Judge H. Jay Ford, III, Case Number: 24SMCV04067, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Lauren Sanchez’s special motion to strike under CCP §425.16 (anti-SLAPP) is GRANTED. The plaintiff is to submit the proposed order and judgment of dismissal.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice judicial notice of eleven (11) documents filed in other legal proceedings. The Court takes judicial noticed of the existence of the documents but not the truth of contested facts stated therein.

Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits A-G and H-J attached to Plaintiff’s second opposition filed on 1-7-2025 are SUSTAINED.

Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibit I (Ex F to first opposition) (Declarations of Michal Sanchez and Eleanor Sanchez) are SUSTAINED, except for:

¶ 1.	In its entirety
¶ 2.	“I have suffered significant damages,” through end of paragraph.
¶ 7.	“I … filed my lawsuits,” through end of paragraph.
¶ 13(h).	In its entirety.

¶¶ 1-2.	In their entireties. ¶ 3 “I am the victim of incestuous sexual and physical abuse” ¶
¶ 6.	In its entirety, except as to the truth of Lauren Sanchez’s alleged statement.
¶ 7.	In its entirety, but SUSTAINED as to the truth of the statement, as Plaintiff has levied no objection based on the secondary evidence rule.
¶ 9.	“I did not tell Michael,” through end of paragraph.
¶ 11.	“On Sunday, February 25, 2024, … Lauren’s attorney, Terry Bird, sent a letter to me[.]”

Plaintiff Michael Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jeff Bezos, Lauren Sanchez, William Isaacson, Terry Bird, and Oliver Rocos on August 21, 2024. His complaint asserts claims for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and (4) defamation. On October 15, 2024, defendant Lauren Sanchez (“Defendant”) specially moved to strike Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute. Plaintiff filed his opposition on December 19, 2024, and followed with a second opposition on January 7, 2025.

Preliminarily, the Court notes Plaintiff’s first opposition memorandum (filed on 12/19/2024) was impermissibly long. “Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d)), excluding exhibits. Plaintiff’s first opposition included forty-six (46) pages of argument. His second filed opposition (filed 1/7/2025) corrects the error. The Court considers the latter opposition, which was timely filed. Plaintiff’s first opposition is stricken for failure to comply with the Rules of Court.

“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims arise from protected activity in which the defendant has engaged. Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has “at least ‘minimal merit. If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 [where moving party seeks to strike an entire cause of action alleging multiple factual bases, court does not determine whether 1st prong is met based on “gravamen” test but must determine whether each factual bases supplies the element of claim or merely provides context].)

On the first step, “courts are to consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability. The defendant's burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.)

Here, Defendant shows how all the claims in the complaint arise from protected conduct by Defendant. Defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action “fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Sprengel v. Zbylut (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 140, 150.) Here, Plaintiff expressly pleads that his action arises “from the unethical and illegal activities committed during litigation of Plaintiff’s lawsuits against Mr. Bezos, Ms. Sanchez, and others.” (Compl. ¶ 12) The acts on which liability are based, according to Plaintiff’s own characterization, were “a campaign of misinformation “sold as fact to news outlets” (Compl., ¶ 19) and a conspiracy “to defeat Plaintiff’s lawsuits” (Id., ¶ 25).

The Court agrees with Defendant that all of Plaintiff’s claims are statements made in connection with, or in contemplation of, litigation; and therefore, are protected speech, because they are “made in connection with an issue under consideration . . . by a . . . judicial body” under Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(2) and/or were started furtherance of a matter of public interest under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4).

II. Anti-SLAPP Second Step – Plaintiff fails to satisfy its Burden of Demonstrating a Probability of Prevailing on their Claims

“The second prong of the statute deals with whether the plaintiff has “demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the superior court, in making these determinations, considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ For purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion, the court considers the pleadings and evidence submitted by both sides, but does not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, the court's responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff. A plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. With these descriptions in mind, we will not strike a cause of action under the anti-SLAPP statute unless it lacks even minimal merit.” Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 261.

At this second step, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidence of both parties. (Ibid.) The plaintiff’s proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.) The court “does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff does not carry his burden to show a probability of prevailing. Although he recites all the facts in Defendant’s supporting evidence and declares a “Truth” in response to each of her purported “False Claim[s]”, he does not offer any admissible evidence to support his claims for defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress or civil conspiracy. Moreover, Defendant shows all of Plaintiff’s claims arise from petitioning activity that is privileged under Civil Code §47(b).

“The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 (Action Apartment).) “The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212.) “The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Action Apartment, at p. 1241.) Where it applies, the privilege is absolute, providing a defense to all torts except malicious prosecution and applying “to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.” (Silberg, at pp. 212, 215-216.)

“A plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits for anti-SLAPP purposes where the claim is barred by the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47.” (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1102; see Flickinger v. Finwall (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 822, 840.)

Plaintiff’s claims within the Complaint are based on (i) statements made during litigation including the successful motion to quash in Sanchez v. AMI, The National Enquirer, Dylan Howard, David Pecker, et al. (Case No. 220CV02924) (the “AMI action”) and (ii) alleged “legal threats” to The Information, Medium.com, and various social media companies. All of these alleged statements were made in judicial proceedings, to achieve the object of litigation, or have some connection to litigation, thus placing the statements within the litigation privilege of Civil Code §47(b). (See Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 920 [holding that statements made during “litigation do not necessarily fall outside the privilege simply because they are, or are alleged to be, fraudulent, perjurious, unethical, or even illegal.”].) The litigation privilege is a complete bar to the claims, and thus Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on their claims.

Finally, Plaintiff’s request to continue the hearing for discovery is denied. Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for such discovery and in particular how such discovery would show he has any reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims. (See Code Civ. Proc., §425.16, subd. (b)(3).)

Defendant sTerry Bird and Oliver Rocos special motion to strike under CCP §425.16 (anti-SLAPP) is GRANTED. Defendants submitted a proposed order along with the motion.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c), Defendants, as the prevailing defendants on a special motion to strike, are entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, the amount of fees and costs to which Defendants are entitled will be determined by the Court on a noticed motion

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice judicial notice of eleven (11) documents filed in other legal proceedings. The Court takes judicial noticed of the existence of the documents but not the truth of contested facts stated therein.

Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits A–L attached to Plaintiff’s second opposition are SUSTAINED.

Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibit I (Declarations of Michal Sanchez and Eleanor Sanchez) are SUSTAINED, except for:

¶ 1.	In its entirety
¶ 2.	“I have suffered significant damages,” through end of paragraph.
¶ 7.	“I was forced to file my lawsuits . . .,” through end of paragraph.
¶ 13(h).	In its entirety.

Plaintiff Michael Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jeff Bezos, Lauren Sanchez, William Isaacson, Terry Bird, and Oliver Rocos on August 21, 2024. His complaint asserts claims for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and (4) defamation. On 12-27-24, Defendants Terry Bird (“Bird”) and Oliver Rocos (“Rocos,” collectively “Defendants”) specially moved to strike Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute. Plaintiff filed his opposition on 1-14-25, and Defendants filed a reply on 3-28-25.

Under the SLAPP statue acts “in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

Here, Defendants shows that all the claims in the complaint arise from Defendants’ protected conduct by Defendant. Plaintiff expressly pleads that his action arises “from the unethical and illegal activities committed during litigation of Plaintiff’s lawsuits against Mr. Bezos, Ms. Sanchez, and others.” (Compl. ¶ 12) The acts on which liability is based, according to Plaintiff’s own characterization, were “a campaign of misinformation “sold as fact to news outlets” (Compl., ¶ 19) and a conspiracy “to defeat Plaintiff’s lawsuits” (Id., ¶ 25). The Complaint alleges that Defendant’s involvement in the underlying litigation is because Defendants represent Defendant Ms. Sanchez as her “personal attorneys” (Id., ¶ 5; see also id., ¶ 25 [describing Defendants purported misconduct in working to “defeat Plaintiff’s lawsuits”].) All of the allegations that Plaintiff presents specific to Defendants are related to their representation of Defendant Ms. Sanchez, where Defendants successfully moved to quash Plaintiff’s third-party subpoena in the AMI action and or represented Defendant Ms. Sanchez related to any possible litigation. (Id., ¶¶ 76–98.)

