Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 21SMCV01059, Date: 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01059 Hearing Date: September 7, 2022 Dept: 207
Background
This action concerns the real property located at 1870 Old
Topanga Canyon Road, Topanga, California 90290. On June 16, 2021, Plaintiff
Jessica Jacobs (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant Steven Ray
Ritchie (“Defendant”) for injunctive relief, quiet title, declaratory relief,
trespass, nuisance, and ejectment. Plaintiff contends she and her husband are
sole owners of the property from the former owner, Lauren Ivester (“Ivester”),
and Defendant is improperly occupying the property, claiming to have a valid
interest in the property by virtue of a lease agreement between himself and
Ivester entered into prior to the sale of the property to Plaintiff. On July
26, 2021, Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff, asserting causes
of action for quiet title, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, trespass,
nuisance, breach of contract, and specific performance.
On June 28, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a
temporary restraining order directing both parties to stay off the property
aside from Plaintiff’s watering of trees. In deciding Plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, the parties filed written submissions with the Court
and the Court heard oral testimony from Plaintiff, Defendant, Ivester, and
Ivester’s co-listing agent Christine Kapetan. On September 23, 2021, the Court
issued its order granting Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The
preliminary injunction entered by the Court similarly ordered both parties to
refrain from accessing the property, though it made additional provisions
allowing Defendant access to remove certain of his personal property and
allowing Plaintiff to provide access to the property to contractors, surveyors,
or county inspectors. The preliminary injunction was subsequently modified to
allow Defendant to remove a shed on the property.
Defendant now brings this motion to dissolve the preliminary
injunction entered by the Court on September 23, 2021. Defendant and Plaintiff
both erroneously refer to the September 23, 2021, order as a “temporary
restraining order.” To be clear, the temporary restraining order entered by the
Court on June 28, 2021, expired on its own terms upon the resolution of
Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendant’s motion attacks the
September 23, 2021, preliminary injunction, not the June 28, 2021.
Request for Judicial Notice
Legal Standard
The
power to modify is an inherent power, exercisable with a permanent injunction,
and therefore necessarily exercisable with a preliminary injunction.¿ (Sontag
Chain Stores Co., Ltd. V. Superior Court¿(1941) 18 Cal.2d 92, 95;¿Union
Interchange v. Savage¿(1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 606;¿San Marcos v. Coast
Waste Mgmt. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 320, 328.)¿ A preliminary injunction is
subject to modification or dissolution at any time upon showing: a material
change in the facts upon which the preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) was granted; the law upon which the preliminary
injunction or TRO was granted has changed; or “the ends of justice would be
served” by the modification or dissolution.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 533; see
also¿City of San Marcos, supra,¿47 Cal.App.4th at 327; Loeffler v.
Medina¿(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.)¿
Analysis
The Court’s September 23, 2021,
order granting Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is based on the
following determinations made by the Court on the evidence before it:
1.
Ivester purchased the
property on or about December 24, 2019, with the intention to purchase the
property for Defendant’s benefit;
2.
After Ivester’s
purchase, Defendant took possession of the property;
3.
On or about August 15,
2020, Ivester sought to evict Defendant from the property via a 3-day notice to
quit;
4.
Ivester sold the
property to Plaintiff and her husband on or about August 27, 2020;
5.
Ivester and Defendant
offered conflicting testimony regarding Defendant’s right to occupy the
property;
6.
Defendant testified he
had a valid 20-year lease for the property which included an option to purchase
the property;
7.
Ivester testified
Defendant never signed the draft lease she prepared, and failed to pay her the
necessary $25,000 for Ivester to quitclaim the property to Defendant;
8.
Ivester and Defendant
submitted different versions of a Residential Lease Agreement which both
contained inconsistencies and discrepancies such that the Court could not
determine “what, if any, final agreement was reached between Ivester and
[Defendant], or even whether either of the two agreements has been properly
executed”;
9.
The evidence showed
Plaintiff owns the property but Defendant was in possession of it; and
10. There is a separate unlawful detainer action pending
between the parties which would resolve the issue of Defendant’s right to
possession of the property.
