Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 24SMCV01665, Date: 2024-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV01665    Hearing Date: August 22, 2024    Dept: O

Case Name:  Azinian-Yazeji, et al. v. State Farm General Insurance Company, et al.

SUBJECT:                 MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant State Farm General Insurance Company

RESP. PARTY:         Plaintiffs Christina Azinian-Yazeji and Steve Yazeji

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant State Farm General Insurance Company Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the Complaint is DENIED. Plaintiffs have properly plead sufficient facts to allege Defendant acted in bad faith by unreasonably delaying or denying policy benefit payments which is sufficient for a prayer for punitive damages as to an insurer.  

REASONING

            “[A] motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading which are not subject to demurrer. A motion to strike does not lie to attack a complaint for insufficiency of allegations to justify relief; that is a ground for general demurrer.” (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.) A motion to strike may be directed to all or a portion of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or demurrer. (See Code Civ Proc., § 435, subdiv. (a).) On a motion to strike, a judge must read the complaint as a whole, considering all parts in their context, and must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations. (See Atwell Island Water Dist. v. Atwell Island Water Dist. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 624, 628, as modified (Feb. 27, 2020).)

            As part of the meet and confer process, the moving party shall identify all of the specific allegations that it believes are subject to being stricken and identify with legal support the basis of the deficiencies. The party who filed the pleading shall provide legal support for its position that the pleading is legally sufficient, or, in the alternative, how the pleading could be amended to cure any legal insufficiency.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subdiv. (a)(1).) “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date a motion to strike must be filed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subdiv., (a)(2).)

            A judge may, on a motion to strike made under CCP § 435 or at any time at the judge's discretion, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter in a pleading,” on terms the judge “deems proper.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).).  “[I]rrelevant . . . matter” means an immaterial allegation in a pleading and includes an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10(b)(1) and (c).)

            CC §3294(a) provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Cal Civ. Code § 3294, subdiv., (a).)

            “Malice is ‘conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is ‘despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.’ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Despicable conduct is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)

            “[E]ven though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants' conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages.” (Monge v. Superior Ct., (1986)176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 510.) Furthermore, “[m]alice and oppression may be inferred from the circumstances of a defendant's conduct.” (Id., at p. 511.)

            Defendant State Farm General Insurance Company (“State Farm”) moves to strike punitives damages from Plaintiffs’ Christina Azinian-Yazeji and Steve Yazejis’ (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to state sufficient facts to support an award for punitive damages. (Motion, p. 5:21–26.) However, “[Plaintiffs] may be entitled to recover punitive damages if [they] can prove that [State Farm] not only denied or delayed the payment of policy benefits unreasonably or without proper cause, but, in doing so, was guilty of malice, oppression or fraud.” (Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1080, as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 20, 2007); see also Morris v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 966, 977 [“if the insurer is found to have acted unreasonably, its liability for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing will sound in tort, exposing it to a much broader array of damages”].)

            In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege State Farm unreasonably denied or delayed payment without proper cause, and Plaintiffs state specific facts to allege the bad faith actions by State Farm. (See Compl., ¶¶ 34–36, 55–57.) At this stage, the Court must accept all well-plead allegations as true, and construe the pleadings “liberally . . . with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) Thus, Plaintiffs have properly plead the possibility of punitive damages against State Farm through their alleged delay, and denial, of policy benefit payments.

            Thus, State Farm’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the Complaint is DENIED.