Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 21STCV40908, Date: 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV40908 Hearing Date: January 26, 2023 Dept: 207
Plaintiff Jessica Jacobs (“Plaintiff”) filed this unlawful
detainer action against Defendant Steven Ray Ritchie (“Defendant”). The action
concerns an undeveloped lot of land in Topanga Canyon located at 1870 Old
Topanga Canyon Road in Topanga California. Defendant claims a right to occupy
the property pursuant to an alleged lease he entered into with the property’s
prior owner. Plaintiff alleges there never was any such lease as between
Defendant and the prior owner, and that even if such a lease does exist it is
void as to her pursuant to Civil Code § 1214.
The Court held a bench trial on Plaintiff’ unlawful detainer
claim and on November 22, 2022, the Court issued an Order After Hearing finding
in Plaintiff’s favor as to the existence of a written lease between Defendant
and the prior owner, and as to her status as a bona fide purchaser under Civil
Code § 1214. On December 8, 2022, the Court issued an Amended Order After
Hearing, and on December 16, entered Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor pursuant to
the findings made in the Amended Order After Hearing. On December 19, 2022, the
Court mailed notice of entry of judgment to the parties. On January 3, 2023,
Defendant filed the instant motion for new trial. Plaintiff has not filed an
opposition to Defendant’s motion.
Legal Standard
The California
Constitution states in Article 6, section 13:
No judgment
shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection
of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error
as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless,
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall
be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.
Code Civ.
Proc. § 657 permits a party to move the Court to vacate the verdict and order a
new trial on seven specific bases enumerated by statute as follows:
1.
“Irregularity
in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party, or any order of the court
or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial”;
2.
Juror
or jury misconduct;
3.
“Accident
or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against”;
4.
“Newly
discovered evidence … which [] could not, with reasonable diligence, have [been]
discovered and produced at the trial”;
5.
“Excessive
or inadequate damages”;
6.
“Insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other
decision is against law”;
7.
“Error
in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.”
(C.C.P. §
657.)
Where a party
moves for a new trial on grounds enumerated (1) through (4) above, the motion must
be made upon affidavits; as to grounds enumerated (5) through (7), the motion “must
be made on the minutes of the court.” (C.C.P. § 658; Gay v. Torrance (1904)
145 Cal. 144, 148 [motion for new trial on ground of irregularity of proceedings
must be made on affidavits]; see also Phipps v. Copeland Corporation LLC
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 319, 339 [holding in accord].) “The ‘minutes of the court’
include the records of the proceedings entered by the judge or courtroom clerk,
showing what action was taken and the date it was taken ( Gov. Code, § 69844)
and may also include depositions and exhibits admitted into evidence and the
trial transcript. (§ 660.)” (Lauren H. v. Kannappan (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 834, 839, fn. 4.)
“The right
to a new trial is purely statutory.” (Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961)
55 Cal.2d 162, 166.) Therefore, the procedural steps prescribed by law as to pursuing
a motion for a new trial must be complied with exactly. (Mercer v. Perez (1968)
68 Cal.2d 104, 118; Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d
52, 66; Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Court (1949) 33 Cal.2d 289, 294 (Telefilm)
[literal compliance with statute is required; significant departure therefrom deprives
trial court of power to grant the motion].)
Analysis
1. Compliance with Statutory Requirements
Defendant’s
motion for new trial was filed on January 3, 2023, which is within the 15 day
deadline imposed by Code Civ. Proc. § 659(a)(2) based off the Court’s mailing
of the notice of entry of judgment on December 19, 2022. However, sections 659
and 659a require motions for new trial and all supporting documents be both
filed and served on all parties. (C.C.P. § 659(a) [“The party intending to move
for a new trial shall file with the clerk and serve upon each adverse party…”];
C.C.P. § 659a [“the moving party shall serve upon all other parties and file
any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the
motion”].) Defendant’s January 3 motion is not accompanied by a proof of
service establishing he has properly served Plaintiff with the instant motion
as required by statute.
Defendant’s
failure to serve Plaintiff divests the Court of jurisdiction to grant the
relief requested in Defendant’s motion:
It is made mandatory by section 659 of the
Code of Civil Procedure that a party intending to move for a new trial shall
serve upon the adverse party a notice of intention so to do. The term
"adverse party" includes every party whose interest in the subject-matter
of the motion will be affected by the granting of the motion. The superior
court is without jurisdiction to reexamine an issue of fact that has been tried
and change its decision thereon unless all of the parties to the issue have
been properly brought before it by serving the required notice.
(Johnston v.
San Fernando (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 244, 246.) As the Court is without
jurisdiction to grant Defendant’s motion, it is accordingly DENIED.
2. Merits
of Defendant’s Arguments
The same result
would follow even if this Court were to ignore the defects in Defendant’s
service of the instant motion and reach the substantive merits of Defendant’s
arguments.
