Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 22SMCV00569, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00569    Hearing Date: October 13, 2022    Dept: 207

Background

 

This is an unlawful detainer action brought by Plaintiff Sunset Equity Partners, LLC (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant Filemon Garcia (“Defendant”) concerning the commercial property located at 1323 Venice Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. When Defendant did not make an appearance in this action, default was entered against him on May 10, 2022, followed by the entry of a default judgment against him on May 19, 2022. On July 25, 2022, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of default and default judgment.

 

Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. A party may oppose motion for summary judgment filed in an unlawful detainer action orally at the hearing or with a written opposition filed and served before or at the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1351(b)-(c).) “If a party seeks to have a written opposition considered in advance of the hearing, the written opposition must be filed and served on or before the court day before the hearing.” (Id., rule 3.1351(c).) At the time this tentative ruling was prepared by the Court, Defendant had not filed a written opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.

 

Summary Judgment Standard

 

Code Civ. Proc. § 1170.7 provides “A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after the answer is filed upon giving five days’ notice. Summary judgment shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under Section 437c.” “Any opposition to the motion and any reply to an opposition may be made orally at the time of hearing or in writing as set forth in (c).”¿ (CRC 3.1351(b).)¿ “If a party seeks to have a written opposition considered in advance of the hearing, the written opposition must be filed and served on or before the court day before the hearing. Service must be by personal delivery, facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means consistent with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1010, 1011, 1012, and 1013, and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties no later than the close of business on the court day before the hearing. The court, in its discretion, may consider written opposition filed later.”¿ (CRC 3.1351(c).)

 

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (C.C.P. § 437c(c).) The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

 

On a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion that each element of the cause of action in question has been proved, and that there is no defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(1); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.)

 

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto . . . . A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

 

When moving for summary judgment or adjudication on a defendant’s affirmative defenses, “A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

 

Analysis

 

Plaintiff brings this motion seeking summary judgment on its Complaint against Defendant. Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts one cause of action against Defendant for unlawful detainer. Plaintiff alternatively moves “for an order granting adjudication in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant FILEMON GARCIA, as to each and every cause of action and defenses for which Defendant FILEMON GARCIA has failed to establish that there are any triable issues of material fact.” (Motion at 2.) The Court notes Plaintiff’s alternative request for summary adjudication does not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. Under rule 3.1350(b), “the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” Plaintiff here has not identified any specific causes of action or affirmative defenses it is moving for summary adjudication on beyond the one cause of action for unlawful detainer which is the subject of the motion for summary judgment. The separate statement Plaintiff filed with its motion similarly runs afoul of rule 3.1350(d), which requires Plaintiff to specifically identify “Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion” in the separate statement itself. This is not merely a technical violation, as Plaintiff’s motion offers no evidence or argument as to any affirmative defense raised in Defendant’s answer and as a result the Court cannot determine which defenses Plaintiff is seeking summary adjudication of. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s alternative request for summary adjudication and will turn to the merits of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

 

The basic elements of unlawful detainer based upon expiration of a fixed term tenancy are: (i) plaintiff owns the property; (ii) plaintiff leased the property to defendant until the lease expiration date; (iii) plaintiff did not give defendant permission to continue occupying the property after the lease agreement ended; and (iv) defendant is still occupying the property. (Camp v. Matich (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 660, 665-666; Ryland v. Appelbaum (1924) 70 Cal.App. 268, 270; CACI 4301.) Where, as here, an action is brought under Code Civ. Proc. § 1161(1), however, no written notice to quit or pay rent is required to be served on the defendant as a prerequisite to initiating unlawful detainer proceedings. (C.C.P. § 1161(1); Castle Park No. 5 v. Katherine (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 10, fn.4; Buck v. Morrossis (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 461, 466; Ware v. Stafford (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 840, 844; Moon v. Marker (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 33, 37 Earl Orchard Co. v. Fava (1902) 138 Cal. 76; Lee Chuck v. Quan Wo Chong & Co. (1891), 91 Cal. 593.)

 

The Court finds Plaintiff has carried its initial burden as to each of these elements, as follows:

 

Plaintiff purchased the subject property on or about April 13, 2021. (UMF No. 1.) At the time of the purchase, Defendant was leasing the property from a prior owner. (UMF No. 4.) “After a property is sold or transferred, the transferee takes subject to the existing lease; this new owner steps into the landlord's shoes and becomes the successor landlord, assuming the terms and conditions of the lease the tenant had with the prior owner… The same is true when the property is sold through foreclosure….” (DLI Properties, LLC v. Hill (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 8.) Thus, Plaintiff assumed the terms and conditions of Defendant’s lease.

 

The lease in question was for a fixed term, and by its own terms “commence[d] on January 1st 2017 and expire[d] at Midnight on January 1st 2022.” (Ex. B to Donel Decl.) The lease contained a renewal option which Defendant did not utilize, and thus the lease expired at midnight on January 1, 2022. (Donel Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Defendant remains in possession of the property. (UMF Nos. 5, 9.)

 

Under the terms of the lease, rent for the property was set at $6,800 per month. (Ex. B to Donel Decl.) Defendant did not pay rent to Plaintiff after the expiration of the lease. (UMF Nos. 8, 10.) Plaintiff alleges it was damaged by Defendant’s continued possession of the subject property in the amount of $57,346.58, calculated at $6,800 for the months February 2022 through September 2022, plus $2,946.58 as the pro-rated share of rent through the October 13 hearing on Plaintiff’s motion. (Motion at 6; UMF No. 12.) The Court finds Plaintiff has carried its initial burden in establishing its damages, except that Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s calculation of rent at $226.66 per day. The daily rent is properly calculated at $223.56 ($6,800 x 12 months = $81,600; $81,600/365 days = $223.56 per day).

 

The Court thus finds Plaintiff has carried its initial burden in showing it is entitled to summary judgment on its cause of action for unlawful detainer. Absent a showing by Defendant that a triable issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detainer, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion.

 

Conclusion

The Court finds Plaintiff has carried its initial burden in showing it is entitled to summary judgment on its cause of action for unlawful detainer. Absent a showing by Defendant that a triable issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detainer, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion.