Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 19SMCV02157, Date: 2022-08-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19SMCV02157    Hearing Date: August 4, 2022    Dept: 207

Background

This case arises from Plaintiff Shawn Dreamer’s (“Plaintiff”) tenancy at an apartment unit located at 4316 Marina City Drive., Unit 331, Marina del Rey, California. Plaintiff brings this action against several parties asserting the presence of toxic mold at the property and alleging Defendants failed to properly respond to or remediate this mold. Plaintiff brings this motion for an order permitting Plaintiff to conduct financial discovery as to Defendants Ray Consulting Group Ventures, Inc.; Rayco Electronics Manufacturing, Inc.; Suraj Development Corp.; Usha Patel; and Mayan Patel in connection with his claim for punitive damages.

Objections to Evidence

Plaintiff’s objections to the Declarations of Lorraine Anderson and Mayan Patel are OVERRULED with the exception of Plaintiff’s objection to paragraph 31 of the Mayan Patel Declaration, which is SUSTAINED.

Legal Standard

Civil Code § 3295(c) prevents pre-trial discovery of a party’s financial condition relevant to a Section 3294 claim for punitive damages. However, subsection (c) enables a plaintiff to move for a court order allowing the discovery “if the court finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294.” (Civ. Code, § 3295(c).) “Such order shall not be considered to be a determination on the merits of the claim or any defense thereto and shall not be given in evidence or referred to at trial.” (Ibid.) “‘In this context, a “substantial probability” of prevailing on a claim for punitive damages means that it is “very likely” that the plaintiff will prevail on such a claim or there is a “‘strong likelihood’” that the plaintiff will prevail on such a claim.’ [Citation.]” (I-CA Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 257, 283.)

Analysis

The Court finds Plaintiff has not established he is very likely to prevail on his claim for punitive damages against Defendants for several reasons.

First, Defendants note the subject property is owned by Defendant Ray Consulting Group Ventures, Inc. (“Ray Consulting”) (Patel Decl. at ¶2.) Defendants Usha Patel and Mayan Patel are shareholders in Ray Consulting. (Id.) Defendants Rayco Electronics Manufacturing, Inc., and Suraj Development Corp. have no ownership interest in the property. Plaintiff’s motion does not discuss the liability of any one of Defendants, rather, Plaintiff attempts to lump Defendants together and suggest they are all liable as “Landlord Defendants.” (Motion at 3.) Plaintiff concedes he does not know the various roles played by the specific Defendants in relation to the property: “The exact relationship between the Landlord Defendants is not completely known at this time, but all the corporations are owned by Mayan Patel.” (Id.)

In his reply, Plaintiff claims he previously explained to Defendants’ counsel why Defendants were each named in the Complaint and claims Defendants did not object, demurrer, or move to strike the Complaint for naming irrelevant parties. (Reply at 8.) Plaintiff suggests it “has been up to Defendants to show they are not proper defendants in light of the facts alleged by Plaintiff.” (Id.) However, this misstates the burden on this motion. It is not Defendants’ burden to show Plaintiff is not entitled to financial discovery, rather it is Plaintiff’s burden to affirmatively establish a strong likelihood of success on his punitive damages claim against the Defendants Plaintiff is seeking discovery from.

Plaintiff here has presented the Court with no evidence suggesting he is very likely to succeed on his claim for punitive damages against Rayco Electronics Manufacturing, Inc., and Suraj Development Corp. Further, while Defendants Usha Patel and Mayan Patel do have some ownership interest in the property, that interest is through their status as shareholders in Ray Consulting. Plaintiff has offered no evidence or argument showing any basis to pierce the corporate veil and hold Usha Patel and Mayan Patel liable for actions taken by Ray Consulting. Plaintiff has not shown a strong likelihood of success on its claim for punitive damages against Rayco Electronics Manufacturing, Inc., Suraj Development Corp., Usha Patel, or Mayan Patel.

Further, on the evidence before it the Court is unable to find Plaintiff is very likely to succeed on his claim against Defendants. Plaintiff’s claims in this action center on the presence of mold in the subject property and Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s claims. The parties here have presented conflicting evidence concerning the history of Plaintiff’s complaints and Defendant’s responsiveness in addressing them. Indeed, there appears to have been different mold testing done with different results. For example, Defendants attach a report prepared by JLM Environmental Inspection & Consulting which found mold in a utility closet adjacent to the subject property but found no presence of mold in air samples taken within the unit. (Patel Decl. at ¶¶10-11, Ex. E.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants never remediated the mold issue and simply painted over it. (Dreamer Decl. at ¶¶8-9.) Defendants respond with evidence showing remediation work was conducted including removal and replacement of drywall and a water heater. (Patel Decl. at ¶¶16-17, Exs. H, I.)

Plaintiff claims he is likely to prevail on his habitability claim because in a previous unlawful detainer action between the parties, Plaintiff “raised habitability defense in his answer, and prevailed at trial.” (Motion at 4.) Plaintiff relies on the Conditional Judgment entered in the unlawful detainer action as proof he succeeded on his habitability defense, but the Conditional Judgment makes no reference to the habitability of the unit or the success of Plaintiff’s defense and instead simply states Plaintiff can reinstate his tenancy by paying $10,800 in back rent on the property. (Dreamer Decl. at ¶7, Ex. 5.) Plaintiff thus has not shown the previous unlawful detainer action included an adjudication in his favor on the same claims he is raising against Defendants here.

Taken as a whole, the parties have submitted conflicting evidence on key issues underpinning Plaintiff’s claims. This is not an instance where a plaintiff has overwhelming evidence establishing a claim, nor is this a situation where a defendant has effectively conceded liability and is only seriously contesting the calculation of damages. Rather, here there appears to be conflicting evidence supporting Plaintiff and Defendants. On such a showing, the Court does not find Plaintiff is very likely to succeed on his claim for punitive damages.

The Court also notes several of the examples of malicious or oppressive conduct offered by Plaintiff appear to be unrelated to the substance of the claims raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint. For example, Plaintiff claims he is entitled to punitive damages because Defendants filed a second, “surreptitious” unlawful detainer action without filing a notice of related case in this action and did not follow the procedures set out at Civil Code § 1983 et seq. concerning the disposition of Plaintiff’s personal property left in the unit after Defendants took possession. However, Plaintiff has not shown this alleged wrongdoing is relevant to any of the causes of action he is asserting in his Complaint which can support a claim for punitive damages.

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial probability of prevailing on his claim for punitive damages, and his motion for leave to conduct financial discovery on his claim is DENIED.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to conduct financial discovery is DENIED.