Judge: H. Jay Ford, III, Case: 24SMCV02657, Date: 2025-04-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV02657 Hearing Date: April 3, 2025 Dept: O
Case Name:
Myers, et al. v. Anderson Air Conditioning, L.P., et al.
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Case No.: |
24SMCV02657 |
Complaint Filed: |
6-4-24 |
|
Hearing Date: |
4-3-25 |
Discovery C/O: |
N/A |
|
Calendar No.: |
4 |
Discovery Motion C/O: |
N/A |
|
POS: |
OK |
Trial Date: |
None |
SUBJECT: DEMURRER TO SAC WITHOUT MOTION
TO STRIKE
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant Centimark
Corporation
RESP.
PARTY: Plaintiffs Michael D.
Myers and Pamela M. Rieder, as Trustors and Successor Trustees of the Myers
Family Trust and Trustees of the MF Trust No. 1, and 2990 S. SEPULVEDA, LLC
TENTATIVE
RULING
Defendant
Centimark Corporation’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs Michael D. Myers and Pamela M.
Rieder, et als’ SAC due to Plaintiffs contracted for warranty as their sole
remedy is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs attached contract
to the SAC includes a SAMPLE WARRANTY which unambiguously states the warranty
is the sole remedy. Plaintiffs argue the SAMPLE WARRANTY is not the agreed-upon
warranty.
Defendant
Centimark Corporation’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs Michael D. Myers and Pamela M.
Rieder, et als’ SAC because the SAC is time-barred due to the contracted for
one-year statute of limitations for bringing suit is SUSTAINED with 20 days
leave to amend. Plaintiffs fail to allege express compliance with the
contracted for one-year statute of limitations, nor exactly when Plaintiffs
discovered the defect upon which the complaint is based.
REASONING
As a general matter, in a demurrer
proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via
proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the
evidence or facts alleged.” (E428.50Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes
the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.)
The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it
stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained,
leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of
successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)
The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended
successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118,
226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can
state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave
to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240,
245).
Plaintiff is only required to
allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (See Committee on Children's
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 212 [“the
complaint should set forth the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts”); 1 Cal.
Affirmative Def. § 10:2 (2d ed.) [allegations of agency, course and scope of
employment, etc. qualify as ultimate facts].) Plaintiff’s allegations must be
accepted as true on demurrer. (See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924 [“For purposes of reviewing a demurrer, we accept
the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint”].)
I.
Demurrer to all causes of action against
Defendant Centimark in the SAC because the parties agreed that warranty repairs
would constitute Plaintiffs’ sole remedy is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to
amend.
"For
purposes of a demurrer, we accept as true both facts alleged in the text of the
complaint and facts appearing in exhibits attached to it. If the facts
appearing in the attached exhibit contradict those expressly pleaded, those in
the exhibit are given precedence." (Mead
v. Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61
Cal.App.4th 561, 567–568; see Dodd v.
Citizens Bank of Costa Mesa (1990) 222
Cal.App.3d 1624, 1627 ["facts appearing in exhibits attached to the
complaint will also be accepted as true and, if contrary to the allegations in
the pleading, will be given precedence"].)
Defendant Centimark Corporation
(“Centimark”) argues that Plaintiffs Michael D. Myers and Pamela M. Rieder, as
Trustors and Successor Trustees of the Myers Family Trust and Trustees of the
MF Trust No. 1, and 2990 S. SEPULVEDA, LLC (“Plaintiffs”) SAC attaches the
contract documents agreed to between the parties, which includes a “SAMPLE
WARRANTY,” and thus the Court may examine and apply the language of the contract
documents including the Sample Warranty. (See SAC, Ex. A; Sample Warranty at SAC
p. 109–112, and Motion, Ex. A) The Court agrees and will examine the contents
of the SAC’s attached contract materials.
Centimark shows that the Sample
Warranty provides an exclusivity of warranty and limitation of remedies
section, which states:
“IV. EXCLUSIVITY OF WARRANTY AND
LIMITATION OF REMEDIES: CENTIMARK EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR ANY OTHER IMPLIED WARRANTY. THIS EXPRESS LIMITED WARRANTY
CONTAINS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE WARRANTY AND REMEDY OF PURCHASER AGAINST
CENTIMARK. THERE IS NO EXPRESS WARRANTY OTHER THAN THAT STATED IN THIS
WARRANTY.”
(See SAC, Ex. A, Sample Warranty (last
4 pages of Ex. A), ¶ IV(a).1.)
Centimark
points to SAC ¶ 88 where Plaintiffs allege they have utilized the warranty
repairs by stating “Centimark has attempted corrections on multiple occasions,
making repairs, with their most recent repairs having been performed on or
about February 2024.” (SAC, ¶ 88.) Centimark argues that they have
fulfilled they warranty obligations as alleged in the SAC, with the warranty being
the exclusive remedy method as stated in the SAMPLE WARRANTY within the
contract materials attached to the SAC.
