Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 20SMCV01452, Date: 2022-10-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20SMCV01452 Hearing Date: October 6, 2022 Dept: 207
Background
Plaintiffs Arian Simantob and Pooneh Simantob, Trustees of
The Arian and Pooneh Simantob Family Trust Dated November 2, 2016
(“Plaintiffs”) are the owners of real property located at 1321 Beverly Green
Drive, Los Angeles, California, 90035. Plaintiffs’ property is located adjacent
to a condominium development located at 558 Hillgreen Drive. Plaintiffs bring
this action against several Defendants, alleging each of them trespassed on
Plaintiffs’ property or directed other people to trespass on their property,
and cut down trees, plants, and other vegetation on Plaintiffs’ property.
On June 1, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an amendment to their
Complaint substituting Defendant Valentino Green Landscape, Inc. (“Defendant”)
for Doe 1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges causes of action against Defendant for
negligence, negligent trespass to timber, intentional property damage,
intentional trespass to timber, trespass, unjust enrichment, injunction, and
specific performance. On September 13, 2022, Plaintiffs and Defendant stipulated
to strike the causes of action for unjust enrichment, injunction, and specific
performance as to Defendant. Defendant now moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claim
for punitive damages against it. Defendant’s motion is unopposed.
Motion to Strike Standard
Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to
pleadings which are not challengeable by demurrer (i.e., words, phrases, prayer
for damages, etc.). (C.C.P. §§ 435, 436 & 437.) A motion to strike lies
only where the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not
been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (C.C.P. § 436.) The grounds for moving
to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(C.C.P. § 437.)
Analysis
1. Meet and
Confer Requirement
Before filing a
motion to strike, the moving party is required to “meet and confer in person or
by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the
motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be
reached through a filing of an amended pleading to resolve the objections to be
raised in the demurrer. (C.C.P. § 435.5(a).) The Court finds Defendant has
satisfied this requirement. (Mooshekh Decl. at ¶ 4.)
2. Punitive
Damages
“In order to survive a motion to
strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an
entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. In passing on the correctness
of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading
subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and
assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th
1253, 1255 (internal citations omitted).)
A motion to strike punitive damages is
properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for
punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc.
(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not
sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages. (Kendall Tacht
Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) The
allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with
specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough. (Smith
v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-42.) A plaintiff’s
“conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and
fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or
malice, express or implied, within the meaning of section 3294.” (Brousseau
v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864.)
Defendant alleges the Complaint
fails to state sufficient facts to support the imposition of punitive damages
against it and simply characterizes Defendant’s conduct as “malicious,
oppressive and fraudulent” in a conclusory manner. (Complaint at ¶¶ 36, 42,
47.) The Court agrees and finds Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against
Defendant is not sufficiently supported by factual allegations showing
Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages against Defendant under Civil Code
§ 3294. The Court thus GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike.
In determining whether to grant
leave to amend following the granting of a motion to strike, the Court applies
the same standard as is applicable to demurrers. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) Under this standard, a plaintiff seeking leave to
amend must “show a reasonable possibility of curing the defect in the complaint
by amendment.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
972, 994.) Plaintiffs here have made no request for leave to amend and have
filed no opposition to Defendant’s motion to strike and thus are deemed to have
conceded the issue. (DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566.) Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion
without leave to amend.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive
damages against it is GRANTED without leave to amend.