Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 20SMCV00776, Date: 2022-10-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20SMCV00776 Hearing Date: October 20, 2022 Dept: 207
Background
Plaintiff Advanced Orthopedic Center, Inc. (“Plaintiff’)
renders emergency medical services to patients insured by Defendants and
Cross-Complainants California Physicians’ Service dba Blue Shield of California
and Blue Shield of California Life and Health Insurance Company (collectively,
“Defendants”). This consolidated action concerns Plaintiff’s claims that
Defendants underpaid Plaintiff for the emergency services provided to
Defendants’ members. Defendants have filed a First Amended Complaint against
Plaintiff asserting causes of action for declaratory relief and money had and
received.
Defendants bring this motion asking the Court to stay 19
small claims actions Plaintiff has filed against Defendants. Alternatively,
Defendants ask the Court to transfer and consolidate each of those 19 actions
with this consolidated action. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion.
Objections to Evidence
The Court makes the following rulings on Defendants’
objections to the declaration of Dr. Jonathan Nissanoff: Objection 1 is
SUSTAINED as to the sentence “Their attempted reimbursements for the medical
services provided to their members in this case were below the value of the
AOC’s services” and is otherwise OVERRULED. Objection 4 is SUSTAINED as to
orders concerning third parties and is otherwise OVERRULED. Objection 5 is
SUSTAINED in its entirety.
Defendants’ remaining objections are otherwise OVERRULED.
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of prior
court filings in other litigation between the parties, as well as the existence
of other lawsuits. Courts can take judicial notice of the existence of Court
records. (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 471, 483; Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 728, 790 n.10.) This includes the records of any Court of record in
the United States. (Salazar v. Upland Police Dept.¿(2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 934, 946.) Defendants’ request for judicial notice is unopposed and
is GRANTED.
Legal Standards
“Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay
proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg
v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) “[A] court ordinarily has inherent power,
in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the
ends of justice.” (People v. Bell (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 323, 329.) “In
ruling on a motion for a stay order, the assigned judge must determine whether
the stay will promote the ends of justice, considering the imminence of any
trial or other proceeding that might materially affect the status of the action
to be stayed, and whether a final judgment in that action would have a res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect with regard to any common issue of the
included actions.” (CRC 3.515(f).)
Code
Civ. Proc. § 1048 provides “[w]hen actions involving common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and
it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.” The purpose of consolidation is to avoid unnecessary costs or delay,
avoid duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both
actions, and avoid inconsistent results by hearing and deciding common issues together.
(Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485.) In deciding whether to
grant a motion to consolidate, the court should weigh whether the common issues
predominate over the individual issues and whether any risks of jury confusion or
prejudice to the parties outweighs the reduction in time and expense that would
result from consolidation. (Todd-Stenberg v. Shield (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th
976, 978.) The granting or denial of the motion to consolidate rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing
of abuse of discretion. (See Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509,
511.)
“Cases may
not be consolidated unless they are in the same department.” (LASC Local Rules,
rule 3.3(g)(1).) “A motion to consolidate two or more cases may be noticed and heard
after the cases, initially filed in different departments, have been related into
a single department, or if the cases were already assigned to that department.”
(Id.)
Analysis
Defendants ask the Court to stay
19 actions filed against them by Plaintiff in small claims court. Defendants
argue the claims raised in these 19 small claims actions are duplicative of Defendants’
claims against Plaintiff in this consolidated action. On January 31, 2022,
Defendant California Physicians’ Service dba Blue Shield of California
filed an action against Plaintiff (Case number 22STCV03670),
and filed a copy of its Complaint in this action. On March 24, 2022, the Court
granted the parties stipulation to consolidate this action with the 22STCV03670
action.
Defendants assert the Complaint
filed in the 22STCV03670 matter pre-dates the small claims actions filed by
Plaintiff and concerns the same issues regarding the same patients and
treatment that form the basis of Plaintiff’s small claims actions. Defendants
contend that because these issues were first raised in the 22STCV03670
Complaint, this Court should be deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction over
those claims pursuant to the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. “Under
the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, ‘when two superior courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all¿parties involved in
litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction over the subject matter¿and all parties involved until such time
as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.’” (Plant Insulation
Co. v. Fibreboard Corp.¿(1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 786–787.)
Plaintiff does not contest that
the small claims actions arise from the same facts and issues asserted by
Defendants in this action or that the 22STCV03670 Complaint pre-dates the
filing of the small claims actions. Rather, Plaintiff responds by arguing
Defendants’ motion has previously been raised and rejected in the small claims
action. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ instant motion is a veiled and untimely
motion for reconsideration under Code Civ. Proc. § 1008.