“[W]here
the parties have stipulated to the nature or amount of a remedy, it is proper
for the trial court to honor the parties' agreement unless it finds that to do
so would be contrary to a rule of law or public policy . . . . [t]he court may
not remake the bargain to the advantage of one party for no reason other than
that the party has become dissatisfied with the agreement. ” (DVD Copy
Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 697, 725;
see also Farnham v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 69, 78 [a
“sole remedy” provision is enforceable when it is “the result of a private,
voluntary transaction”]; Nelson v. Spence (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 493, 497
[“Where a contract expressly provides a remedy for a breach thereof, the
language used in the contract must clearly indicate an intent to make the
remedy exclusive”.]
“The modern
trend of the law is to favor the enforcement of contracts, to lean against
their unenforceability because of uncertainty, and to carry out the intentions
of the parties if this can feasibly be done.” (Goodwest Rubber Corp. v.
Munoz (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 919, 920. “[A] written contract, having been
deliberately executed, is presumed to correctly express the parties’
intentions.” (Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 214
Cal. App. 3d 1, 19; see also Civ. Code, § 1638 [“The language of a contract is
to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does
not involve an absurdity”].)
The
language in the SAMPLE WARRANTY attached to the Contract indicates that the
parties did consent to make warranty repairs the exclusive remedy. The Court
examined the attached Contract in Ex. A, and the only other statement regarding
remedies is a one-year statute of limitations to file a claim within the SAMPLE
WARRANTY. Nowhere else is a remedy mentioned, nor does another section exist which
expressly negates, or makes ambiguous, the exclusive remedy section.
In the Opposition, Plaintiffs argue
that the Sample Warranty is not the actual warranty agreed upon between the
parties and requested leave to amend to clarify their allegations. The Court grants
that request.
Centimark’s Demurrer to the SAC based
on the contractual imitation of remedies to the express warranty as the sole remedy is
SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.
I.
Demurrer to all causes of action against
Defendant Centimark as claims are barred by contractual one-year time limit to
bring suit— SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.
Centimark demurs to all causes of
action in the SAC arguing all claims are barred by a contractual one-year
statute of limitations to bring the claims also included within the SAMPLE
WARRANTY. Specifically, paragraph V of the SAMPLE WARRANTY states as follows:
“V. TIME LIMIT FOR BRINGING SUIT: ANY
ACTION BY PURCHASER TO ENFORCE ANY CLAIMS AGAINST CENTIMARK MUST BE COMMENCED
WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE DATE THAT A DEFECT IN MATERIALS OR WORKMANSHIP, OR
OTHER BREACH OR ANY OTHER CLAIM IS DISCOVERED OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISCOVERED.”
(See SAC, Ex. A, Sample Warranty (last
4 pages of Ex. A), ¶ V.)
“In general,
California courts have permitted contracting parties to modify the length of
the otherwise applicable California statute of limitations, whether the
contract has extended or shortened the limitations period.” (Hambrecht &
Quist Venture Partners v. American Medical Internat., Inc. (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 1532, 1546.)
Centimark argues
that the SAC alleges the one-year time period to file the action against
Centimark began on 1-29-22, since Plaintiff’s allege that “work for necessary
repairs” began on 10-12-21, and continued after completion of initial work on
1-29-22. (SAC, ¶¶ 84–85.) Thus, it follows that Plaintiffs first learned of the
defect on 1-29-22, when after initial repairs, the work continued meaning the
repair was not properly fixed and needed more repair. At that point, Plaintiffs
reasonably should have discovered the issue which would begin the one-year time
limit to bring suit, thus 1-29-23 was the last date to bring suit. The claim
was filed on 6-4-24, therefore, Defendants argue the complaint was filed well
outside the SOL according to the SAMPLE WARRANTY and allegations.
Plaintiffs argue
that the SAC alleges Plaintiffs initial discovery of the defective work after
Centimark’s completion of the work as late as February of 2024. (Oppo., p. 6:11–24;
SAC, ¶ 88.) However, the SAC does not expressly allege this fact, instead the
SAC states the following: “Centimark has attempted corrections on multiple
occasions, making repairs, with their most recent repairs having been performed
on or about February, 2024.” (SAC, ¶ 88.) This allegation does not necessarily stand
for the proposition that Plaintiffs discovered the defect on or about February
of 2024, since Plaintiffs could have discovered the defect as early as 1-29-23 as
argued by Centimark. Thus, Plaintiffs have not properly plead compliance with
the contracted for one-year statute of limitations within the SAMPLE WARRANTY.
Thus, Centimark’s
Demurrer to the SAC as barred by the contracted for one year SOLD to bring
claims is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.
II.
Demurrer to all causes of action as uncertain—[ADDRESS
AT HEARING]