Defendant claims new evidence and
a change in circumstances merits the dissolution the preliminary injunction. As
set forth above, dissolution is only proper where such change in circumstances
or new evidence concern the facts or law upon which the preliminary injunction
is based. Upon review of Defendant’s motion, the Court finds Defendant has
failed to show such a change or circumstances or new evidence relevant to the facts
or law upon which the September 23 order is based. Rather, Defendant attacks
ancillary or immaterial statements or claims made by Plaintiff which he
contends were false.
For example, Defendant takes issue
with Plaintiff’s characterization of the property as raw or undeveloped,
claiming he performed extensive work on the property between Ivester’s purchase
in 2019 and sale in 2020. The Court expressly recognized this in its order,
stating “Ritchie has brought a wood-chipper onto the property, cleared
brush, and cut down trees. He has also built an unauthorized structure on the
property and placed a wrought iron fence around the property.” (Order at 3.)
Defendant similarly claims Plaintiff lied in a police report
by stating Defendant had sent her harassing emails whereas a police report
notes Plaintiff initiated the email conversation with Defendant. The September
23 order makes no reference to such email harassment as a basis for granting
Plaintiff’s motion. The order does note Plaintiff submitted videotaped evidence
of Defendant threatening her, which is consistent with the document attached as
Exhibit 22 to Defendant’s motion, which states “We provided I/Jacobs with a
link to evidence.com to upload the video of her encounter with P/Ritchie.”
Defendant also complains Plaintiff
has erroneously asserted she did not close escrow with Ivester until August 28
or August 29, 2020, while the deed transfer shows escrow closed on August 27.
However, the Court’s September 23 order expressly found the sale occurred “on
or about August 27, 2020.” (Order at 2.)
Defendant represents the prior
unlawful detainer action has been concluded, however it appears an appeal in
that matter is currently pending with the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles
Superior Court and thus remains unresolved. Further, there remains pending
another unlawful detainer action, Case No. 21STCV40908, concerning Defendant’s
right to possession of the property. The September 23 order noted Defendant’s
right to possession was an issue to be resolved in separate litigation. This
remains true at present.
The “newly discovered” evidence
submitted by Defendant is simply not germane to the Court’s reasoning in
granting Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction or is mischaracterized
by Defendant. For example, Defendant argues email correspondence shows
Plaintiff and Ivester had a “close relationship” at or around the time of the
sale of the property from Ivester to Plaintiff and her husband. This is of no
import to the September 23 order. Further, the supporting evidence submitted by
Defendant is an unauthenticated June 7, 2021, email in which it appears Ivester
and Plaintiff are arguing about the sale and what was or was not disclosed
beforehand. This does not suggest a close relationship, but rather an
adversarial one.
Defendant also mischaracterizes
the content of text messages and other correspondence between himself and
Plaintiff as indicating Plaintiff admitting he had a valid lease to reside at
the property, however these text messages show Plaintiff was told by Ivester
that the draft lease had not been signed and Plaintiff was asking Defendant
whether he had a signed copy and, if so, to send it to her.
Defendant submits photographs
which he claims show he is in possession of a fully executed 20-year lease for
the property. However, the documents reflected in these photographs are
completely illegible such that the Court cannot determine whether these
documents even relate to the subject property. Exhibit 3a shows a series of
thumbnail images from which no writing can be discerned. Exhibit 3b shows a
pile of documents on the seat of a car, and what text is not obscured in this
photograph is illegible. Thus, the Court remains unable to determine from this
evidence whether Defendant has a valid right to possession of the property by
virtue of a lease agreement with Ivester.
The Court also notes Defendant does
not explain how these images are “newly discovered” if he is the one who took
them. If Defendant believed he had dispositive evidence of a valid lease which
was not put before the Court in its hearings on Plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary injunction, he could have filed a motion for reconsideration within
10 days of the September 23 order pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1008. Defendant
here did not do so and cannot now claim his own photographs are newly
discovered such as to justify relief under Code Civ. Proc. § 533.
The Court finds Defendant has not
shown any change in circumstances or newly discovered evidence justifying the
modification or dissolution of the preliminary injunction entered by this Court
on September 23, 2021, and Defendant’s motion is thus DENIED.
The Court notes both parties have
complained in their written submissions about the other party’s lack of proper
service of filings in this action. Both parties are cautioned to abide by the
service requirements for any materials filed in this litigation. Continued
failure to properly serve the other side may result in future motions being
taken off calendar or denied by the Court.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion to vacate the September 23, 2021,
preliminary injunction is DENIED.