Defendant claims
the Court improperly deemed Plaintiff’s claims to be for unlawful detainer rather
than forcible detainer. Defendant claims Plaintiff has only ever raised claims
for forcible detainer in this action, and the Court deprived him of due process
by finding for Plaintiff on a theory of unlawful detainer. The Court previously
considered and rejected this argument in ruling on Defendant’s December 6,
2022, motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s original Complaint in this
action, filed November 5, 2021, is expressly captioned as a Complaint for
“Forcible detainer or, in the alternative, Unlawful Detainer.” Plaintiff’s
operative First Amended Complaint filed on April 21, 2022, similarly contains
allegations of both unlawful detainer and forcible detainer, and attaches a
notice to quit which raises claims of both unlawful detainer and forcible detainer.
Defendant’s claim that he had no notice the trial in this
action was to include a claim of unlawful detainer is also belied by the
record. On May 2, 2022, Ritchie filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint
styled as “Answer-Unlawful Detainer” in which he made assertions which sound in
unlawful, not forcible detainer, such as his assertion that Jacobs’ claim was
based on his alleged failure to pay rent. Such claims alleging possession of
the property as a lawful tenant are incompatible with a cause of action for
forcible detainer. Similarly, on June 23, 2022, Ritchie filed a “Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs [sic] Unlawful/Forcible Detainer Petition.” On August 22,
2022, the Court served Defendant with an Amended Notice of Unlawful Detainer
Trial which expressly notified Defendant that this case had “been set for
unlawful detainer Non-Jury Trial” before the Court. The Court finds Defendant
was fully aware this case concerned allegations of unlawful detainer and has
waived any argument that this action should be narrowly construed to only
assert claims of forcible detainer by failing to raise this objection prior to
or during trial.
At the bench trial on this action, the Court adjudicated all
issues raised by the parties in this action and found in Plaintiff’s favor on a
claim of unlawful detainer. Under Roberts v.
Casey (1939) 36
Cal.App.2d Supp. 767, a judgment in plaintiff’s favor on a claim for unlawful
detainer is proper where supported by the evidence produced at trial, even if
the operative complaint only asserts a claim for forcible detainer.
Accordingly, even if this Court were to find Plaintiff had only asserted a
cause of action for forcible, rather than unlawful, detainer, this would not be
grounds to grant Defendant’s motion.
Defendant also
repeatedly claims that Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detainer was previously
adjudicated in the related action between the parties, Case Number 21SMUD00002.
Defendant argues the 21SMUD00002 action adjudicated the issue of possession in
his favor and this issue could not be relitigated at the trial in this action.
Defendant misconstrues the Court’s ruling in the 21SMUD00002 action. In the
21SMUD00002 action, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s
case on the basis of defects in Plaintiff’s notices to quit on which the action
was founded. The October 8, 2021, order sustaining Defendant’s demurrer
expressly stated “Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice.”
(Order at 3.)
Where a claim has been dismissed without prejudice at the
pleading stage, there is no preclusive effect to such dismissal. (Shuffer v.
Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 216 [“we cannot construe the
dismissal, without prejudice, of petitioner's first action, sought and obtained
by petitioner before the case was at issue, as ‘a final judgment on the merits.’
Thus, respondent's claim that petitioner is barred from relief on the ground of
res judicata must be rejected as lacking in merit”].) Accordingly, the Court’s
sustaining of Defendant’s demurrer in the 21SMUD00002 action did not prevent Plaintiff from serving Defendant with
a new notice to quit and initiating a separate unlawful detainer action to
adjudicate the merits of the parties’ dispute regarding Defendant’s claim to
possession.
Defendant further
argues the Court erred in finding Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser entitled
to the protections of Civil Code § 1214, claiming the Honorable Judge Karlan
previously determined Plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser under section
1214 in his February 3, 2022, ruling in the third action pending between the
parties, Case Number 21SMCV01059. Defendant misconstrues the effect of the
February 3 order. In the 21SMCV01059 action Plaintiff brought a motion “for
cancellation” of Defendant’s claimed lease. The Court denied the motion
“without prejudice” on the basis that Plaintiff’s motion was procedurally
improper and should have been raised through a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication. The Court further noted there were disputed facts which would
prevent the summary adjudication of the validity of Defendant’s claimed lease.
In other words, Judge Karlan made no affirmative finding that Plaintiff was not
a bona fide purchaser under section 1214, rather he simply found the legitimacy
of Defendant’s claimed lease and Plaintiff’s rights under section 1214 would
have to be adjudicated at trial. This is precisely what happened here.
Defendant also asserts there was
evidence which would support a finding in his favor, however this alone does
not establish the weight of the evidence does not support the verdict.
Defendant offers no analysis of the evidence put forth by Plaintiff beyond
conclusory attacks that such evidence was erroneous or false because it was
contradicted by his own evidence. Defendant’s motion does not demonstrate how
the evidence produced at trial was factually or legally insufficient to support
an award in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant is at most claiming the Court should
have decided conflicting evidence in his favor, but this does not establish
Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to establish a claim for unlawful
detainer against him. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant has failed to meet
his burden in showing the weight of the evidence presented at trial does not
support the Court’s ruling at trial.
Thus, even if
this Court were to reach the merits of Defendant’s arguments it would find
Defendant had failed to carry his burden to show any valid grounds for new
trial. This is a separate and independent basis which compels the DENIAL of
Defendant’s motion.
Disposition
Defendant’s motion for new trial is DENIED.