Judge: Helen Zukin, Case: 22SMCV01184, Date: 2023-01-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV01184 Hearing Date: January 3, 2023 Dept: 207
Background
Plaintiffs Kasra Vahmi and Bersadeh Bagheri (“Plaintiffs”)
bring this action against Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as
trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust (“Defendant”) concerning Plaintiffs’
right to possess certain real property located at 2491 Roscomare Road in Los
Angeles, California. Plaintiffs’ operative Complaint, filed July 25, 2022,
asserts three causes of action against Defendant: quiet title, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief. Defendant brings this demurrer under Code Civ.
Proc. § 430.10(c), arguing Plaintiffs’ claims in this action are duplicative of
those asserted in other litigation currently pending between the parties.
Defendant also demurrers to each cause of action individually under Code Civ.
Proc. § 430.10(e), arguing the Complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual
allegations to constitute a cause of action against it. Plaintiffs oppose
Defendant’s demurrer.
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of
pleadings and court records in other actions pending between the parties.
Defendant’s request is unopposed and is GRANTED.
Demurrer Standard
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento
(1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must
be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the
pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v.
Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such,
the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied
factual allegations. (Id.) However, it does not accept as true
deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Stonehouse Homes
LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.)
The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege
ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter
of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set
forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient
particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of
his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26
Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)
Analysis
1. Meet
& Confer
The Court finds Defendants have
satisfied their obligation under Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(3) by submitting a
declaration showing “the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer
failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or
otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3)(B);
Wozniak Decl. at ¶3.)
2. Other
Litigation Between the Parties
Defendant argues the causes of
action raised by Plaintiffs’ Complaint are barred by Code Civ. Proc. §
430.10(c) as there are other actions between the parties which concern the same
causes of action. Defendant points to an unlawful detainer action it previously
brought against Plaintiffs, Case Number 19SMUD02217, and a separate Complaint
filed by Plaintiffs against Defendant, Case Number 20SMCV00691. The 19SMUD02217
action was not the first unlawful detainer action filed by Defendant. Defendant
previously filed an unlawful detainer action, Case Number 19SMUD00192, which
was subsequently dismissed.
Plaintiffs argue their claims in
this action are not barred by the 20SMCV00691 action. The Court agrees. The
20SMCV00691 action, filed May 13, 2020, concerns allegations of malicious
prosecution in connection with the first unlawful detainer action, 19SMUD00192.
The 20SMCV00691 action does not involve any questions of Plaintiffs’ right to
possess the subject property, rather it alleges Defendant brought the 19SMUD00192
without proper notice and caused Plaintiffs to incur unnecessary fees and
expenses in defending an action which was meritless by virtue of the
deficiencies in the underlying notice on which it was based. Plaintiffs’ right
to possess the subject property is not at issue in that action.
The second unlawful detainer
action, 19SMUD02217, was tried and the jury returned a verdict in Defendant’s
favor, finding Plaintiffs did not have a right to possess the property. In that
action, Plaintiffs argued they had the right to possess the subject property as
bona fide tenants under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”). In
the 19SMUD02217 action, Plaintiffs fully litigated this issue in pre- and
post-trial briefing, as well as in the trial itself, and Plaintiffs claims were
rejected by the Court and the jury. Plaintiffs have appealed this result in the
19SMUD02217 action, and this appeal is still pending. Plaintiffs moved for a
stay of the lockout in the 19SMUD02217 action pending the appeal, which was
denied. (Complaint at ¶36 [the “stay pending appeal under Code of Civil
Procedure § 1176 has been denied by both the trial court and appellate
department thereof”].)
Plaintiffs’ Complaint in this
action asserts a cause of action for quiet title based on Plaintiffs’ alleged
status as bona fide tenants under the PTFA. The Complaint claims the question
of possession was wrongfully decided in the 19SMUD02217 action, and expressly
states this action was filed “to address the right to possession.” (Complaint at
¶¶15-17.) Plaintiffs’ Complaint asks the Court to “determine their interests as
bona fide tenants entitled to remain in possession under the PTFA.” (Id.
at ¶25.) The Complaint also seeks declaratory relief as to Plaintiffs’ rights
under the PTFA and asks the Court to stop the lockout based on the judgment in
the 19SMUD02217 action. (Id. at ¶¶35-40.)
Defendant argues Plaintiffs’
Complaint improperly asks the Court to enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere
with the superior court’s determination of Plaintiffs’ right to possession in
the 19SMUD02217 action. “One department of the superior court cannot enjoin,
restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of
the superior court.” (Ford v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737,
742.) Plaintiffs argue this Court is not being asked to interfere with the
19SMUD02217 action because it has concluded. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’
appeal of the judgment entered in the 19SMUD02217 action is pending, and as
long as that appeal is pending, the judgment entered by the trial court is not
considered final. “California law is settled that pending appeal a trial
court judgment is not final.” (Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140
Cal.App.3d 932, 936.) Indeed, the only reason the instant action is not barred
by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is the pendency of
Plaintiffs’ appeal in the 19SMUD02217 action. (Id.)
The Court finds Plaintiffs’
Complaint in this action would require the Court to overturn or ignore the
verdict reached by the jury in the 19SMUD02217 action, as well as the Court’s
orders in that action denying Plaintiffs’ motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, for new trial, and for a stay of proceedings pending the
resolution of Plaintiff’s appeal. As the Court explained in Paul Blanco's Good
Car Co. Auto Group v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86:
As a general
rule, a trial judge cannot overturn the order of another trial judge.
[Citations] Weighty concerns compel this long-standing principle. (In re Alberto
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426–431 [125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526] (Alberto).) Fundamentally,
it “is founded on the inherent difference between a judge and a court and is designed
to ensure the orderly administration of justice.” (Id. at p. 427.) Because
a superior court is a single entity comprised of member judges, “‘one member of
that court cannot sit in review on the actions of another member of that same court.’”
(Id. at pp. 427–428.) “For one superior court judge, no matter how well intended,
even if correct as a matter of law, to nullify a duly made, erroneous ruling of
another superior court judge places the second judge in the role of a one-judge
appellate court,” and “‘it would be only a matter of days until we would have a
rule of man rather than a rule of law.’” (Id. at p. 427.) Furthermore, to
countenance such a practice would lead to judge-shopping—venturing from judge to
judge until a favorable ruling is obtained—which “‘would instantly breed lack of
confidence in the integrity of the courts.’” (Ibid.)
(Id. at 99-100.)
Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint
under Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(c). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating they can cure the defects in
the Complaint through further amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.) Plaintiffs’ oppositions to
Defendant’s demurrer does not make any showing as to how this issue could be
cured through further amendment. The central purpose of this action is to avoid
the lockout following the judgment in the 19SMUD02217 action and to relitigate
Plaintiffs’ rights to possession under the PTFA. The Court is not sustaining
the demurrer on the basis of some technical issue or deficient factual
allegations, rather it is sustaining the demurrer because it cannot grant the
relief sought by Plaintiffs without improperly invading the orders and
judgments of the 19SMUD02217 action. The Court finds no basis to conclude this
issue could be cured by further amendment, and thus the Court sustains
Defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend.
As the Court has sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend as to these causes of action, the Court need
not address Defendants’ remaining arguments on demurrer and declines to do so.
Conclusion
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ entire Complaint is
SUSTAINED without leave to amend.