Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 21STCV40908, Date: 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV40908 Hearing Date: February 17, 2023 Dept: 207
Plaintiff Jessica Jacobs (“Plaintiff”) filed this unlawful
detainer action against Defendant Steven Ray Ritchie (“Defendant”). The action
concerns an undeveloped lot of land in Topanga Canyon located at 1870 Old
Topanga Canyon Road in Topanga California. Defendant claims a right to occupy
the property pursuant to an alleged lease he entered into with the property’s
prior owner. Plaintiff alleges there never was any such lease as between
Defendant and the prior owner, and that even if such a lease does exist it is
void as to her pursuant to Civil Code § 1214.
The Court held a bench trial on Plaintiff’s unlawful
detainer claim and on November 22, 2022, the Court issued an Order After
Hearing finding in Plaintiff’s favor as to the existence of a written lease between
Defendant and the prior owner, and as to her status as a bona fide purchaser
under Civil Code § 1214. On December 8, 2022, the Court issued an Amended Order
After Hearing, and on December 16, entered Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor
pursuant to the findings made in the Amended Order After Hearing.
The parties have brought three motions before the Court: (1)
Defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment entered in the 21STCV40908
action, (2) Plaintiff’s motion to expunge the lis pendens and modify the
preliminary injunction entered in the 21SMCV01059 action, and (3) Plaintiff’s
motion for attorney’s fees as a prevailing party in the 21STCV40908 action. The
Court discusses each of these motions in turn below.
Legal Standard to Alter or Amend Judgment
Code Civ. Proc. §
187 states: “[w]hen jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by
any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this
jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by
this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code.” “Section
187 contemplates amending a judgment by noticed motion. [Citations.] The court
is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to amend a judgment,
but may rule on the motion based solely on declarations and other written
evidence. [Citation.]” (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v.
City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 280.) In addition, pursuant to Code
Civ. Proc. § 116.630, “[t]he court may, at any time alter judgment, for good
cause, upon motion by a party and notice by the clerk to all affected parties
at their last known address, amend the name of the party to include both the
correct legal name and the actually used name or names of that party.”
Legal Standard
to Expunge Lis Pendens
A lis pendens is an instrument recorded in the office
of the county recorder that gives constructive notice of a pending lawsuit
affecting title to the real property described in the lis pendens. (Gale v. Superior Court (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1395.) The pleadings in the lawsuit to which the lis pendens refers must describe a specific parcel of
real property and must state a “real property claim.” (Ibid.; C.C.P. §
405.1.) For purposes of expunging lis pendens, a real property claim is a cause of
action that, if successful, would affect title to or the right of possession of
specific real property or the use of an easement identified in a pleading.
(C.C.P. § 405.4; Civ. Code, §§ 405.2, 405.4.)
Where a motion to
expunge a lis pendens has been filed, the proponent of the lis pendens
carries the burden of showing evidence that the lis pendens is supported
by a real property claim which is probably valid. (C.C.P.
§ 405.32; Hunting World, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th
67, 70-71 [synopsized review of the legislature’s 1992 changes to the lis pendens
statutes, especially as to the legal standard applied on a motion to expunge].)
Where a movant does not establish the probable validity of his claim underpinning
a lis pendens by a preponderance of the evidence, the lis pendens
shall be expunged. (C.C.P. § 405.32.)
Analysis
1. Defendant’s
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
Defendant’s
motion to alter or amend the judgment entered in Plaintiff’s favor in the 21STCV40908
action is based on the same
allegations and arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the causes
of action contained in Plaintiff’s operative pleading, and right to a trial by
jury which the Court has previously considered and rejected in its December 8,
2022, ruling on Defendant’s ex parte application for reconsideration, February
1, 2023, ruling on Defendant’s motion for a new trial, and February 10, 2023,
ruling on Defendant’s motion to clarify. Defendant’s motion to alter or amend
the judgment on these same bases is DENIED for the same reasons as previously
set forth in those orders.
2. Plaintiff’s
Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens and Modify Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff moves
to expunge the lis pendens recorded against the property be Defendant on
July 26, 2021, in the 21SMCV01059 action. Plaintiff also moves to
dissolve the preliminary injunction previously entered in that action.
As Plaintiff has
moved to expunge the lis pendens entered by Defendant, Defendant bears
the burden of establishing “by a preponderance of the evidence the probable
validity” of his claim to the subject property. (C.C.P. § 405.32.) The Court
finds Defendant has not carried this burden. Defendant’s argument against the
expungement of the lis pendens is based on the pendency of his
cross-claims in the 21SMCV01059 action. Defendant asserts he will likely
prevail on his claims for fraudulent conveyance, specific performance, and
breach of contract in this action. The Court notes Defendant’s July 26, 2021,
Cross-Complaint does not assert a claim for fraudulent conveyance, and thus
Defendant cannot rely on such a claim to support a lis pendens against
the property.
