing CACI No. 2000.)
Discharges of water on to a
plaintiff’s property can be held as a nuisance and a trespass. (See Mangini
v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1136 [“the city's
discharge of water on to plaintiff's property was held to be both a trespass
and a nuisance.”].)
Plaintiffs allege Plaintiffs own
the property at issue. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants negligently
and continuously allowed water to enter into the Plaintiffs’ Home without
permission (Id., ¶¶ 12–23, 64–65.) Plaintiffs allege they were harmed by
the water intrusion. (Id., ¶¶ 28–31.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (Id., ¶¶ 12–23,
64–65.)
V.
Motion to Strike prayer for attorneys’ fees and
civil penalties—DENIED
Defendant moves to strike
Plaintiffs prayer for attorneys’ fees under the Davis-Stirling Act and civil
penalties under Civ Code 5235.
“The Davis-Stirling Common Interest
Development Act (Davis-Stirling Act or the Act) governs an action to enforce
the recorded CC&Rs of a common interest development. (§§ 4000–6150
[formerly §§ 1350–1376].) Section 5975 provides that CC&Rs may be enforced
as equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and “[i]n an action to enforce
the governing documents [of a common interest development], the prevailing
party shall be awarded reasonable attorney[ ] fees and costs.” (§ 5975, subd.
(c); see id., subd. (a).) The prevailing party is entitled to attorney
fees “ ‘as a matter of right’ ” and the trial court is “ ‘obligated
to award attorney fees ... whenever the statutory conditions have been
satisfied.” (Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
583, 590.) It is understood that an action to enforce governing documents
covers breach of governing documents claims at issue here. (See generally Martin,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1024.)
Civ Code 5235 states the following:
A member may bring an action to enforce
that member's right to inspect and copy the association records. If a court
finds that the association unreasonably withheld access to the association
records, the court shall award the member reasonable costs and expenses,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and may assess a civil penalty of up
to five hundred dollars ($500) for the denial of each separate written request.
(Civ. Code, § 5235, subd. (a), emphasis
added.)
The
Davis-Stirling Act allows the prevailing party in an action to enforce
CC&R’s to collect attorneys’ fees.
Plaintiff has properly plead an action to enforce the CC&R’s as to the
Defendant and thus a prayer for attorneys’ fees is proper.
Plaintiff
includes the prayer for civil penalties as to Defendant El Camino Townhouses
Owners Association (“El Camino”), and not the demurring Defendant here.
Plaintiff pleads a sixth cause of action for Violation of Civil Code Section
5200 as to El Camino and DOES 1–20 only, which carries a civil penalty of up to
$500 “for the denial of each separate written request. (See Civ. Code, § 5235,
subd. (a),) Thus, Plaintiff is permitted to plead a prayer for a civil penalty
as to the 6th cause of action for El Camino.