Defendants show that Plaintiff’4^th cause of action for defamation arises out of protected petitioning activity because the claim is based on statements made in a Trust letter, and alleged legal threats/complaints to “social media platforms” relating to Plaintiff’s posts concerning the matters raised in Plaintiff’s various lawsuits (Compl., ¶¶ 127–129.)

Defendants provide evidence that the Bird’s alleged threat to “evict Plaintiff’s completely innocent eighty-two-year-old mother Eleanor,” on 2-25-24 was in fact a Trust Letter sent to Plaintiff and Eleanor Sanchez, in anticipation of litigation should Plaintiff fail to comply, to demand that Plaintiff cease and desist from ongoing fraudulent representation regarding his ownership interest in the Property and his right to lease it out. (See Rocos Decl., ¶ 25; Ex. I.) A cease and desist letter sent in anticipation, or in relation to, possible litigation is protected conduct under the SLAPP statute. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1024; see also Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268 [that a party sent a letter prior to litigation “does not mean it is not protected activity”].)

In the opposition, Plaintiff does not provide any arguments to contradict Defendant’s evidence and assertion regarding the 2-25-24 letter. Plaintiff repeats the allegations that Defendants threatened to evict his mother, but does not provide any evidence of this occurrence, and does not refute that the Defendants provided letter constituted the alleged “threat.” The 2-25-24 letter is exactly how Defendants describe it in their motion—a demand letter, sent in anticipation of litigation, demanding that Plaintiff cease and desist his ownership representation of the property and his right to lease it. The letter never once mentions an eviction of Plaintiff’s mother, Eleanor Sanchez, it only mentions that if Plaintiff fails to cease and desist Eleanor Sanchez “will also be deemed to have surrendered all of her rights with respect to the Property.” This is clearly a letter in anticipation of litigation and not an eviction letter as stated by Plaintiff. Thus the letter is protected activity under the SLAPP statute.

Additionally Defendants show that the alleged legal threats and complaints to social media companies were also connected with actual and/or contemplated litigation related to a possible defamation suit filed against Plaintiff by Defendant Sanchez and her attorneys, Bird and Rocos. These alleged communications are protected prelitigation third-party communications advising the third-party social media sites of possible defamatory statements made against Defendant Sanchez. (See See, e.g., Neville, 160 Cal. App. 4th at p.1268 [employer’s letter to former employee’s customers accusing him of unlawful conduct and advising customers not to do business with him was protected conduct]. Furthermore, Defendants declare that they never contacted the social media sites as alleged by Plaintiff, but only raised the social media posts in Court as Plaintiff’s posts were “sufficiently concerning” and “intended to harass” Defendant Sanchez. (See Rocos Decl., ¶¶ 28–34.) Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion with any admissible evidence in the opposition or his declaration.

Thus, Defendants meet their burden to show that all claims within the Plaintiff’s complaint arise out of protected conduct under the SLAPP statute.

II. Anti-SLAPP Second Step – Plaintiff fails to satisfy its Burden of Demonstrating a Probability of Prevailing on their Claims

Plaintiff does not carry his burden to show a probability of prevailing. Although he recites all the facts in Defendant’s supporting evidence and declares a “Truth” in response to each of her purported “False Claim[s]”, he does not offer any admissible evidence to support his claims for defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress or civil conspiracy. (See Motion, Ex. J.) Moreover, Defendant shows all of Plaintiff’s claims arise from petitioning activity that is privileged under Civil Code §47(b).

Plaintiff’s claims within the Complaint are based on (i) statements made during litigation including the successful motion to quash in Sanchez v. AMI, The National Enquirer, Dylan Howard, David Pecker, et al. (Case No. 220CV02924) (the “AMI action”) and (ii) alleged “legal threats” to The Information, Medium.com, and various social media companies. All of these alleged statements were made in judicial proceedings, to achieve the object of litigation, or have some connection to litigation, thus placing the statements within the litigation privilege of Civil Code §47(b). The litigation privilege is a complete bar to the claims, and thus Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on their claims.

Additionally, in the opposition, Plaintiff does not provide any argument or authority as to why the litigation privilege should not apply.

