Judge Helen Zukin, Case 22SMCV00585 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 22SMCV00585, Date: 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00585 Hearing Date: January 20, 2023 Dept: 207

Background

Plaintiff Chang Yup Lee (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant 2918 3rd Street, LLC (“Defendant”) stemming from construction work allegedly performed by him on real property owned by Defendant 2918 3rd Street, LLC. In a separate action, Case number 22SMC00585, Defendant 2918 3rd Street, LLC brings suit against Adus Master Inc. (“Adus”) and Yilan Lee for claims relating to this same construction work, which Defendant 2918 3rd Street, LLC alleges was performed by Adus and Yilan Lee without a contractor’s license. On November 16, 2022, the Court ordered the two actions consolidated under the 22SMC00585 case number.

Defendant2918 3rd Street, LLC now moves for judgment on the pleadings on the causes of action for indebitatus assumpsit, quantum meruit, account stated, open book account, and declaratory relief asserted in Plaintiff Chang Lee’s operative Complaint. Plaintiff Chang Lee opposes Defendant 2918 3rd Street, LLC’s motion.

Legal Standard

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint… [¶] The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.” (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether the factual allegations, assumed true, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452-453.)

Analysis

1. Meet and Confer Requirement

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 439(a).) A declaration regarding meet and confer efforts must be filed with the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439(a)(3).) Defendant has submitted a declaration from counsel stating a “good faith effort to meet and confer” on the subject of Defendant’s motion was made on November 17, 2022. (Howard Decl. at ¶2.) This statement does not provide the Court with sufficient basis to determine whether the in person or telephonic meet and confer actually occurred as required. Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to the merits of Defendant’s motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439(a)(4).)

2. Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action

Defendant seeks judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s second through fifth causes of action which assert quasi-contractual claims for indebitatus assumpsit, quantum meruit, account stated, and open book account. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the existence of a valid express contract between the parties in the first cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff argues he may plead alternative and inconsistent theories of recovery, and claims the validity of the contracts which form the basis of his claim for breach of contract is not undisputed. The parties agree Plaintiff is entitled to plead inconsistent theories of recovery in his Complaint, however Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations of the Complaint which do not deny the existence or enforceability of the written contracts attached to the Complaint.

Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., cited by Defendant, is instructive. In Klein the Court affirmed the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer to quasi-contract cause of action for unjust enrichment where the plaintiffs had also pled a cause of action for breach of contract and the existence of an enforceable contract nullified the quasi-contractual claim. The Court explained:

Although a plaintiff may plead inconsistent claims that allege both the existence of an enforceable agreement and the absence of an enforceable agreement, that is not what occurred here. Instead, plaintiffs' breach of contract claim pleaded the existence of an enforceable agreement and their unjust enrichment claim did not deny the existence or enforceability of that agreement. Plaintiffs are therefore precluded from asserting a quasi-contract claim under the theory of unjust enrichment.

(Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1389-1390.) Plaintiff concedes he cannot recover for both breach of contract and these quasi-contractual causes of action. The question under Klein is whether Plaintiff’s quasi-contractual causes of action disputed or denied the existence of an enforceable contract between the parties as an alternative basis for recovery. The Court finds the Complaint contains no such alternative allegations, rather the quasi-contractual causes of action challenged by Defendant each expressly incorporate the allegations of the cause of action for breach of contract. Under Klein, this is insufficient to support quasi-contractual causes of action.

As this issue could be cured by further amendment of the Complaint, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s claims for indebitatus assumpsit, quantum meruit, account stated, and open book account with leave to amend. In granting Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claim for quantum meruit is superfluous because it is duplicative of issues raised by Defendant’s Complaint in the consolidated action, which will be tried first. However, Plaintiff is not a party to the Adus action, and the Defendant’s Complaint may be dismissed or resolved prior to trial without involving Plaintiff. Thus, the Court cannot find the quantum meruit action is redundant or unnecessary at this stage of the pleadings.

3. Sixth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s cause of action for declaratory relief is superfluous and duplicative of his cause of action for breach of contract, claiming the requested declaratory relief would not have any “practical consequences” in this litigation. (Motion at 12.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s cause of action for declaratory relief seeks a judicial determination that Plaintiff contracted with Defendant to perform the subject construction work. As part of this determination, Plaintiff requests “an order reforming the Contracts to remove reference to ADUS Master so as to reflect the actual intention of the Parties.” (Complaint at p. 8, ¶4.) Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of contract does not contain a request for reformation. At this stage, the Court cannot find the declaratory relief claim is wholly duplicative of Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract. Indeed it appears Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract may depend, in part, on the Court granting the request for reformation contained in the cause of action for declaratory relief. As such, the declaratory relief claim would not be superfluous but would be essential to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for declaratory relief.

Conclusion

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED with leave to amend as to the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint and is otherwise DENIED.