Judge H. Jay Ford, III, Case Number: 24SMCV00813, Date: 2024-06-25 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Larry Cogan Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff Steven Lalich’s Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of Defendant’s alleged intoxication at the time of the incident at issue do not arise to a level of malice needed for a punitive damages claim under CC §3294.

CC §3294(a) provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Cal Civ. Code § 3294, subdiv. (a).)

“Malice is ‘conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is ‘despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.’ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Despicable conduct is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)

“One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 897.)

Defendant Larry Cogan (“Cogan”) argues that Plaintiff Steven Lalich (“Lalich”) has not alleged any facts to support a punitive damages award against Cogan, and conclusory allegations that Cogan was intoxicated is not enough to establish malice. (Motion, p. 6.) Cogan recognizes that driving a vehicle while intoxicated can support a claim for punitive damages under Taylor, however Cogan argues this case differs from Tqylor because in Taylor numerous allegations were included in the complaint to reach a punitive damages claim including “defendant's history of alcoholism, his prior arrests and convictions for drunk driving, his prior accident attributable to his intoxication, and his acceptance of employment involving the transportation of alcoholic beverages,” and no factual allegations were included by Lalich. (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 896.)

The Court agrees with Cogan. Lalich’s conclusory statement alone that Cogan “was intoxicated at the time of the subject collision,” does not arise to the level of conscious disregard for the safety of others, or malice, needed to reach punitive damages. Lalich would need to plead more facts to reach a claim for punitive damages similar to Taylor.

The Taylor court went onto state that the additional factors alleged in the complaint are not “essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Ibid.) However, the conclusory statement of intoxication alone is not enough without more factual allegations. “[T]he term “malice” as used in Civil Code section 3294 has been interpreted as including a conscious disregard of the probability that the actor's conduct will result in injury to others.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88.) “The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable.” (Id., at p. 89.) Thus, without more factual allegations surrounding Cogan’s intoxication at the time of the alleged collision the allegations remain only a foreseeable risk of injury, and do not reach the level of probable risk to allege punitive damages.