Finally, Plaintiff’s possible request to continue the hearing for discovery is DENIED. Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for such discovery and in particular how such discovery would show he has any reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims. (See Code Civ. Proc., §425.16, subd. (b)(3).)

Defendant William Isaacson special motion to strike under CCP §425.16 (anti-SLAPP) is GRANTED. The Defendant is to submit the proposed order and judgment of dismissal.

Defendant’s 10-15-24 Request for Judicial Notice judicial notice of eleven (11) documents filed in other legal proceedings. The Court takes judicial noticed of the existence of the documents but not the truth of contested facts stated therein.

Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits A and B attached to Plaintiff’s opposition, are SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff Michael Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jeff Bezos, Lauren Sanchez, William Isaacson, Terry Bird, and Oliver Rocos on August 21, 2024. His complaint asserts claims for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and (4) defamation. On 2-21-25, Defendant William Isaacson (“Isaacson”) specially moved to strike Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute. Plaintiff filed his opposition on 2-28-25, and Isaacson filed a reply on 3-28-25.

Isaacson shows how all the claims in the complaint arise from Isaacson’s protected conduct. Plaintiff expressly pleads that his action arises “from the unethical and illegal activities committed during litigation of Plaintiff’s lawsuits against Mr. Bezos, Ms. Sanchez, and others.” (Compl. ¶ 12) The acts on which liability are based, according to Plaintiff’s own characterization, were “a campaign of misinformation “sold as fact to news outlets” (Compl., ¶ 19) and a conspiracy “to defeat Plaintiff’s lawsuits” (Id., ¶ 25). The Complaint alleges that Isaacson’s involvement in the underlying litigation is due to the fact that Isaacson “represented Mr. Bezos pro hac vice during Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit against American Media Inc.” (Id., ¶ 4; see also id., ¶ 25 [describing Isaacson’s purported misconduct in working to “defeat Plaintiff’s lawsuits”].) All of the allegations that Plaintiff presents specific to Isaacson are related to his representation of Mr. Bezos, where Isaacson successfully argued to quash Plaintiff’s third-party subpoena in the AMI action. (Id. ¶¶ 64–75.)

The Court finds all of Plaintiff’s claims are “per se protected” statements made in connection with, or in contemplation of, litigation; and therefore, are protected speech, because they are “made in connection with an issue under consideration . . . by a . . . judicial body” under Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(2). (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 480 [“all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute”].)

II. Anti-SLAPP Second Step – Plaintiff fails to satisfy its Burden of Demonstrating a Probability of Prevailing on their Claims

Plaintiff does not carry his burden to show a probability of prevailing. Plaintiff does not offer any admissible evidence to support his claims for defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress or civil conspiracy.

Moreover, Isaacson shows all of Plaintiff’s claims arise from petitioning activity that is privileged under Civil Code §47(b). “The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 (Action Apartment).) “The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212.) “The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Action Apartment, at p. 1241.) Where it applies, the privilege is absolute, providing a defense to all torts except malicious prosecution and applying “to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.” (Silberg, at pp. 212, 215-216.)

Plaintiff’s claims against Isaacson within the Complaint are based entirely in connection with Isaacson’s representation of Bezos in successfully seeking to quash Plaintiff’s third-party subpoena in Sanchez v. AMI, The National Enquirer, Dylan Howard, David Pecker, et al. (Case No. 220CV02924) (the “AMI action”). (See Compl., ¶¶ 64–75.) All of these alleged statements were made in a judicial proceeding, to achieve the object of litigations or have some connection to litigation, thus placing the statements squarely within the litigation privilege of Civil Code §47(b). The litigation privilege is a complete bar to the claims against Isaacson and thus Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing.

Additionally, in the opposition, Plaintiff does not provide any argument or authority as to why the litigation privilege should not apply.

Defendant Jeff Bezos special motion to strike under CCP §425.16 (anti-SLAPP) is GRANTED. The Defendant is to submit the proposed order and judgment of dismissal.

Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits A and B attached to Plaintiff’s opposition, and Exhibits A and B attached to the declaration filed on 3-3-25 are SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff Michael Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jeff Bezos, Lauren Sanchez, William Isaacson, Terry Bird, and Oliver Rocos on August 21, 2024. His complaint asserts claims for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and (4) defamation. On 2-21-25, Defendant Jeff Bezos (“Bezos”) specially moved to strike Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute. Plaintiff filed his opposition on 2-2-25, and Defendant filed reply on 3-28-25.

