Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 21SMCV01059, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01059 Hearing Date: June 29, 2023 Dept: 207
Background
This action concerns the real property located at 1870 Old
Topanga Canyon Road, Topanga, California 90290. On June 16, 2021, Plaintiff
Jessica Jacobs (“Jacobs”) filed a Complaint against Defendant Steven Ray
Ritchie (“Ritchie”) for injunctive relief, quiet title, declaratory relief,
trespass, nuisance, and ejectment. Jacobs contends she and her husband are sole
owners of the property, which they lawfully purchased from the former owner,
Lauren Ivester (“Ivester”), Jacobs contends Ritchie is improperly occupying the
property, claiming to have a valid interest in the property by virtue of a
lease agreement between himself and Ivester entered into prior to the sale of
the property to Jacobs. On April 7, 2023, the Court granted Ritchie’s motion
for leave to file a First Amended Cross-Complaint, which was deemed filed that
same day. Ritchie’s FACC asserts causes of action against Jacobs, Ivester,
and other cross-defendants for quiet title, preliminary and permanent
injunction, declaratory relief, trespass, nuisance, breach of contract,
specific performance, and fraudulent conveyance.
In a related action between the parties, Case No.
21STCV40908, the Court adjudicated the issue of possession of the subject
property at a bench trial on Jacobs’s claim for unlawful detainer. The Court
found for Jacobs and on December 16, 2022, entered judgment in her favor on her
claim for unlawful detainer. Ritchie has filed an appeal of that judgment,
which is currently pending in the Court of Appeal.
Jacobs now brings a demurrer to the FACC, as well as a
motion to strike the FACC. Ritchie opposes the demurrer and motion to strike.
Preliminary Issues
The Court notes that Jacobs’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike
are not supported by a declaration attesting to whether Jacobs attempted to
meet and confer with Ritchie before filing these motions, as is required under
Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.41(a) and 435.5(a). (CCP §§ 430.41(a),
435.5(a).) Nevertheless, the Court may not overrule a demurrer or motion to
strike for inadequacy of meet and confer efforts. (Id., §§ 430.41(a)(4),
435.5(a)(4)). The Court admonishes Jacobs to comply with all motion pleading
requirements going forward.
The Court also notes that the proof of service provided with
Jacobs’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike indicates that she directly served the
moving papers for these motions on Ritchie. Parties are generally not permitted
to serve documents directly on each other, but must effect service by someone
who is not a party to the action. The Court admonishes Jacobs to comply with
this requirement going forward.
Judicial Notice
The Court GRANTS Ritchie’s Request for Judicial Notice of
its files in Case Number 21STV40908, but declines to take judicial notice of
the other items requested, as Ritchie’s appeal is currently pending and is not
determinative of the Court’s ruling here. Also, Ritchie did not attach any
exhibits to the Opposition, even though exhibits were referenced in it.
Moreover, the Court only takes
judicial notice of “the existence, content and authenticity of public records
and other specified documents”; it does not take judicial notice of the truth
of the factual matters asserted in those documents. (Dominguez
v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal. App. 5th 389, 400.)
Legal Standard
Demurrer
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of
whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the
allegations liberally and any defects must be apparent on the face of the
pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not
the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984)
153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects
appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§
430.30, 430.70.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether
the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn,
supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)
Motion to Strike
Analysis - Demurrer
Jacobs demurs to each
cause of action in the FACC on the grounds that the issue of the alleged lease
agreement between Ritchie and Ivester was previously adjudicated in a different
action between the parties, i.e., 21STCV40908. Jacobs does not identify the
specific grounds for the Demurrer with respect to each cause of action. (See
CCP § 430.60 [“A demurrer
shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the
complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be
disregarded.”]) Nevertheless, the Court infers Jacobs is arguing that the FACC
fails to state a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e)
due to the issue of the alleged lease agreement between Richie and Ivester
having already been adjudicated in 21STCV40908. Thus, the Court will
still consider the Demurrer.
Jacobs’ Demurrer is predicated entirely on the argument that the
Court in the case of 21STCV40908 found that Ritchie’s alleged lease agreement
with Ivester was invalid, and that each cause of action in the FACC is based on
the existence of the alleged written lease agreement. Thus, the issue has
already been litigated and each cause of action fails.
In opposition, Ritchie contends that there were numerous issues
with the trial in the case of 21STCV40908 and with the trial court’s analysis
in its ruling therein. Ritchie contends that there were text messages
indicating Jacobs had acknowledged receiving a copy of the written lease
agreement before purchasing the subject property. Ritchie further contends that
the Court did not rule the lease agreement was void, but only that Ritchie had
failed to carry his burden of proof in establishing the existence of a valid
written lease between himself and Ivester, and that title disputes cannot be
adjudicated in an unlawful detainer or forcible detainer action, citing to Balassy
v. Superior Court for this contention.
The Court agrees with Jacobs that the November 22, 2022 ruling in
Case Number 21STCV40908 supports the Demurrer to the FACC. (Bitsawros v.
Greenberg (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 189, 192 [court could take judicial notice
of other actions filed by the plaintiff in sustaining a demurrer].) The
November 22, 2022 ruling found that Ritchie failed to establish the existence
of the lease agreement with Ivester and that even if Ritchie had established
its existence, the evidence showed Jacobs was still entitled to ownership of
the subject property under Civil Code section 1214 because she acquired title
to the subject property without notice of Ritchie’s alleged interest in the
subject property. (Minute Order (11/22/2022), LASC Case No. 21STCV40908.)
Contrary to Ritchie’s contention, this latter part of the decision was not a
hypothetical analysis, but rather was an independent basis for awarding
judgment to Jacobs. (Id., p. 6 [“[E]ven if the Court were to find
Ritchie had established the existence of a valid lease as between himself and
Ivester, such lease would be void as to Jacobs and would not entitle Ritchie to
possess or occupy the property following Jacobs’ purchase from Ivester. This
is a separate and independent basis to find in Jacobs’ favor on her First
Amended Complaint for unlawful detainer.”] [emphasis added]). Given the
Court’s ruling that the alleged lease agreement is void as to Jacobs, Ritchie’s
claims against Jacobs necessarily fail as a result.
To the extent Ritchie cited to
exhibits attached to the Opposition to support his contentions therein, the
Court again notes that no exhibits were attached to the Opposition. More
importantly, the FACC also references other exhibits not attached to it, and
are thus beyond the scope of this Demurrer. The Court may only consider that
which is within the pleadings at issue or that which is subject to judicial
notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) As such, Ritchie’s
contention regarding text messages involving Jacobs are unhelpful because they
are nowhere to be found in the Court’s file in 21STCV40908, nor were there any
included with the FACC. Additionally, Ritchie’s citation to Balassy v.
Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1148 is unpersuasive and does not
stand for the proposition cited.
Therefore, the Court will
sustain the Demurrer with leave to amend.
Analysis – Motion to Strike
Jacobs’ Motion to Strike is moot
in light of the Court’s ruling on the Demurrer above. Alternatively, the Motion
to Strike fails to identify the specific provisions of the FACC that Jacobs
seeks for the Court to strike, as is required under California Rules of Court,
Rule 3.1322(a). The Motion to Strike is no different than the Demurrer.
Accordingly, the Motion to Strike will be denied.
Conclusion
The Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer in its entirety, with
20-days leave to amend.
The Court DENIES the Motion to Strike as moot.