Defendants acknowledge they have
previously sought this same relief in the small claims actions and have been
denied each time. Defendants attach a June 17, 2022, order in the small claims
action 22 SMSC00377 in which Judge Sepe-Wiesenfeld denied Defendants’ request
to stay. In reaching that decision, Judge Sepe-Wiesenfeld reasoned:
Defendant now asserts that the
Unlimited Court has exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and requests declaratory
relief in the form of a Request for Order and Answer for this Court to stay,
dismiss or transfer plaintiff's actions to the Honorable Judge Helen Zukin in
Unlimited Jurisdiction due to two consolidated cases involving the subject
parties. Defendant has failed to demonstrate a compelling reason for the
dismissal, transfer or stay of the action. The Unlimited Jurisdiction Court has
not related the cases or issued any ruling impairing this Court's ability to
continue to determine the issues in each case before this Court. Further, a
stay, dismissal or transfer will not result in a fair and equitable result for
all parties. The Court finds that Defendant's Request for Order and Transfer
would result in significant delay and costs to plaintiff who selected the Small
Claims Court to have his cases heard expeditiously without significant cost or
the necessity for legal counsel. Defendant has failed to demonstrate a
sufficient basis to grant the request and Plaintiff would be unfairly
prejudiced by a stay, dismissal or transfer of the action.
(Ex. D to Nordon Decl. at 1.)
The Court finds Defendants’
instant motion necessarily asks the Court to reconsider these prior rulings and
reach the opposite result. As Defendants seek the reconsideration of prior
court orders, it is governed by Code Civ. Proc. § 1008. “Section 1008 governs motions for
reconsideration, by parties or the court itself. It is the exclusive means for
modifying, amending or revoking an order. That limitation is expressly
jurisdictional.” (Morite of California v. Superior Court (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 485, 490.) A motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1008 must be made “within
10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order.”
(C.C.P. § 1008(a).) The moving party must present new facts, circumstances or
law in order to grant a motion for reconsideration. (See C.C.P. § 1008(a); see also¿Mink
v. Superior Court¿(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342.)
Plaintiff argues Defendants’
motion is untimely under section 1008 and fails to make the showing required to
justify relief under that section. Defendants do not dispute this, but instead
argue section 1008 does not apply here because under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 116.710
and 116.770 they are “expressly permitted by law to appeal each of those
rulings….” (Reply at 3.) However, Defendants have made no showing that the
existence of appellate review is relevant in determining the applicability of
section 1008. Indeed, the Court notes appellate review is available to parties
in civil proceedings generally and the Court is aware of no authority which
holds trial courts are not bound by the limitations of section 1008 where the matter
for which reconsideration is sought is otherwise subject to appellate review.
Defendants also argue the Court is
free to ignore the rulings issued in the small claims actions because they were
void for lack of jurisdiction under the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction. This circular reasoning would also require the Court to
improperly reconsider the rulings in the small claims actions and reach a
different result.
Kerns v. CSE
Ins. Group (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 368 is instructive. In Kerns, defendant insurer brought a
motion for summary judgment arguing it had no duty to defend or indemnify. The
trial court denied the motion. Defendant later submitted the exact motion again
when the case was before a different judge. The second motion was granted. The
Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding the second motion for summary
judgment was an improper motion for reconsideration which did not comply with
the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. § 1008. The Court noted “the requirements of section 1008 are jurisdictional and
exclusive” such that a trial court did not have the jurisdiction to rule on a
motion for reconsideration which did not comply with the requirements set forth
in section 1008. (Id. at 390.) The Court noted the defendant’s second
motion for summary judgment was expressly based on the same facts and law as
were asserted in defendant’s first motion and thus the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to grant the second motion as:
[O]ne trial judge may not reconsider and overrule the previous interim ruling
of a predecessor judge of the same court by the expedient of simply ignoring the
existence of that prior ruling. Not only would such a procedure render inoperative
the procedural, substantive and jurisdictional requirements of section 1008, but
it would completely undermine “the general rule that one trial court judge may not
reconsider and overrule an interim ruling of another judge.” (Ziller, supra,
206 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1232
(Id. at
393 [quoting Ziller Electronics Lab Gmbh v. Superior Court (1988)
206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232].)
Defendants attempt to distinguish Kerns,
arguing it did not involve a small claims action. However, as set forth above,
Defendants have made no showing that section 1008 does not apply to small
claims actions. Indeed, as Defendants point out “there are statutes within the
Small Claims Act that explicitly exclude certain rules pertaining to superior
court litigation generally from being applied in small claims court—for
example, the exclusion of time extensions under CCP §§ 1005 and 1013 referenced
in CCP § 116.140.” (Reply at 4.) The Court notes there are not such exclusions
concerning section 1008.
Accordingly, under Kerns,
the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction to reconsider and overrule the orders
entered in the small claims actions denying Defendants’ prior motions seeking
the same relief sought before this Court. Defendants’ motion to stay and/or
consolidate is thus DENIED.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion to stay and/or consolidate is DENIED.