Bezos shows how all the claims in the complaint arise from Bezos’s protected conduct. Plaintiff expressly pleads that his action arises “from the unethical and illegal activities committed during litigation of Plaintiff’s lawsuits against Mr. Bezos, Ms. Sanchez, and others.” (Compl. ¶ 12) The acts on which liability are based, according to Plaintiff’s own characterization, were “a campaign of misinformation “sold as fact to news outlets” (Compl., ¶ 19) and a conspiracy “to defeat Plaintiff’s lawsuits” (Id., ¶ 25).

Additionally, the alleged communications with Medium.com, The Information, and other social media companies were alleged to be “legal threats” and thus made in connection with anticipated litigation. (See Compl., ¶¶ 61–62, 98.) Alleged communication in anticipation of litigation is also considered protected activity under CCP § 425.16. (See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [“[j]ust as communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation], ... such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16”].)

Plaintiff appears to argue in the opposition that Flatley v. Mauro is instructive, however, the Court does not agree. Flately recognized an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute that applies only in “rare cases” where “the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes,” that the speech or petitioning activity was criminal conduct. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320.) Plaintiff fails to show that the situation here is one of the “rare cases where the defendant’s assertedly protected speech or petitioning activity is conclusively demonstrated to have been illegal as a matter of law,” “either through defendant’s concession or by uncontroverted and conclusive evidence.” (Ibid.) Bezos has not conceded that that his activity was criminal conduct nor does Plaintiff provide evidence to conclusively establish criminal activity. Thus, the Flatley exception does not apply.

The Court finds all of Plaintiff’s claims are statements made in connection with, or in contemplation of, litigation; and therefore, are protected speech, because they are “made in connection with an issue under consideration . . . by a . . . judicial body” under Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(2) and/or were started furtherance of a matter of public interest under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4).

II. Anti-SLAPP Second Step – Plaintiff fails to satisfy its Burden of Demonstrating a Probability of Prevailing on their Claims

Moreover, Bezos shows all of Plaintiff’s claims arise from petitioning activity that is privileged under Civil Code §47(b). “The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 (Action Apartment).) “The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212.) “The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Action Apartment, at p. 1241.) Where it applies, the privilege is absolute, providing a defense to all torts except malicious prosecution and applying “to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.” (Silberg, at pp. 212, 215-216.)

Plaintiffs claims within the Complaint are based on (i) statements made during litigation such as Bezos’s successful motion to quash in Sanchez v. AMI, The National Enquirer, Dylan Howard, David Pecker, et al. (Case No. 220CV02924) (the “AMI action”) and (ii) alleged “legal threats” to The Information, Medium.com, and various social media companies. All of these alleged statements were made in a judicial proceeding, to achieve the object of litigations or have some connection to litigation, thus placing the statements within the litigation privilege of Civil Code §47(b). The litigation privilege is a complete bar to the claim and thus Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on their claims.

Additionally, in the opposition, Plaintiff does not provide any argument or authority as to why the litigation privilege should not apply.

Case No.:	24SMCV04067	Complaint Filed:	8-21-24
Hearing Date:	4-22-25	Discovery C/O:	N/A
Calendar No.:	10	Discovery Motion C/O:	N/A
POS:	OK	Trial Date:	None

Case No.:	24SMCV04067	Complaint Filed:	8-21-24
Hearing Date:	4-22-25	Discovery C/O:	N/A
Calendar No.:	10	Discovery Motion C/O:	N/A
POS:	OK	Trial Date:	None

Case No.:	24SMCV04067	Complaint Filed:	8-21-24
Hearing Date:	4-22-25	Discovery C/O:	N/A
Calendar No.:	10	Discovery Motion C/O:	N/A
POS:	OK	Trial Date:	None

Case No.:	24SMCV04067	Complaint Filed:	8-21-24
Hearing Date:	4-22-25	Discovery C/O:	N/A
Calendar No.:	10	Discovery Motion C/O:	N/A
POS:	OK	Trial Date:	None