Defendant correctly argues summary unlawful detainer
proceedings concern only the right to possession and are not meant to resolve
disputes as to the title of real property. However, this on its own does not
establish the probable validity of Defendant’s crossclaims. Defendant’s claims
are based on his right to ownership of the property pursuant to a lease
agreement with the property’s prior owner which he claims contained an option
to purchase the property. This is the same claim on which Defendant based his
right to possession in the unlawful detainer action 21STCV40908. In the
unlawful detainer action, the Court held Defendant had failed to establish the
validity of this claimed lease, and that even if he had it would not grant him
a right to possession of the property as Plaintiff was a good faith purchaser
under Civil Code § 1214. Defendant has not established the probable validity of
a different finding in the 21SMCV01059 action based on the preponderance of the
evidence. Indeed, Defendant does not offer any evidence in support of his
opposition beyond his own conclusory assertions as to what the evidence at
trial will show. The Court finds this is insufficient to carry his burden under
Code Civ. Proc. § 405.32 and therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to expunge the
lis pendens entered in the 21SMCV01059 action.
Plaintiff also
moves to modify the September 23, 2021, preliminary injunction entered in the 21SMCV01059
action. The preliminary injunction generally restrained Plaintiff and Defendant
from entering the property, with some limited exceptions. On January 13, 2023,
the Court lifted the injunction as to Plaintiff, holding she was entitled to
access the property pursuant to the judgment entered in the 21STCV40908 action.
Plaintiff asks the Court to modify the preliminary injunction to permanently
restrain Defendant from accessing the property. Such relief is by definition
beyond the bounds of a preliminary injunction and could only be granted upon a
showing that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in her favor on the merits of
her claims in the 21SMCV01059 action. That question is not before the Court at
this time.
However, the Court instead will dissolve the January 13, 2023,
preliminary injunction. In granting the preliminary injunction, the Court noted
the question of possession of the property would be resolved by way of an
action for unlawful detainer pending between the parties, and directed the
parties to “notify the Court upon completion of that matter, so the Court can
either maintain or eliminate this preliminary injunction.” (Sept. 23, 2021,
Order at 4.) The parties’ respective claims of possession have been resolved
through the trial in the 21STCV40908 action. The Court entered judgment in
Plaintiff’s favor in that action, finding Defendant has no right to possess or
occupy the property at present. Plaintiff is thus entitled to full possession
of the property, and Defendant has no legal right to enter, occupy, or possess
the property at present.
The Court thus DENIES Plaintiff’s request to summarily enter
a permanent injunction against Defendant and instead finds good cause to
dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on September 23, 2021. However,
Defendant is cautioned not to interpret the dissolution of the preliminary
injunction as an indication that he is permitted to enter the property for any
purpose as the Court has already determined he has no possessory interest in
the property. If Defendant were to enter the property without permission at
this time, he would risk subjecting himself to further legal proceedings.
3. Plaintiff’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff moves
the Court for an award of $6,668.82 in attorney’s fees, claiming Code Civ.
Proc. § 1174 allows for the recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party
in the 21STCV40908 action. The Court finds section 1174 contains no such
attorney fee provision for prevailing parties in unlawful or forcible detainer
actions. As the Court explained in Larson
v. City and County of San Francisco, an award of attorney’s fees is only appropriate in an
unlawful detainer case in two specific contexts: (1) where a tenant raises a
habitability defense under Code Civ. Proc. § 1174.2(b), (2) where a tenant prevails
on a claim of retaliatory eviction under Code Civ. Proc. § 1174.21:
Thus, when the Legislature has determined an
award of attorney fees is appropriate in an unlawful detainer case, it has provided
for such. It has done so in two specific contexts—where a habitability defense is
raised … and where a tenant prevails on a claim of retaliatory eviction …. That
the Legislature has not otherwise provided for attorney fees in unlawful detainer
cases indicates it does not intend that ordinary unlawful detainer proceedings be
burdened with such a mandate.
(Larson v. City
and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1298.)
“California follows the so-called ‘American
rule’ when it comes to attorney fees: Parties in civil litigation bear their
own unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” (Siry Investment, L.P.
v. Farkhondehpour (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1138.) Plaintiff has not
shown any statute or contract provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees
incurred in connection with the 21STCV40908 action. Plaintiff’s motion
for attorney’s fees is thus DENIED.
Disposition
Defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s motion to expunge the lis pendens recorded in the 21SMCV01059
action is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to modify the preliminary injunction
entered in the 21SMCV01059 action is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The
Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction against Defendant,
however the Court instead dissolves the preliminary injunction as Plaintiff has
been found to be entitled to full possession of the property in the 21STCV40908
unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is DENIED.